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THE
MEETING OF EXTREMES'
IN
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

BY
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PREFACE

I TAKE as the leading example of what I desire to discuss in the present work the familiar opposition of Realism and Idealism. These terms, as understood throughout the various aspects of life, are traditional battle-cries and watchwords rather than names of precision; but even as designations of philosophical attitudes they have histories full of inspiration; and, varied as are the meanings which they have possessed and possess to-day, it would seem a churlish proposal that those whose hearts are set upon what they suggest should be called upon to employ them no more. Yet the very fulness of signification which they have acquired is inimical to definiteness of application, more especially when the application is an antithesis. Every philosophy, we must suppose, is bona fide impressed with the significance, which seems to it pre-eminent, of some certain general character or interest which it finds attractive and commanding within the universe. But it is not inevitable, nor is it the case, that the general name or watchword which indicates the principal passion distinctive of any persistent philosophical attitude is or has been sustained by the same facts

and arguments throughout, or, again, by facts and arguments in conflict with those which have sustained its traditional opposite.

It may be true at starting that the "Idealist" is taught to say, "On earth there is nothing great but man, in man there is nothing great but mind"; while the Realist's temper may be "to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things."¹ But it is certain that each of them, if he follows his primary clue freely, with an open mind, and his eye upon the object, may, or rather must, be led to investigations and appreciations which will carry him to seek completeness in regions within his opponent's spiritual home. It is, I believe we might in general say as an example, at least one party of the most realistically minded who care most intensely for transcendent theism or polytheism and for the persistent finite individual subject—for spirit and spiritualism, in short, as a bounded division of the universe, sharing it with matter; it is at least a faction of the idealistically minded who refuse to see in mind and nature either the factors of an ultimate antithesis, or provinces of data either of which is simply reducible to the other. Each of them, to the best of its power, finds room for the complementary elements; and the freer, more subtle, and more penetrating their

¹ Alexander, *Proc. Brit. Academy*, 1913-14, p. 279.

respective explorations, the more they show indications of supporting one another. The substitution of these fine and dissolvent analyses, of this sapping and mining under fortifications of an obsolete type, for a warfare of crude antagonism and bombardment at long ranges, is perhaps on the whole a new thing in the history of philosophy (though indeed it began with Plato), and is a feature of remarkable promise in the philosophy of to-day.

There may be others, therefore, besides the present writer, who are weary of the clamorous and spurious pretensions to highly significant antagonism on a basis of etymology misunderstood which attach in common usage to the titles in question; and who will be ready, under any such heading as that of "speculative philosophy," to recognise with Professor Alexander and the neo-idealists of Italy (the recognition is itself a case of what I have in mind) that every philosophy, and not "idealism" only, is attempting to do justice to the standpoint of "the whole,"¹ and to appreciate to the best of the experience it controls and the analysis it can command the respective places of externality and mind and value in the universe.

It is with a view to illustrating what I hope is a convergence of investigations towards some such

¹ Cf. Alexander, *Proc. Brit. Academy*, p. 297.

truly speculative attitude free, concrete, penetrating, and widely appreciative—which contemporary philosophy on all sides seems very strikingly to reveal, that I shall try to point out in their connection some fundamental features shared by the groups of thinkers most strongly opposed to one another to-day.

What first attracted my attention to this point of view was the really startling difference and agreement between the Italian neo-idealists who follow Croce and Gentile, and the English and American neo-realists, who are represented, say, by Professor Alexander and the Six. On the one side thought, self-creative and all-producing, the ultimate principle and even the ultimate type and form of reality; on the other, a self-existent universe, actual in space and time, in which mind—that is, distinct individual minds—holds a place on equal terms with other finite things. And yet in both alike, such is the spirit of the age, we have the actual and ultimate reality of Time, progress to infinity, as the fundamental character of the real, and with these inevitably (what I suspect to be a deep-lying motive in both) the specifically ethical and non-religious attitude, for which, to quote the old humanistic watchword and paradox, “the end is progress.”¹

¹ I believe this to be, or to have been, a motto put up in Newton Hall, the Comtist meeting-place in London. I admit that I cannot recall the source of my information.

Other features, analogously related, have appeared in philosophy on all sides. One such is plainly connected with a change in the fashion of argument since Kant attacked abstract ontology. By this change a new rank has been given to man's primitive and indestructible instincts and emotions in which his own incompleteness on various sides of his being, in religion, for example, in knowledge, in social living, becomes irrefragably clear to him.¹ This is not an abandonment of what is sound and cogent in those old arguments in which man used the technical language of thought to embody his overwhelming sense of his unity with and in a universe which excelled himself. It is not a lesser or a weaker logic: it is a fuller and a better logic. It is examining on all sides the unities and discrepancies of man's concrete experience, and discerning the conclusions towards which these index-characters inevitably point. You are no longer taking a single bearing with a single compass, but are covering a whole region with a systematic survey.

Again, in connection and continuity with the above recognition, you find not in one group alone, but in all quarters of the philosophical world, the insight that truth, value, and a common

¹ Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 305. I am aware that in intention this thinker's attitude is not neglectful of the special claims of religion.

possession of externality, affirm themselves as the solid meeting-point of minds in social intercourse, so that the identity and universality of mind, if you doubt it in one sense, returns upon you as a granite-hard fact in another; and the evidence for it in all its senses is continuous and analogous.

In short, when actual experience is explored by painstaking and appreciative analysis, when you look at things straight and simply and in the concrete, and disentangle their implications with care and sympathy (I have in mind as an example Professor Whitehead's "Concept of Nature"), then you find the connection of one member with another in the universe to have all sorts of characteristics of inevitable complementariness, which are not adequately represented by such expressions as "mind creates" or "mind discovers," "sensa exist, do not exist," "are dependent, are independent," "are mental, are material," "things are located in space, are not located in space." With more careful and less controversial modes of approach, you find you can get below these first obvious answers in the common-sense catechism, and pursue, as Hegel pointed out,¹ in the higher walks of thought modifications of a common basis, rather than tumble this way and that² between crude contradictories.

* ¹ McTaggart, "Studies in Hegelian Dialectic," chap. iv.

² Plato, *Rep.* 479D.

These remarks on the ontological mode of statement and reasoning, together with what I have further observed on the same topic in the body of my work,¹ may indicate, for those whom it interests, the general position which I should take up towards Dr. McTaggart's writings, and in particular to his important treatise on the Nature of Existence. It would be improper and, indeed, impossible to suggest here a summary criticism upon a book which has but recently appeared, and which, perhaps, with the best opportunities for studying it, I should not have been equal to criticising. All that I hope to gain by mentioning it in this place is to set before my readers the conception that the direct ontological method which he pursues is perhaps not to be held in principle to supersede all interest and value in the attempts at a critical survey of experience in which my work has mainly consisted. It seems to me almost fundamental to our respective standpoints that I hold no experience, however empirical *prima facie*, to be destitute of metaphysical implication, while Dr. McTaggart, though not, as I understand, excluding on principle empirical data, does appear to move in a region comparable to that which is thought of as the region of the *a priori*. I base no criticism on this appearance. I should wish to be considered capable of moving in this region

¹ *E.g.*, p. 202.

myself. I only desire that enquiries which, *prima facie*, go outside it may not as a matter of course be ruled out of order in philosophy. I may add that whatever might be my conclusion if it were possible for me thoroughly to examine Dr. McTaggart's special argument—a matter not of a few days—I can have no hesitation in saying that I completely sympathise with the doctrine which he proposes to sustain, "the idealism which rests on the assertion that nothing exists but spirit."¹

I think that I ought also to indicate, at least in a word or two, my attitude to Mr. Bradley's well-known criticisms of time, space, and relations. For it seems probable that the popular verdict may be that these features of the world have in recent mathematical theory been demonstrated as actual existences, and that any criticism directed upon them *ipso facto* falls to the ground. The line which I have taken in the latter part of the present work, in harmony with that which I believe Mr. Bradley to have consistently maintained,² shows how I should reply to any such suggestion. My view would be that the absolutist, to whom a perfectly thoroughgoing relativity has always been of the essence of the real,³ has played an effective

¹ "Nature of Existence," sect. 52.

² See "Essays," p. 411, n.

³ See p. 155, n.

part in forcing philosophy to the more concrete standpoint from which it treats such experiences to-day. In space-time, change, and relation, it now deals with the relational wholes, relational arrangements, unities comprising and sustaining relations,¹ apart from which absolutism has always maintained both relations and terms to be inconceivable. Unities contain relations, but unities are not relations, nor constituted by relations. "The universe contains change, but the universe itself cannot change."²

Such an estimate as that offered by Lord Haldane in his work on the Reign of Relativity appears to me therefore merely as an interpretation of the absolutist arguments, which would be fair if he had not, as I must think, omitted to consider throughout the aspect insisted on in the sentence I have just quoted, and emphasised throughout the whole of Mr. Bradley's works. I have offered in the body of my work a brief comment—no more—on Lord Haldane's valuable treatise.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

Оxford, 1921.

¹ "Essays," pp. 200, 303-306.

² *Loc. cit.*, note 2, p. xi.

4. The parry attempted by them; the error imputed not adopted. But we say, imputed because adopted; could not be imputed if its absurdity understood. Re-rejoinder in defence of the parry; conception of *acquired or secondary tautologous identity*. (i.) Primary impossibility of imputing tautological identity to Greeks and their followers. (a) Plato's theory of 1cality; (β) formulæ of non-contradiction in Plato and Aristotle, 106-110. (ii.) Acquired tautologous identity; novelty or synthesis exhausted in being known, or even knowable, so that block recurs in spite of it? But how know that truth continues true? Only by its being in one with life of universe. Will sun rise to-morrow? "Why not?" So $7 + 5 = 12$ not true as isolated proposition, but only on basis of coherence with whole, continuous with all experiences, new and old. So far with Gentile, only insist that universe beyond mere thinking is not transcendent of experience, but continuous with it. The whole, in its creative origination, does not move as a whole from what it is. This is open secret of $7 + 5 = 12$, 110-113. (iii.) To think that it does move as a whole proves misconception of law of identity, even in those who seem to explain it well (Watts Cunningham). Progressist runs away from paradox of reality and inference, which is ultimate. Teleology does not escape being an approximation-theory, 113-114.
5. Meaning of intellectualism. Not always, but usually, dyslogistic. Implies cognition to be taken as type of thought, and cognition by intellect to be in terms of false identity, as Bergson maintains. This imputation rests on the misconception of identity above dealt with; nature of the judgment slurred. If it is appreciated, term "intellectualist" is meaningless, except in formal sense "satisfies intellect" (Watts Cunningham), 114-116.

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Note that relativity does not perhaps establish ultimate progressiveness of universe. Compare analogy of

purely personal time-view compared with supposed absolute measurement of time—e.g., clock time. This latter is universal and serviceable in a sense, but foolish to take it as more real than the personal time-view, or as superseding it in every way. So in the world of relativity. The varying and "relative" time-systems can be correlated, as I gather, in a common world, by certain methods of transformation. But there is no ground for treating their diversity as unreal, or superseded by their reduction to terms of each other, 150-153. The total of connected time-systems are real individual times, and do not form a time—a time of the universe, 153-155. Note on relativity of motion in previous philosophy, and on implication of time with space in popular measures of length, 155-156.

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Lord Haldane's "Reign of Relativity" in some degree open to analogous observations, though its main principle solid; comment on. (1) Knowledge as a fact. (2) Watts Cunningham and the objective order; relation to Green. Error due to Royce? (3) Perfectibility and progress not the supersession of the illusion (Hegel), but the illusion itself, of which religion is the supersession, 194-200. These attitudes, the purely ethical and the religious, seem to be what most profoundly divide

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CHAPTER X

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Method of setting out in the concrete the attitudes which embody principles. Attempt to carry out in this way a comparison between the moods and ideas we have discussed. The assurance that universe as such is ultimately progressive in time—by what kind of observations it is suggested. Narrowness of the progress alleged. Specific "movements"; course of ideas; *not*, what thought requires. Where ultimate reality lies—in what thought requires; *not*=actual thinking. Progressistic attitude neglects universe; is individualistic—ethical attitude. Endless progress cannot be defended *qua* attainment on ground of approximation. Defectiveness of a progress which is a career of a special group on a special line—hastiness of postulates about civilisation, happiness, culture; contrast with large revelation of spiritual meaning, 202-209. Bradley on humanism, 208. Reasonable ideas of progress, retaining doctrine of reality of time; rejection of anthropocentric position; man learning from universe, not "mastering nature." Succession of events *ad infinitum* as character of finite existence, common ground to all doctrines; question is what it implies, 209-211. Now start from opposite view—viz., that change is not ultimate in the whole. Expectation would be the same as regards series of events as a fact, depending on nature of finite. But would lay less stress on outstripping past, as if the gain were to leave it behind. All determinate advance would be seen to involve loss, and all past to be full of indications of perfect whole uttering itself in finite. The whole as a whole

must be beyond the series of changes, though revealing itself in it, 211-213. These would be the opposing attitudes natural to the respective beliefs, but would not amount to philosophical proof of either, 213-214. But the moral and religious tempers which underlie such attitudes, do rest on principles of different value. Moral point of view self-contradictory and cannot be final, and in experience is not taken so. It belongs to the general mood which we saw that it accompanies; and shares its defect in taking the temporal series as ultimate reality, and so throwing man's perfectibility within this, 214-215. The religious point of view makes it possible to express the individual's effort in the only form open to it—viz., in finite attainment within the existent series, and yet *also* for the individual to unite himself with perfection by faith and will, in the infinite whole which *finite attainment partially expresses through subordinate change*. The universe so conceived does not itself move from itself in a course of time and change, 216-217.

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CHAPTER I

MIND AND ITS OBJECTS

I WILL not begin my discussion with that most striking antithesis and identity to which I referred in the Preface—namely, the main relation between the neo-realists, and, as I will venture to call them, the neo-idealists, consisting in their doctrines of time and progress as ultimate reality. For this remarkable agreement involves one entire philosophical position of to-day, and it will better be approached when we come to deal in conclusion with the total issues of life and value.

In the present chapter, then, we will consider some kindred points of view which, without uniting extreme antagonists in absolutely identical positions, nevertheless analyse away, in many degrees and directions, the apparently solid differences between them.

1. And in the first place, while it is true that the "modern" or "neo"-idealist insists upon thought — actual thinking — as the creator, condition, and only genuine type, of reality, it is to be borne in mind that there is another idealism, or at any rate a philosophical position, which might equally well claim the title of speculative philosophy, and which, rejected by the neo-idealist,

might well appeal for support to the neo-realist. Thought, it is aware, is not a matter of reproducing a transcendent world—a block universe—fixed in itself as an object without life or activity. It considers the operation of thinking, not as copying a given model, but as coherent construction. Nevertheless it is not to be persuaded that the great life and spectacle of the universe can be represented either as a product of discursive thinking, or as reaching its completeness and culmination in anything which can reasonably be described by that analogy—for example, in the philosophical consciousness. Such a speculative philosophy welcomes the neo-realist's assertion that the world of sense-perception has being in its own right, and that the splendours and values which we seem to contemplate directly are apprehended by us as they truly are. That philosophy does not volatilise, so to speak, our world of fact and externality, but accepting for it all that it claims of existence and reality, then passes on to interpret its conditions, and assign its significance more profoundly, I hold to be the eternal lesson of thinkers like Plato and Hegel; and in recent thought it was certainly the fundamental position of T. H. Green. To make more of experience, and not less, is their unceasing effort and uninterrupted aspiration. The body of reality is not a dead transcendent block, limited once and for all, because it is beyond the immediacy of our mental life. Our mental life is *prima facie* a feeble and isolated thing until it has learned in some degree to draw force and volume from the

real which is in nature and in the world—in all the great forms of experience. It is only as you build up experience in all its richness of detail that you can begin to approach the real whole or the completer mind which this kind of idealism aspires to apprehend. *You* do not make the world; *it* communicates your nature to you, though in receiving this you are an active organ of the world itself. Everyone who is inspired by love of nature and the yearning for a full experience must turn with relief, I think, from the neo-idealist to the neo-realist, or to the more robust idealist of an older date. He instinctively recoils from the tendency to reduce all forms of experience to any single one of its types or kinds.

I take as a notable illustration Dr. Moore's well-known "Refutation of Idealism" (*Mind*, 1903). This, as I read it, is to be welcomed from the standpoint of speculative philosophy in two respects at least: (i.) The implication, as I understand it, on the first half-page, that the Idealist is in the wrong if he maintains that particular things in space are in themselves altogether different from what they look like to us (except in the sense of the strictly continuous and additional determinations proffered by physical science). Here I take Dr. Moore to be with Plato and Hegel, and, to go to their minor successors, with T. H. Green and, say, Nettleship. It is hardly fair to attempt to answer for a living writer, but I should have thought Mr. Bradley would condemn any departure from this attitude

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as a misuse and misconception of the doctrine of "relativity" in its older sense. "If the reader believes that a steam-engine, after it is made, is nothing but a state of the mind of the person or persons who made it, or who are looking at it, we do not hold what we feel tempted to call such a silly doctrine, and would point out to those who do hold it that, at all events, the engine is a very different state of mind, after it is made, to what it is before." And in the footnote, "We may remark that the ordinary philosophical person, who talks about 'relativity' [in the older sense, of course], does not seem to know what he is saying. He will tell you that 'all' (or 'all we know and can know'—there is no practical difference between that and 'all') is relative to consciousness, not giving you to understand that he means thereby any consciousness beside his own, and ready, I should imagine, with his grin at the notion of a mind which is anything more than the mind of this or that man; and then, it may be, a few pages farther on or farther back, will talk to you of the state of the earth before man existed on it. But we wish to know what in the world it all means, and would suggest, as a method of clearing the matter, the two questions: (1) Is my consciousness something that goes and is beyond myself; and if so, in what sense? and (2) Had I a father? What do I mean by that, and how do I reconcile my assertion of it with my answer to question (1)?"¹ The tone of this passage is what strikes me as so suggestive. Obviously it never occurred to the

¹ "Ethical Studies," p. 61 and note.

writer that the chair would be more spiritual if it were not a chair. Certainly for myself, if an idealist were to tell me that a chair is really not what we commonly take it to be, but something altogether different (unless he meant "a dance of electrons" or the like), I should be tempted to reply in language below the dignity of controversy. The position in question—Hegel's and Green's—is, I should say, that a chair is a chair right enough; that is, that what an upholsterer or anyone in a drawing-room would tell you about it is quite a true description. But when you come to ask further questions, there is much more to be said, and these questions the upholsterer has never raised, and, as such, can never raise. Here the physicist's standpoint may fairly be used as an illustration. It is ridiculous to say that it contradicts what the chairmaker says, any more than an economist's view of a sovereign contradicts a metallurgist's. Take Professor Whitehead's "Concept of Nature" with its account of the situation of an object.¹ Does it mean that I am wrong in thinking that I am sitting on my chair? Of course, if Dr. Moore's implication is the opposite—viz., that in maintaining the spirituality of the universe, the idealist both does *and must* maintain that we are wholly wrong in our common notion of a chair, then I must think that he has misunderstood the facts necessary to idealism, and so far has failed to bring assistance to speculative philosophy.

¹ Pp. 146, 190.

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And (ii.) I believe he does well in insisting "on the distinctness and objectivity of sensa, whatever may be the precise conditions of their being. The point for philosophy seems to me to be that anyhow they are not nothing, and I agree with Professor Whitehead's observation that "it seems an extremely unfortunate arrangement that we should perceive a lot of things that are not there"¹ (secondary qualities). The idea that things are somehow volatilised or made "subjective" or non-existent, if to, say, one hundred accepted conditions of their being you add a couple more, making a hundred and two, is one which must obstruct all sane philosophy until the neo-realists have taught us to dismiss it as absurd. But indeed I understand Professor Whitehead to accept the percipient event as one of the hundred.

Otherwise I confess Dr. Moore's argument seems to me in the main merely formal and even verbal. From the presence of any common point in two different things he seems to argue that each of the things consists of at least two elements *no less distinct and unconnected than two qualities belonging to disparate series* ("green" and "sweet," p. 444). Surely there never was such a hiatus in a serious argument. However, that is not my present point, and the contribution to philosophy stands fast independently.

This is our first case then. The speculative philosopher recognises as a comrade in speculative

¹ "Concept of Nature," p. 27.

philosophy the neo-realist who demands a place and being and value, distinct whether isolable or no, for all that sense-perception has to give us. The question of production as against discovery, we shall see, is neither here nor there in the problem of existence and reality. The product is as inherently necessary to the producer as the producer to the product, and as the created to the creator. If it is a mind and eye that say "red" under certain conditions, that makes no difference to the reality of red, and only a partial difference to the generality of its existence; for the connection after all is general or natural, and not personal.¹

Of course, when we come to speak of the unity of the universe, we may find one detailed view more suggestive than another. But whatever are our views in detail, it is much to have learnt that every experience is to have its rights if we mean to be serious with speculative philosophy.

2. The idea of a general or universal character in mind or minds has usually marked a boundary between realism and idealism. The general will, for instance, seems nonsense to Professor Alexander, who still rejects a *general* mind *totidem verbis* from his realistic point of view,² though finding room for a *collective* mind, and attaching indeed fundamental importance to it. But when

¹ Stout, "Gifford Lectures," Syllabus II., p. 4. Cf. Whitehead's "percipient event."

² "Space, Time, and Deity," II., 241, 351-2.

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we look closer at neo-realist and analogous contentions, we find the opposition undermined.

To begin with, if *sensa* can exist apart from sense or thought, it is obvious that here at once we have a common element ready to hand for minds. The *sensa* are there, the same for you as for me—a postulate which is as necessary to the idealist as to the realist—and in as far as we apprehend them, these are common elements *before* our minds, if not *constituting* them. This postulate of a common world, indeed, is a postulate in which realistic common sense, as we shall see, seems led by the suggestions of necessity to anticipate the most ultimate demands of reason. Obviously, it is an idealistic position in advance of anything which mere mentalism can offer. In the familiar recent doctrines of a world which is common through the social need and contact, which latter is a criterion if not the criterion of truth and reality,¹ we have this universality of mind drawn out and insisted on to-day, especially by the realist and his ally the behaviourist and cross-sectionist.² We gasp when we come upon a realist argument that mind is nothing but the objects that enter into it. A good scientific law, we are accustomed to think, is convertible, and if we apply the rule in this case, where have we landed? But anyhow, the social criterion of reality is as familiar in Royce and Gentile as in Perry, Holt, and Alexander. I cite also an inter-

¹ Cf. Alexander, *op. cit.*, II. 303.

² Alexander on Holt, II. 109. Cf. *Proc. Brit. Academy*, 1913-14, p. 290.

esting statement of it from another point of view:¹
 "I have sometimes sat looking at a comrade, speculating on this mysterious isolation of self from self. Why are we so made that I gaze and see of thee only thy wall, and never thee? This wall of thee is but a movable part of the wall of my world; and I also am a wall to thee. We look out at one another from behind masks. How would it seem if my mind could but once be within thine, and we could meet and without barrier be with each other? And then it has fallen upon me with a shock—as when one thinking himself alone has felt a presence—that I *am* in thy soul. These things around me are in thy experience. They are thy own; when I touch them and move them I change *thee*. When I look on them, I see what thou seest, and I experience thy very experience. For *where art thou?* Not there, behind those eyes, within that head, in darkness, fraternising with chemical processes. Of these, in my own case, I know nothing and will know nothing; for my existence is spent not behind my wall, but in front of it. . . . And there art thou also. This world in which I live is the world of thy soul; and being within that, I am within thee. I can imagine no contact more real and thrilling than this; that we should meet and share identity, not through ineffable inner depths (alone), but here through the foregrounds of common experience, and that thou

¹ From Hocking's "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 265 (borrowed by me from Hoernlé's "Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics," p. 229).

shouldst be—not behind that mask—but *here*, pressing with all thy consciousness upon me, *containing* me, and these things of mine. This is reality, and having seen it thus, I can never again be frightened into monadism by reflections which have strayed from this guiding insight.”

On the other hand, again, take the neo-realist's full contention that *sensa* can exist without a percipient or thinking mind, and are not “mental,” but “material,” or physical. Here is a difficulty, as before an advantage, shared with mentalism. In the free appreciative handling of data which prevails to-day, it seems not to matter so much how you class things, or how they are produced, as what they are like in themselves, and how they can be got to behave. For the purposes of science you want a world of physical objects, and mentalism as such, it is true, with difficulty gives you one. But is realism which takes *sensa* as its reals in any better case? You have here to meet the arguments of the critical realist,¹ and the *sensa* seem to fail you as material for a physical world; and, indeed, their self-existence is a very partial and doubtful tenet of the neo-realist himself.² It seems necessary for any speculative philosophy to insist on the continuity of the *sensum* with the world of physical objects, which, I take it, the neo-realist means to imply while presenting no

¹ “Essays in Critical Realism,” and Professor Sellars’ “Critical Realism.” Stout, Syllabus II. 2-3.

² If, at least, Mr. Russell still counts as one. Note, also, Professor Perry’s conditional attitude, “The New Realism,” pp. 135, 150.

adequate rationale of it.¹ Here we seem to have the claims of the physical order better met by those who insist *ab initio* on the unity of the world for thought,² than by the advocates of self-existent *sensa*. The fact is, what we need for a full philosophy is to avoid the mania for reducing experience to a single typical form ; and here the term "speculative philosopher" seems so far to fit the neo-realist by reason of his primary free acceptance of everything that comes—if only he keeps it in its place,³ and does not compress the properties into a compactness which involves incompatibility.

3. There are three points at least which remarkably illustrate the contamination of nature by mind, and which are revealed by the realistic enquiries summed up under the general head of relativity. I believe that besides the higher instruction which this doctrine carries for those who, unlike myself, can follow its mathematical consequences, it has in general, and interpreted by a very simple and elementary analogy, a considerable importance for metaphysics. I shall return later to the analogy. At the present moment I wish to illustrate the effect which, though a purely empirical enquiry, it has produced in contaminating nature with mind.

The three points which, greatly daring, I borrow

¹ Cf. Stout, Syllabus II., p. 1. See below on "Critical Realism."

² Cf. Stout, *ibid.*

³ To talk of a "world" of sense data is at once a theory ; but it needs drawing out. Cf. Holt in "The New Realism," p. 372. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

from what little I can grasp of Professor Whitehead's "Concept of Nature," are—(i.) the moral of bifurcation ; (ii.) the need or convenience of assuming observers in "time-systems" ; (iii.) the situation of objects.

(i.) It is of course an obvious remark that "the physicist's actual procedure cuts across and ignores all classificatory boundary-lines dividing the supposedly physical from the supposedly mental."¹ Colours and sounds are taken not as "sensations" or "ideas," but as *phenomena*. So far as I understand, I gather that this is the attitude embodied in Professor Whitehead's criticism of the "bifurcation" of nature. And I take it that for the philosophy of science it is absolutely sound. In adopting it, the author tells us exactly what he is doing, and at what point the philosopher begins to get excited about something else beyond the limits which the author has just laid down. For the author does not mean to say anything "as to the psychological relation of subjects to objects, or as to the status of either in the realm of reality."²

So far, so good. But I think we can be doing no wrong if, at our own risk and for our own purpose, we try to say a word or two more.

We have been told what the author's discussion contemplates. There are certain normal objects which are included, and are to be considered, within the pale of nature—that is to say, within the pale of what is accessible to sense-perception. Now we seem, in restricting with the author our

¹ Hoernlé, p. 106.

² "Concept of Nature," p. 47.

discussion to this province, to be considering what we might call a statutory nature, like the statutory income on which we have learnt to pay our income-tax ; not on all that comes to us, as it comes, but on an amount determined according to rule by what it is convenient for general purposes to take account of. To draw the line in this way is artificial. The contamination of nature by mind would not in a complete consideration arrest itself at the boundary where our statutory attention would be arrested. We should meet with disturbing factors in mind¹ and further-reaching considerations in the system of reality, and should be carried into a metaphysical valuation.

The moral of bifurcation, or of the rejection of bifurcation, would then, for our purpose, be this : we have delineated as nature a solid province of coherent fact in which *sensa* and physical conditions are equally good phenomena. We are right—we are compelled by logic—in working under this scheme, not to go back upon it. We cannot have it two ways. All the same, it tells us for certain that we cannot find a nature which is not mixed with mind. The *sensa* may exist *per se*, but we cannot get them so. They are in every case abstractions out of the fuller wholes—even if mere cross-sections of the world of objects—which we call minds, and they are open to influences which our statutory nature cannot include.

It makes little ultimate difference whether we treat mind as creative, with the “modern” idealist, or as actively receptive, with the normal

② *E.g.*, in apperception.

logician, or as purely selective, with such a realist as Professor Alexander. Whatever line you take, you are driven to explain the appearances of things by some sort of relativity to mind. And our humble moral is merely this, that this elementary platitude of normal philosophy, this position which gives rise to the extremist creationism of the newest and most audacious "idealism," is enforced upon us in the case we are considering by the most intimate, analytic, and appreciative study of the plain natural facts from the bare point of view which considers how in their fulness and concreteness they are given in actual experience. So fully is this the case that the "idealist" might at once deny *ab initio* Dr. Moore's first half-page, and might say that he himself alone is taking the world as he finds it, and as it seems.

(ii.) I do not profess to know whether it is more than an illustration when the relation of time systems to one another is elucidated by the postulation of an observer at rest in the space system belonging to each. I quote the passage I have in mind, deserving to be known, and no doubt, in fact, widely familiar, for the simplicity with which it explains a fundamental idea :

"If there is no absolute position, a point must cease to be a simple entity. What is a point to one man in a balloon with his eyes fixed on an instrument, is a track of points to an observer on the earth who is watching the balloon through a telescope ; and is another track of points to an observer in the sun who is watching the balloon

through some instrument suited to such a being. . . . I have at least explained exactly what I do mean by a point, what relations it involves, and what entities are the relata."¹

It seems clear to me that in this explanation the three observers are exceedingly convenient ; but I do not know whether we are to take them as necessary. I should have imagined—again wholly *meo periculo*—that the features of relativity, which can be generally described, as they are described in the passage before us, on the basis of certain hypothetical systems, would equally exist in actual systems in the absence of these resident observers, so to speak, and that therefore the relations of points and point-tracks in different systems to one another could in principle and in theory be known and expressed by any single observing and calculating mind apart from their appreciation by observing minds in the systems, each to each. The vision would be one of bewildering complexity, but I cannot understand that it would be theoretically inconceivable. Whether there could be a universe at all without a mind is not the question here. It is whether there could be relativity without a mind in every system. If so, it cannot be argued that the demonstration of relativity has at this point carried farther on a realistic basis the contamination of nature by mind. But it is clear that something of the kind is strongly suggested and is highly appropriate in elucidation of the principle. It is very difficult, I imagine, to obtain the essential quasi-

¹ "Concept of Nature," p. 135.

absolute rest-points except by the contrivance of locating an observer in each. But, in principle, I should have thought it is enough to conceive one. Therefore the moral of relativity is not, if I am right, the permeation of the universe by mind¹ or minds, but only a strong suggestion in that direction.

(iii.) As leading up to a further suggestion, I cite a most significant passage:

"The explanation of nature which I urge as an alternative to this (of nature as 'a mere aggregate of independent entities, each capable of isolation') is that nothing in nature could be what it is except as an ingredient in nature as it is. The whole which is present for discrimination is posited in sense-awareness as necessary for the discriminated parts. An isolated event is not an event, because every event is a factor in a larger whole and is significant of that whole. There can be no time apart from space; and no space apart from time; and no space and no time apart from the passage of the events of nature. The isolation of an entity in thought, when we think of it as a bare 'it,' has no counterpart in any corresponding isolation in nature." Here, in the most concrete of realisms (whether or no the author calls himself a realist), we find implied the central principle that "the truth is the whole" which reunites in some degree all thinkers who in any way claim to be philosophers. We have to remember, also, what will be insisted upon more fully below, how, for Professor Alexander at least, the recognition

¹ Contrast Carr, "Relativity," chap. viii.

of time as inherent in space and in nature is in itself an avowal of something necessary to being which bears an analogy to mind. Here the realist has hold of a clue which carries him into sympathy with Bergson and the modern idealist. Whether they make the completest use of this feature in which their philosophies participate is a question we shall have to face in our conclusion.

In the meantime, I develop the recognition of "the whole" with reference to the attitude common to Professor Whitehead, and, say, Professor Holt, with regard to the situation of objects.

Anyone who had ever considered appreciatively Plato's treatment of conflicting perceptive judgments of magnitude and of the reconciliation of contradictions must have been led to the view that a "thing" in its completeness must include all its conditional appearances. Among other results, this leads to a difficulty in pronouncing where in space the thing is situated.

"It is seldom possible to say just where the object itself terminates and its relations to other entities commence."¹ So Professor Whitehead²: "Science and philosophy have been apt to entangle themselves in a simple-minded theory that an object is at one place at any definite time, and is in no sense anywhere else."³ "This admission," he continues (*viz.*, the admission "that each object is in some sense ingredient throughout

¹ Holt in "New Realism," p. 371.

² "Concept of Nature," p. 145.

³ Carlyle's famous words, however, cannot yet be forgotten: "Nothing can act except where it is; with all my heart, only, where is it?"

nature"), "is obviously a necessary axiom for those philosophers who insist that reality is a system. I am maintaining the humbler thesis that nature is a system." We enjoy here the result of a direct and impartial study of experience, which carries us forward towards the unity of the universe. A fuller statement follows :

"In truth, the object in its completeness may be conceived as a specific set of correlated modifications of the characters of all events, with the property that these modifications attain to a certain focal property for those events which belong to the stream of its situations. The total assemblage of the modifications of the characters of events due to the existence of an object in a stream of situations is what I call the 'physical field' due to the object. But the object cannot really be separated from its field. The object is, in fact, nothing else than the systematically adjusted set of modifications of the field. The conventional limitation of the object to the focal stream of events in which it is said to be 'situated' is convenient for some purposes, but it obscures the ultimate fact of nature."¹

To my mind, there is a philosophical moral in all this, just as there was in the features noted before. When a really instructed and appreciative gaze is turned even on a limited province of the world, it reveals in the experience submitted to it the character which is found there by philosophers of genius like William James and Mr. Bradley. Isolations and abstractions are provisional ; "there

¹ "Concept of Nature," p. 190.

are no lines in nature," as a great artist said. What you have is an immediate and continuous unity, in which your reflection can find order, but cannot find separation. A "thing" has to be grasped like a theory ; you cannot handle it like a brickbat ;¹ you cannot make it up as a whole by putting its appearances together, for every appearance involves a correlative condition, and most of the conditions are incompatible with each other. All this a thorough realism gives us to-day. We wish we could live to see in what central results these convergent influences will in the future combine.

4. Perhaps there is no question on which the various aspects of speculative philosophy are more remarkably distributed among the philosophical groups of to-day than the question of the being and structure of the mind. Psychology without a soul, it has been said, has long been familiar ; but now we seem to be confronted by psychology without a consciousness.² As we all know, the question has been propounded, "Does consciousness exist ?" Now in this line of enquiry, as we have partly seen already, neo-realism and radical empiricism are singularly bold. And yet in their boldness they are pursuing a course largely akin to Aristotle's conceptions,³ and also to the main track of post-Kantian idealism, and, as I understand it, to the self-creative thinking of

¹ Holt, *loc. cit.*

² Hoernlé, p. 237.

³ Hoernlé, *loc. cit.* Aristotle, Professor Hoernlé points out, has a behaviourist side. But we noted above that if you convert the cross-sectionist proposition you get a startling opposite extreme.

the recent Italian group. In the beginning, if not in the end, there is a close analogy between immediate experience as construed by Mr. Bradley and by William James ; and for both of them, as for the main post-Kantian philosophy, the mind is just what it experiences and what it does. Behaviourism and the searchlight and cross-sectionist doctrines are welcome accentuations and illustrations of such ideas as these, and emanate from the extreme neo-realist group ; to whose free and audacious handling of direct inspection—I do not say introspection—speculative philosophy appears to me greatly indebted.

And what is the "subject" of which we read so much in Gentile—the subject which can never be an object, according to that philosopher's doctrine, which has been impeached as denying to the mind all knowledge of its own contents, and therefore involving a complete Agnosticism ?¹

So far as I can see, it is nothing more and nothing other than thought as occupied in thinking. It is that activity in which mind, so far as at any moment it can reach and penetrate, makes itself one with the whole life of reality, and affirms, in form and intention, that all existence enters into and sustains its decree. The *de facto* imperfection of the activity makes no difference. The point is that the thinking function unites itself with whatever range of experience at the moment serves for it to represent the whole, in the presence of which thought always lives, and

¹ Bonucci, *Rivista Trimestrale*, I. 2. 156.

the characterisation of which it always presumes itself to achieve.

There are three parallel doctrines which may be mentioned as illustrating this conception in different quarters of the philosophical world.

(i.) The one most simply and closely akin to it, as I imagine, is that which insists that you cannot criticise the judgment you are in the act of passing.¹ You can make it in turn an object, and pass upon it a further judgment; but while you judge it (cognate accusative), and in judging it, your activity is completely absorbed; it is one and indivisible, and you must take yourself, as in that activity, to be infallible and beyond review. The judgment of which you make an object is no longer a judgment whole and entire; it has acquired some prefix, such as "that," and has become a subordinate or dependent factor as distinguished from a complete or categorical thought. This is the view of the wider speculative philosophy, and I do not believe that either more than this or less can be meant by Gentile's "subject," which is one with the activity of the transcendental ego—the operator in constructive and universal thinking as such—which is something which can never, by any possibility, itself be contemplated as an object.

If I am right, here again, in the camp where mind is absolutely everything, where there is no reality but thinking makes it so, just for this reason we find no structure assigned to the particular individual or substantive mind, and it

¹ Bradley, "Essays," p. 381.

seems to take its place just as an activity of the real, which is while and what it does, but reposes, so to speak, nowhere and on nothing. Naturally enough, for Gentile at least, it is credited with no continuity after death in respect of the empirical individual; and here, we shall see directly, the speculative philosopher of extreme idealism concurs with the most prominent thinker who stands on the ground of realism.

(ii.) I need not spend many words in referring to a doctrine of the judgment which has been specially affirmed by the present writer. It is here only in point as illustrating and confirming the ultimately categorical nature, excluding all reserve and all self-criticism, with which the judging consciousness sustains its world.

The waking mind, he has maintained, considered in its logical activity—that is, as thought—is a total and continuous judgment, which sustains by affirmation the world of reality. You cannot open your eyes or attend to any sense-perception or any fact of experience without insisting on some “judgment” which is really a fragment of the one all-inclusive judgment. Its connection with all factors of the comprehensive judgment, although in various degrees implicit, is on examination inevitable and unmistakable. You in London can draw no line in respect of necessity between the thought of Edinburgh and the thought of the Antipodes, any more than you can draw a line between your affirmation of the floor which you see before you and the floor a foot behind your chair. The floor may have a trap-door behind

you. No matter. No one could say that all your judged inferences are right; only that, for you, they are inevitable. There are all sorts of subordinate qualifications, reservations, and conditions recognised by tacit or intentional abstraction within the total affirmation. But all that is an object of thought is ultimately a constituent of it, and there are no imaginary entities or floating ideas ultimately isolable from the tissue of the inclusive judgment.

Here, then, in experience, as, by its *nisus* which is thought, it recognises the unity of the world, we once more have the self-assertion of the true subject, experience within a certain focus transcending itself in identification with the whole. We need no original pure subject, nor any acts distinctive of a being or substance to be considered as the mind. The subject is the focus which transcends its own immediacy by its inherent identification with the whole, inherent because this is what thought means and consists in.

(iii.) For the side of speculative philosophy which demands a substantial individual mind, we have to seek a certain type of realist. But my point at the present moment is a minor one; not to accent his assertion of the substantive mind-structure, but to note that even where that is asserted we find a peculiar and I think a felicitously expressed doctrine, which in effect has much in common with the neo-idealist conception of the subject which we have just been considering. I am speaking of Professor Alexander's distinction between enjoyment and contemplation.

The idea is familiar to-day, and I need hardly describe it *de novo*. For my present purpose the point of it is this : Although the mind is a substance, or at least an individual being of definite constitution, it cannot be made an object to itself in an act of cognition. The reservation harmonises with the very definiteness—some would call it crudity—with which the mind as one thing apart is contrasted with its objects as in external relation with them. The mind, then, in acting—say, in apprehending—is aware of itself, but is not before itself as an object. This awareness, the sense of living in a volition or apprehension, of being engaged in an experience, is what the realist before us calls “enjoyment.” We experience our living and endeavouring, but only in a peculiar way, and introspection, as I understand, is only possible as a somewhat more attentive species of enjoyment.

Here, as I understand the matter, Professor Alexander is so far at one with theorists as much opposed to him as Mr. Bradley and Professor Taylor.¹ It is common ground that you cannot get out the contents of the mind and lay it before itself to be looked at. And further, if you are in a sense alive to what goes on in the awarenesses and creations of the mind as a focus of experience, it is an indirect awareness through indications furnished by harmony or discord evident in the immediate experience or feeling, which feeling is always the mind’s foundation and the accompaniment of all its endeavours. Satisfaction, harmony,

¹ Bradley, “Essays,” chap. vi. and Appendix.

and the reverse become known through the general self-feeling which accompanies the consideration of certain objects, or of certain trains of ideas. The subject, while it is subject, cannot be before us as an object. But it betrays the success or failure, the smoothness or the jarring of its operations, through the feeling which is its index.

If, on the other hand, we desire an existent or substantial mind, with acts distinguishable from its objects, and a pure subject to which the acts are referable, we must go to-day, in the main, not to the philosopher for whom mind is the chief thing in reality, nor yet to the extreme new realist, who tends to equate mind with its responses or its objects, but to Professor Alexander perhaps, or to Professor Laird,¹ whose free enquiry into the mental experience has results just opposite to those referred to a moment ago.

Thus on all sides there is a convergence on the conception of mind as consisting of what it does and experiences. And even where it is comprehended in the belief of the realist (one kind of realist) among isolable individual things, even so, it is not like other objects, an object to be laid before mind itself and contemplated by it, but only conveys the awareness of its activities through a peculiar type of self-feeling. And it may be noted, as I observed just now, that having attached the mind as a quality to a concrete individual thing, the realist who believes that this thing is finite in space and time is as ready to abandon the

¹ Cf. Laird's "Problems of the Self." Professor Laird counts himself a realist. Cf. Stout, *Syllabus*, II. vii.

survival of particular minds after bodily death¹ as is the philosopher of the opposite type for whom the particular mind is rather an utterance of the Absolute—however inevitable and profound—than intrinsically a self-existent unit of a plurality.²

To summarise the results of this chapter :

1. Neo-realism is actively assisting to restore and maintain the true balance of traditional idealism between creation and discovery as activities of mind, impeached by neo-idealism.

2. Neo-realism is both by its primary postulates and by social sympathy and investigation led to sustain the conception of a world common to individual finite minds, the thesis of idealism and antithesis of pluralism.

3. Concrete and realistic examination of nature exhibits it as at least most readily expounded on the analogy of mind (observers in the distinct systems), as only barred by convention from expanding into a reality relative to mind, and as a system of unlocalisable objects involving a system of reality which must include it.

4. In the theory of mind neo-realism both denies (with extreme idealism, and also in further ways) and also supports (with the idealism of the past) the ascription of the unity of mind to a pure subject inherent in it. It agrees with extreme idealism that there is no subject which can be made an object. Both it and idealism sit loose to "immortality," the former because there *is* a

¹ Alexander, "Time," etc., II., 423.

² Gentile, "Spirito," p. 127. Cf. Bradley, "Appearance," p. 501; "Essays," pp. 451, 467.

subject, which would involve specific conditions of continuance, the latter because there is none.

I confess that I am irresistibly reminded by these considerations of a judgment which I ventured to propound in my first philosophical work,¹ in commenting on the idea that the day of the great post-Kantians was done. "The plan of the great masters is being handed over to be carried out piecemeal by the journeymen."

That seems to me to be on the whole what has been happening, though some of those engaged in the work have been more than journeymen. On the other side, no doubt, we must give weight to T. H. Green's saying, "It has all to be done over again." All this sapping and mining of to-day will doubtless lead up to a reconstruction of speculative philosophy in the concrete, and with respect for the various sides which it presents.

¹ "Knowledge and Reality," Preface.

CHAPTER II

THE UNIVERSE AND THE REAL WORLD

1. WHEN we speak of the Real World, we are inclined to suppose, before we have reflected on the matter, that our expression must include all that is in the universe. Everything that is, we should naturally argue, must exist, and everything that exists must be real. But we soon observe that usage does not bear us out in this conception, and that the epithet "real" inevitably has the effect of suggesting a contrast with something unreal, which, however we interpret it, must fall, we should suppose, within the universe which includes everything. Thus the real world, *prima facie*, contains less than the universe.

To face this paradox frankly and boldly is a considerable achievement of modern philosophy, and its consequences are of great importance. And in the statement at least of this problem we feel, as in other fields, that the neo-realist has done excellent service, and that the spirit of the age has brought into substantial agreement, in the recognition of the problem, if not altogether in its solution, extremists from very different regions of thought.

Let us start from the outspoken neo-realist :

"The picture which I wish to leave is of a general universe of being in which all things

physical, mental, and logical, propositions and terms, existent and non-existent, false and true, good and evil, real and unreal, *subsist*." "One entity or complex of entities can belong to two or more classes or groups at the same time, as one point can be at the intersection of two or more lines: so that an entity can be an integral part of a physical object, of a mathematical manifold, the field of reality, and one or any number of consciousnesses, at the same time."¹ All these distinctions then, *prima facie*, fall within the universe, and the problem presses upon us whether by some critical procedure we are to diminish their number and variety, or whether, even if we are able to bring them into some sort of order and correlation, we are to infer that the universe is not so single and simple an affair as we thought when we first reflected, for example, upon "real" and "unreal." For the "realists," new or old, this approach to the enquiry seems decidedly eccentric. But their value largely consists in their eccentricity; in their habit of picking up all the oddest things they can lay hands on which look like facts, however common sense may appraise their reality, and throwing them at sober people's heads. This is not one's preconceived notion of a realist, but I think it is the neo-realist's view of himself.

Anyone who will compare Mr. Holt's attitude here with Mr. Bradley's teaching in chapters iv. and xvi. of his "Essays on Truth and Reality," will find what, to me, is a very remarkable resemblance. The realist has picked up important

¹ Holt, "New Realism," pp. 372-3. Cf. Hoernlé, 86 ff.

things. The essential point is made when we have noted with Mr. Bradley that the universe must be taken to include both the real and the imaginary.¹ It, the universe, is certainly qualified by the work of imagination ; cancel the imaginary, and how much of it is gone ! It is then certainly changed ; and, we are tempted to say, is changed much for the worse. The "real" world falls within it, as a special construction or convention, attached to my present and waking body ; and the very nature of this basis of attachment shows to demonstration how arbitrary, though unavoidable, is our selection, out of all the worlds we experience, of that which we shall set up and observe as real *par excellence*, and the standard for all the rest.

Mr. Russell, again, in his primary position, seems to accept this point of departure. "Dreams and waking life, in our first efforts at construction, must be treated with equal respect ; it is only by some reality not *merely* sensible that dreams can be condemned."² And a further passage is still more explicit : "The analogy [on which we infer other people's minds from their bodies] in waking life is only to be preferred to that in dreams on the ground of its greater extent and consistency. If a man were to dream every night about a set of people whom he never met by day, who had consistent characters and grew older with the lapse of years, he might, like the man in Calderon's play,

¹ Bradley, "Essays," p. 45.

² "Our Knowledge of the External World," p. 86. Hoernlé, p. 79.

find it difficult to decide which was the dream world and which was the so-called 'real' world. It is only the failure of our dreams to form a consistent whole, either with each other or with waking life, that makes us condemn them. Certain uniformities are observed in waking life, while dreams seem quite erratic. The natural hypothesis would be that demons and the spirits of the dead visit us while we sleep; but the modern mind, as a rule, refuses to entertain this view, though it is hard to see what could be said against it. On the other hand, the mystic, in moments of illumination, seems to awaken from a sleep which has filled all his mundane life: the whole world of sense becomes phantasmal, and he sees, with the clarity and convincingness that belongs to our morning realisation after dreams, a world utterly different from that of our daily cares and troubles. Who shall condemn him? Who shall justify him? Or who shall justify the seeming solidity of the common objects among which we suppose ourselves to live?"¹

Compare, again, Mr. Bradley: "My 'real world,' we saw, is a construction from my felt self. It is an inconsistent construction, and it also in the last resort depends on my present feeling. You may protest that its basis is really my normal waking self, but in the end you have no way of distinguishing such a self from the self which is abnormal."² And with reference to dreams, in *prima facie* agreement with the passages from Mr. Russell:

¹ "External World," p. 95.

² Bradley, "Essays," p. 46.

‘Suppose that there are other minds, which, in their waking lives, start from a basis other than that of my waking self, is it impossible that their worlds should be better and more real than mine? And if you reply that the whole supposition is untenable, such an assertion, we have seen, has no rational ground. Again (to leave other minds), suppose that in hypnotism, madness, or dream, my world becomes wider and more harmonious than the scheme which is set up from my normal self—then does not, I ask, what I dream become at once a world better and more real? And if you know that this does not and cannot happen, then explain how you know it.”¹

We may compare with these a curious passage of Giovanni Gentile, who in insisting on his thesis of the self-affirmation and self-creation of the subject (ego), rejects the “vulgar notion” that when we awake we grasp at material sensa to restore us to a certainty of our own reality. The truth, he urges, is the reverse. We are not making external nature the touchstone of reality. The touchstone is in ourselves. We are not perfectly sure of the external reality, and before we can accept it have to fit it in with the whole web of experience which belongs to the subject, in which we can find a place for it, and not for the dream, except as the latter is a fact in our history.² This point of view is in practical agreement with the others we have referred to, so far as it indicates that the “real world” is open to criticism.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 464, and the whole of chapter xvi.

² “*Spirito*,” p. 90.

But the absolutism of self-creation ascribed to the ego, because we are supposed to be dealing with the transcendental self when we really are dealing with the empirical self, practically revokes the recognition that the self on which that world is constructed—in fact, the empirical self, though estimated as the transcendental self—offers an unstable basis. Thus he tends to cut down the universe to the “real world”; and this narrowing effect attends throughout upon his one-sided preference for discursive thought as the true form of the real. He does not recognise that such thought is a shifting basis of construction.¹

The impartial approach to all forms of experience as *prima facie* within the universe was suggested to the neo-realists by Meinong’s “Gegenstandstheorie,” or at least arose in harmony with it;² and we shall have now to take further account of this conception, in attempting to bring together the points of view which have been applied in the attempt to introduce some order into any such chaotic aggregate of experience as Mr. Holt’s survey, for example, brought before us.

2. In order that speculative philosophy may draw the fullest gain from the audacious approach we have described, it seems necessary that it should, if possible, assign validity to the heterogeneous distinctions in question, while ordering and connecting them in such a way as to transmute them from an unaccountable congeries into a system with a connected structure.

¹ Green, *Proleg. to “Ethics,”* Sect. 47. Review of J. Caird, “*Works*,” III. 138.

² Hoernlé, pp. 86 ff.

The governing antithesis is that between the real and the unreal. All the others enumerated above, especially true and false, good and bad, though it would take a complete philosophy to investigate them in detail, yet must follow the lines on which we determine the meaning of real and unreal. "The problem is," as Professor Hoernlé says, "to find an interpretation of propositions apparently mentioning and referring to unreal objects, which shall save for them, as wholes, the intelligible meaning they clearly have, without saddling us with the task of finding a place in the world for things which have no place there."¹ We will note the main suggestions in this direction which arise in different quarters of the philosophical world, and endeavour to estimate their agreement, and to appreciate in some degree the consequences to which they point.

Before leaving Mr. Holt's pronouncement from which we started (p. 28 above), we must add to it Professor Hoernlé's warning: "There will simply *be* things which are 'real' and other things which are 'unreal,'" and if we are realists we shall add that neither sort owes its being in any way to being perceived, conceived, or in some other manner apprehended by a mind." And the root-principle is, he tells us, that whatever any mind is in any way conscious of, must at any rate *be*.² This is, indeed, what we should expect; but we shall find that the realists' boldness and originality does good service in varying their points of view, and that Professor Alexander's attitude, for instance, cannot

¹ Hoernlé, p. 87.

² *Ibid.*

be precisely comprised within the terms of Professor Hoernlé's warning.

First, we may observe that the formulation of the root-principle just mentioned, though a well-intentioned recognition of a truth—that all thought is about some reality—is not sufficiently concrete to help us to advance. The heterogeneous terms, then, all *are*, but we get from this no kind of suggestion as to how they may be connected with one another. When we pass from Mr. Holt to Professor Alexander,¹ we abandon this idea of neutral being in favour of determinate concrete worlds.

We may start our enquiry from Green's sane and concise treatment of the supposed antithesis between the real and the unreal.² "What is the real?" is for him a futile question, which could only be answered by saying the real is everything. When we judge anything to be unreal, we are not opposing a general class of unreal beings to real beings, but are comparing one particular reality with another, from which it ought to be, but in a certain judgment has not been, distinguished, in which case we speak of it as a mere appearance of the other. The conception of the unreal as an abstract universal opposed to the real is a verbal generalisation of the relations between such couples of judgments, all of which affirm particular distinct realities. This may be not really that, but it is always really something. Thought always qualifies a real, though not always rightly.

¹ "Space," etc., I. 200.

² Proleg to "Ethics," Sects. 23, 24.

This is the simple and general outline of the doctrine which eminent thinkers in all camps appear to accept as the basis of their treatment of error and appearance to-day, taken so widely as to include imagination and illusion.¹ These distinct degrees or values of partial reality all arise within the universe, and qualify it, owing to two simple and inevitable characteristics of thought: the first, that all affirmation, though it is about a real, is conditioned by the special basis or limitation or reservation under which it is necessarily made; and the second, that in the current practice of thought and perception its dependence on these bases and limitations habitually passes out of sight. Consequently, truth is continually being claimed as absolute or complete for assertions and appearances which are only true under very special conditions. We have already seen the most striking case of this in Mr. Bradley's account of dream worlds and other specially conditioned imaginations, which belong to the universe, while they deviate from what we accept on a normal and commonsense basis as "the real world." And we may confirm our attitude not only by Professor Stout's account of error and imagination,² but by the extraordinarily complete and ingenious analysis which Professor Alexander has furnished of all degrees of appearance from imagination down to illusion.³ Whether this account remains within the description which I cited from Professor Hocnrlé

¹ Alexander, *re* unreality, "Space, etc.," II. 224.

² *Arist. Proc.*, 1910-11.

³ "Space, etc.," II. 219 ff.

of the realist's "unreal" as owing no jot or tittle of its being to any mode of being apprehended by the mind, approaches, as it seems to me, very nearly to a verbal problem. As a realist, Professor Alexander substitutes everywhere the idea of selection and combination for that of mental creation and production ; and in this way and for this reason we gain from the realist quarter the most complete and decisive testimony that appearances are in every case particular realities within the universe, selected, repieced, recombined according to laws of their own, which constitute them into worlds by which the universe receives illumination and extension.¹

When, indeed, we come to values, this author does affirm the co-operation of the mind—as, for example, in the reading of a sense-datum, which makes it beautiful. But quite apart from this, what we want and insist on in the present context is the recognition that imagination, which is but thought acting freely, in pursuing its peculiar quest and interest, whether in mathematics or in romance, is developing a world which qualifies the universe, and is controlled by inherent laws belonging to those of the universe itself.

To this conception of the essential truth and value of subordinate worlds, arising through special conditions, interests, and experiences, which guide and inspire and remould our courses of thinking towards original but valid construc-

¹ I do not mean that a poet, say, can add to the universe ; but I do mean that the greatness of what it is, is largely due to him.

tions, we find the sharpest opposition in Mr. Russell's second position,¹ as I may call it, which seems to have obtained the assent of Professor Hoernlé in his valuable discussion, from which I have already borrowed so much.

Here Mr. Russell sets himself, as I understand, to reduce to order the heterogeneous aggregate of beings recognised by Meinong and Mr. Holt, restricting reality to "the real world," and denying that "unreal objects" even *are*.

His explanation, directed to the problem of which Professor Hoernlé's statement was cited above, turns on the misuse of symbols—that is to say, on the falsity of the assumption that because it is the function of symbols to have meaning, therefore we may take every group of symbols which can be understood in a proposition as having reference to some object which has being. What he substitutes for this assumption, as I understand, is the conception that in speaking, for example, of imaginary objects, say, of fairies, as unreal, we are making use of a general description, and denying that objects which correspond to that description are to be found "in the real world," which I gather that he takes as the world of actual sense-data² (or sense-percepts?).

Thus it would seem that he now adopts as a standard the real world, and attempts, if I follow rightly, to cut down the universe to this. The position seems a little ambiguous when compared

¹ Contrasting it with that described, p. 30 above. See for this Hoernlé, p. 87 and ref.

² Hoernlé, p. 89.

with that of Mr. Holt. Mr. Russell, one might say, accepts unreal objects as a subdivision of the universe in the sense that objects are intelligibly spoken of which are not real. On the other hand, he will not allow these objects so much as being, but rather treats them as nullities, mere creations of misunderstanding, to be explained away. Thus we are brought back to the real world as the sole and exclusive reality—"there is only one world, the real world,"¹ and in it, for example, you will never meet with a sense-perception corresponding to the description of a fairy.

Thus the whole notion of a number of worlds, such as worlds of dreams or worlds of imagination or other worlds according to the basis offered by the present self from which in each given case our construction starts, is radically swept away, and Mr. Russell's apparent agreement² with Mr. Bradley, Mr. Holt, and Professor Alexander is abandoned.

I cannot but think that there is a misconception here, and I am unable at this particular point to follow Professor Hoernlé, who endorses his position. I gather that the latter agrees with Mr. Russell that the idea of "universes of discourse"—a real world, a world of fairy tale, a world of literary fiction, etc.—is an evasion of the problem. These "worlds" arise in the real thoughts of real human beings by that misuse of symbols which has been explained. "There is only one world, the 'real' world; Shakespeare's imagination is part of it, and the thoughts that he had in writing 'Hamlet' are real. So are the thoughts that we

¹ Russell in Hoernlé, p. 88.

² See above, p. 30.

have in reading the play. But it is of the very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings, etc., in Shakespeare and his readers are real, and that there is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet. When you have taken account of all the feelings roused by Napoleon in writers and readers of history, you have not touched the actual man; but in the case of Hamlet you have come to the end of him. If no one thought about Hamlet, there would be nothing left of him; if no one had thought about Napoleon, he would soon have seen to it that someone did."¹ Professor Hoernlé emphatically agrees.

Here I regret to say that I cannot follow. The whole matter in question has been discussed at length by Professor Stout,² Professor Alexander,³ Mr. Bradley,⁴ and myself.⁵ I need only refer to the crucial point, and illustrate it briefly. It will be enough to deal with the world of imagination.

It is hardly necessary to clear out of the road the notion that imagination somehow differs fundamentally from thought. It is simply free constructive thinking; the presence or absence of concrete pictorial detail does not affect its nature. Of course, the mathematical imagination has very little of this. But, again, of course, thinking may proceed on a special basis—what in logic we

¹ Russell, "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy." Cf. Hoernlé, p. 88.

² *Arist. Proc.*, 1910-11.

³ "Space, etc.," II. 219 ff.

⁴ "Essays," iv., xvi.

⁵ "Knowledge and Reality," 144 ff. "Logic" (2 ed.), I. 274 n.

should call hypothetical thinking—and the condition on which it proceeds may be more or less forgotten. So far you have the beginnings of illusion, but that is no reason why in pursuing imaginative thought such a special reservation or abstraction, if it occurs, should thus be forgotten. Illusion is not necessary to imagination.

The identity of thought and imagination being established, we proceed to insist on the principle to which Mr. Holt, as I should say, paid lip-homage with his doctrine of universal being or subsistence, but did not give it effective development. In Professor Stout's words, it is "Whatever is thought, in so far as it is thought, is therefore real."¹ Thus in developing, e.g., a romance with the scene laid in the eighteenth century, a writer of fiction is pursuing the possibilities, which are real qualifications arising out of features of the universe, presented by human life subject to the conditions and reservations operative in the eighteenth century, as he understands them. He is making out a world subject to laws which are real, which belong to it, and which he did not invent. Professor Alexander's account of imagination is practically the same. Mr. Bradley² criticises Professor Stout's vivid and effective expressions, in which he represents the possibilities so developed—say the hero's life in the eighteenth century—as realities of the universe.³ It is dangerous to come between the points of such mighty opposites; but I am convinced for

¹ See Bradley, "Essays," p. 275.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ Stout, *Arist. Proc.*, 1910-11, pp. 192, 197.

my own part that this is a minor matter, and turns upon the nature of a "real possibility," as Mr. Bradley himself has explained it.¹ A real possibility, speaking generally, is a consequent whose conditions are in part known to be real and none of them known to contradict reality. Such a possibility is not straight away as it stands a reality, because the supposal which completes it is not fully attached to the content of the whole, but has only a partial basis in a special world within which thought is working *ad hoc*; but all the same, it has a real position in the universe. In the framework of logic, to which all these conceptions must come back, it is the assertion made by a hypothetical judgment; and in every hypothetical judgment there is a fundamental categorical assertion—the assertion of the real basis of the nexus between antecedent and consequent, upon which basis their particular connection is supposed. Imagination—free thought—could not work unless it were affirming a basis of this kind in reality, and building further upon suggestions arising out of it. The best imagination keeps its real basis most fully in view, and takes in so much of the universe that its depth of real content is very far superior to that of commonsense actuality—"Create he can Forms more real than living man." But thought, when governed by no controlling interest, may undergo a slip or break, leaping from a relevant to an irrelevant feature of the imagined complex, and starting a fresh and relatively disconnected development on that arbitrarily

¹ "Principles of Logic," p. 187.

selected basis. There you have arbitrary fancy, and the grasp of reality is much inferior. But reality you must have, as long as you have thought.

Now to go to illustrations. Will any man maintain that in reading with imaginative enjoyment—say “Ivanhoe”—his attitude of thought is that these ideas once ran through Walter Scott’s mind? In the first place, if it were so, it would be plainly inadequate to the facts. For much, the ordinary person has no idea how much, of the romance is true, and is on the whole taken as true by the reader, of reality in historical fact. Much more is true, and is judged as true, in spirit—that is, is a just representation of human nature, and must be so taken if there is to be imaginative enjoyment. Every character in the book has its own world of thought and feeling, and all of these are derived, with such and such degrees of correctness and fidelity, from the general features and characters which experience warrants us in holding real, and are so taken in imaginative enjoyment. As Professor Alexander says,¹ the whole thing is put together, not out of actual experience, but on the lines followed by such objects when real for actual experience.

All this affirmation of real characteristics, though embodied in what technically speaking are implicit hypothetical judgments conveying categorical affirmations of great complexity, would be absolutely annihilated if we tried to regard the achievement of imagination in question as consist-

¹ “Space, etc.,” II. 219 ff.

ing solely in the thoughts which passed through the author's mind when writing it, and which are aroused in the readers' minds when reading it. The suggestion is a contradiction in terms, for thought so taken would be thought no longer.¹ It would be, *per impossibile*, a series of psychical events devoid of meaning.

The illustration by a comparison of Hamlet and Napoleon is simply disposed of. The plain fallacy is in taking Napoleon before his work is done and Hamlet after. Strike out, then, all the effects of each on humanity, and Napoleon, being *ex hypothesi* still alive, may produce some more; Hamlet, his influence having *ex hypothesi*—an arbitrary and impossible hypothesis—reached the ultimate end of its growth, and supposing all of it up to that point annihilated, can create no more.

But this is all arbitrary supposition. The two creations are great by their effects on man; if you test them by abolition, you must abolish all effects or none. The flesh-and-blood existence does not make the difference; it is one among other features, and counts for something. But if it made the difference, why am not I as important as Hamlet? Both abstractions of the total influences are ridiculous absurdities; and the only effect of the illustration is to enforce the tremendous reality of the world of imagination, and its probable superiority, in causal influence, to "the real world" continuous with our bodies. I cite what seems to me a very convincing passage from Elihu Burritt :

¹ Stout, *loc. cit.*, p. 194.

"Let us go¹ to a higher authority and example than the unconsidered impression of these unthoughtful minds for a truer conception of what this creative faculty of the human mind was to do and be for the material well-being and spiritual life and destiny of mankind. . . . What was Christ's view and example in regard to this great faculty of idealism? Why, He created a hundred-fold more fictitious personages and events than Dickens, or Thackeray, or any other novelist ever did. We read that He seldom spoke to the people except in parables. And what were His parables? They were *ideals*, that were more vivid than the abstract *reals* of actual human life. They were fictions that were more truthful than facts and more instructive. They were fictitious transactions, experiences, and actors; but every one of them had a true human basis, or possibility of fact, which carried its instructions to the listener's mind with the double force of truth. Take, for example, the Prodigal Son. Historically he was a fiction. But to the universal and everlasting conscience and experience of mankind, there has not been a human son born into this world for two thousand years endowed with such immortal life and power as that young man. He will live for ever. He will give power,

As long as the heart has passions,
As long as life has woes.

He will travel down all the ages, and in living sympathy and companionship with the saddest

¹ Elihu Burritt ("Life and Labours," by Northend): Lecture on "The Reality and Mission of Ideal Characters."

experiences of human nature, he will stand at every door and lair of sin and misery and shame ; he will stand there as he stood in his rags, hunger, and contrition among the swine, and say to the fallen, with his broken voice and falling tears : ' I will arise and go unto my father, and say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and in thy sight, and am no more worthy to be called thy son ; make me as one of thy hired servants.'

"The Good Samaritan historically was as fictitious a being as the Prodigal Son. But what one man has lived on the earth since he was introduced to the world who has been worth to it the value of that ideal character ? What one mere human being has worn actual flesh and blood for the last two thousand years who lives with such intense vitality in the best memories, life impulse, and action of this living generation as that ideal of a good neighbour ? What brightest star in our heavens above would we hold at higher worth than the light of his example ? For ever and for ever, as long as men shall fall among the thieves that beset the narrow turnings of life, or into the more perilous ambush of their own appetites and passions, so long the Good Samaritan will seek for them with his lantern in one hand and his cruet of oil in the other, and pour the healing sympathy of *his loving heart into their wounded spirits* ; and, with a hand and voice soft and tender with God's love, raise the fallen, bind up their wounds, and bring them back to the bosom of the great salvation. . . . Take, for instance, the most impressive and valuable character to mankind that the

Old Testament has handed down to us, the king and poet David. How the blue of twenty-five centuries has smoothed the rough crevices and wide discrepancies of his actual human life! He never stands before us in his bald, historic reality. We have created him a new and immortal being, as a companion and counsellor in all our experiences of trial, temptation, sin, joy, and sorrow. We have taken the living breath of his beautiful and tender psalms, or life, and breathed it back into a human ideal, which we call David. . . ."

Professor Hoernlé considers his and Mr. Russell's position to be in harmony with the argument of Kant and Hume against the ontological proof. A concept cannot guarantee the existence of a real object corresponding to it. The only difference between "real" and imaginary dollars is that the former are empirically given and the latter are not.¹ The sound view on this difficult question was laid down, I should urge, in a few words by Green²: "The mere idea of a hundred thalers is no doubt quite different from the possession of them, not because it is unreal, but because the relations which form the real nature of the idea are different from those which form the real nature of the possession." The difference, as Mr. Bradley argues at length in chapter iii. of his "Essays," is one of content.³

¹ Hoernlé, p. 91.

² Proleg. to "Ethics," Sect. 24.

³ P. 43. And so, if I understand right, says Professor Alexander, "Space, etc.," II. 250, note, in agreement with Miss Wodehouse: "The difference between supposal and belief is not merely, as Mr. Meinong thinks, one of mental

The fact is that in a certain sense the ontological argument is sound. Every idea in its way, subject to one or another reservation or condition or abstraction, qualifies the real. The point is to determine by its content in what mode or subject to what condition its qualification is to be taken.

Mr. Russell, then, from whose earlier position we hoped for a remarkable coincidence uniting Mr. Holt's comprehensive enumeration of beings and Mr. Bradley's recognition of diverse worlds within the universe, has in his later attitude abandoned us, and serves only as an extreme example of the contradictions which arise if we take the common-sense real world as a standard in this discussion. Nevertheless, in different degrees of emphasis a single conclusion presses upon us alike from the extreme neo-realist in harmony with "Gegenstandstheorie," from such a rationalising neo-realist as Professor Alexander,¹ and from such original thinkers in other philosophical camps as Mr. Bradley and Professor Stout.

And the conclusion, borne in upon us from so many quarters, may be expressed in Mr. Bradley's pregnant words:

"In what sense, then (we may ask once more), and how far are we justified when we regard such states as dreams and madness as irrational, and take their deliverance as unreal? We believe in

attitude, but of the contents of the object." See further on ontological argument, essay on Essence and Existence, below.

¹ "Space, etc.," II., chaps. vii.-ix. inclusive, form a complete and orderly survey of the various worlds of appearance, some of which (see on value) are dependent on mind.

the first place their content to be more narrow and less consistent ; and within our actual knowledge that belief is, we have seen, to speak in general, correct. Such a conclusion, on the other hand, even so far as it goes, we must remember, is *ex parte*. It rests on the mere assumption that our waking world has a sole or superior reality. Again, what we call abnormal states lead in general, we find, to isolation and destruction. Between dream bodies, for example, we can discover no co-operation, and these bodies seem in relation with no common environment. Now that, to speak in general, they have no working connection with *our* environment, must be admitted. On the other hand, to conclude that these bodies have no world of their own and are everywhere isolated, each from all others, goes (we saw) beyond our knowledge. Our judgment once more here is simply *ex parte*. We are resting throughout on the assumption that our 'real' world of fact is the one reality.

"Within limits, all must agree, such an assumption is necessary. If I am to live at all, I must act, and, if I am to act, it must be on the world which comes to me here and now as given. I cannot will myself away into another sphere, even if there are other spheres better and more real. If my life is to continue, and if I am to realise in it a rational order and scheme of conduct and knowledge, there is but one course possible. I must start from what I find, now and here, in feeling and perception ; I must from this basis construct what I call the real world of facts and

events ; and for most purposes I must accept at least this order as real. There is a higher reality, doubtless, beyond all fact and event, but it is within my own world that this higher world must realise itself for me. And when reflection tells me that, for all I know, the normal world of my experience is but one world amongst others, what difference should that make? The true reality is not in any case a 'real' world or worlds of mere fact and event. And in any case for myself a 'real' world other than my own is useless. It is on my world, and on that alone, that my ideal life can be built.

"It is well to remember that my life and world, as mere existing facts, have no value ; and the thought of other, of even an indefinite number of other, unknown worlds and lives may keep this truth before our minds.

"Our world, and every other possible world, are from one side worthless equally. As regions of mere fact and event, the bringing into being and the maintenance of temporal existence, they all alike have no value. It counts for nothing when or where such existence is taken to have its place. The differences of past and future, of dream and waking, of 'on earth,' or elsewhere, are one and all immaterial. Our life has value only because and so far as it realises in fact that which transcends time and existence. Goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these, and is eternal. But in whatever world they appear, that world so far is real."¹

¹ Bradley, "Essays," pp. 465 ff.

Conceptions of this kind could not arise unless and until the total complex of experience came to be considered with impartial and appreciative analysis, and we see how this, their essential basis, tends to assert itself, with different degrees of systematic conciliation, in diverse sections of the neo-realist camp. A comparison of Mr. Russell's two positions, showing how he repudiates his own primary suggestion, is almost as instructive as the advance in Professor Alexander towards an orderly array of appearances, all of which qualify the universe.

The above discussion, we may note, gives us the means of defining reality, which has been pronounced indefinable. Reality is the correlative of thought, and may be defined as the object affirmed by thought. The defect of "Esse is Percipi" is that thought may affirm what transcends perception, though not what transcends experience.¹

3. If, rejecting the point of view which has just been dwelt upon, we insist on taking ultimate reality as determined by the standard of our single real world, we have to ask ourselves how to estimate the relation of time to such reality. We should expect the uncompromising defence of time to come from the neo-realist, and, although we saw that he supplies material for the construction of a very complex system of the universe, yet we are not deceived on the whole in this expectation. Nevertheless, the matter is not quite simple. In the first place, there are realists and realists. Professor Alexander's universe is not a simple

¹ Bradley, "Essays," p. 153.

process of events *ad infinitum*, as I should suppose that that of the six would be,¹ but carries with it pervading tendencies to a sort of self-realisation and totality—a recognition, at all events, of some demand of that character. M. Bergson, I suppose, is to be reckoned as a realist so far as concerns his recognition of the objectivity of time, though, once more, his interpretation of the universe is of an extraordinary simplicity, and seems to dissolve away all the differences and complexities in which we commonly find a clue to the whole.² Then, further still, I presume on the whole from the realist camp, there comes the intimate introduction of time into nature through the doctrine of relativity, not necessarily carrying a metaphysical doctrine of the type of Professor Alexander's, but leaving open, as I judge, the alternative between a mere mode of being of the universe, subordinate to an ultimate totality, and a progressive passage forming its ultimate nature.

All this, as I said, is what we should expect. But there is something more, which is a really curious and suggestive phenomenon, and which I will merely state in the present chapter, as a transition to a fuller treatment when we raise issues affecting ultimate values.

I refer to the estimate of time and progress, mentioned by anticipation in the Preface, which emanates from the Italian neo-idealists, Croce, Gentile, and their followers. For them, as for Professor Alexander, and for our own Professor

¹ Hoernlé on Perry, p. 65.

² The artistic imagination, for instance : "Le Rire," p. 175.

James Ward,¹ the basis of reality is historical. The universe not merely includes, but is and consists in, an advance in time, primarily at least a succession of events.

In this remarkable case what I must confess appears to me as at once an extreme exaggeration and an unjustifiable narrowness in the conception of reality springs from the idea of thought as the fundamental creative agency operating through an inherent dialectic. This dialectic has lost—such, I regret to say, is my conviction—that connection with a sense of the whole which, on the one hand, is the ruling motive in the Hegelian system, and, on the other, may be gathered—though, in my view, subject to a lack of system and rationality—from the neo-realist contentions, especially in the pregnant form which Professor Alexander has given them. I will state the doctrine, on its positive and negative side, in their own words. We may take, for example, a passage from Croce (marginal summary, "Conception of the Cosmic Progress"): "From the cosmic point of view, at which we are now placing ourselves, reality displays itself as a continual growing upon itself; nor can a real regress be conceived, because evil, being that which is not, is unreal; and that which is, is, always and exclusively, good. The real is always rational, and the rational is always real. Cosmic progress, then, is itself also [as well as that of nature] an object of affirmation, not problematic, but apodeictic."²

¹ Cf. "Realm of Ends," p. 468.

² "Pratica," p. 175 (E. tr., 253).

"The Spirit, an infinite possibility overflowing into infinite actuality, has drawn, and is drawing at every moment, the cosmos out of chaos, has collected the diffused life into the concentrated life of the organism [*dell'organo*], has effected the transition from animal to human life, has created and is creating modes of life ever more lofty. The work of the Spirit is never completed, nor ever will be so. Our aspiration to something superior is not vain. The yearning itself, the infinity of our desire, is a proof of the infinity of that progress. The plant dreams of the animal, the animal of man, and man of superman; this, too, is reality, if it is reality that in every movement of history man surpasses himself.¹ A time will come in which the great exploits and achievements which are now our memory and our pride will be forgotten; as we have forgotten the exploits and achievements, no less great, of those beings of genius who created what we call human life, and who appear to us as savages of the lowest grade and, so to speak, men-monkeys. They will be forgotten, because the proof of progress is in *forgetting*; that is, in the fact being resolved without remainder into the new fact, in which, and not in itself, it has value."² Yet "the spiritual activity has the fullest consciousness of its own eternal categories."³ We cannot predict the concrete forms which progress and perfecti-

¹ An apparent analogy between this passage and Professor Alexander's view of Deity strikes us at once.

² There seems to be here a fundamental fallacy. Cf. Wicksteed, "Religion of Time and of Eternity."

³ "Pratica," p. 180.

bility will take (because it is our business to make them, not to know them), but we can decide upon issues which are not of fact but of thinkableness or unthinkableness of conceptions—*e.g.*, of individual immortality or the existence of God. It is demonstrated that these are unthinkable in the traditional form. "Man does not seek a God external to him, like a despot who arbitrarily commands and benefits him ; nor does he aspire to an immortality, which would be insipid rest ; but he seeks that God whom he has in himself, and aspires to that activity which is Life and Death together."¹

We note in these passages, beside all the attractiveness of their faith in reason, a somewhat narrow basis of humanism ; and on this analogy we are not surprised to find it asserted about nature : "If so-called nature is, it is in evolution ; if it is in evolution, it cannot be so without some consciousness." It is assumed throughout, in harmony with the pre-eminence assigned to active thought, that what is not conscious must be mechanical—an assumption which emphasises the narrowness of the conception on which the whole view depends. "Una natura immobile, esterna, meccanica"—that is what you must come to if you do not take nature as conscious. I cannot reconcile with these expressions the continuation of the same passage :² "Nor ought we to find any difficulty in detecting everywhere activity, development, consciousness, with its antitheses of

¹ "Pratica," pp. 179-181 (E. tr., 258).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

good and evil, of joy and grief. Certainly neither do the stars smile, nor is the moon pale with melancholy; these are imaginations of the poets. Certainly trees and animals do not talk like men; this, when it is not poetry, is coarse anthropomorphism. But nature, in its inwardness, aspires to good and shrinks from evil; as a whole it drops tears and thrills with joy; the struggle and the victory is in every point, and every instant, of the universal life." There is a note of pantheism here, which, if sustained, would make a great difference to the solidity of these thinkers' view of the universe. I know of no other place in Croce or Gentile which seems to recognise a nature as a positive form of spirit; and I can only suppose that the character here ascribed to it depends on treating it as unified with the concrete human consciousness.

The conception of reality as a progress *ad infinitum*¹ arises by a simple departure from the Hegelian idea of dialectic. If reality is really becoming, he urges, it ought not to end; if it can end, there can be no reason why it should have begun;² and therefore the movement of the real must be its own intimate nature as becoming; but the dialectic must be taken as a movement in time, and its completion self-contradictory. With this, we see at once the conception of the whole as the immanent spring of the movement is struck out; the separate phases present no contrast with the

¹ I shall notice Croce's protest against this expression below.

² "Saggio Sullo Hegel," p. 152.

whole such that it can act in them as a spring of movement.¹ Prima facie, therefore, his idea of the progress of reality—which is inherently a becoming—would be that of a progress *ad infinitum*. But this consequence he repudiates—"the progress *ad infinitum*, never reaching its goal, is not a progress; and the idea of approximation is an illusion." He is aware of the example of Tantalus: "The true conception of progress must therefore fulfil at once the two opposite conditions, of an attainment, at every instant, of the true and good,² and of raising a doubt at every fresh instant, without, however, losing what has been attained; of a perpetual solution and of a perpetually renascent problem demanding a new solution; it must avoid the two opposite one-sidednesses of an end completely attained, and of an end unattainable, of the *progressus ad finitum* and of the *progressus ad infinitum*. This requirement might also be expressed by saying that a true conception of progress should make synthesis of the Oriental idea of cycles or recurrences, or of perpetual constancy,³ and of the Western idea of a breathless career towards novelty, or of perpetual change, supplementing the immobility of the first by the mobility of the second. Without this amendment,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65. Cf. Gentile: "From the abstract to the concrete there is no path" ("Spirito," p. 219). The principle of true dialectic is rather, "Every abstract tends to return to its concrete" (McTaggart, "Studies," p. 97).

² Much like Ward, "Realm of Ends," p. 475, quoting Höffding.

³ As $1 \times 1 \times 1 = 1$, he adds in a note with reference to Nietzsche, p. 163, *op. cit.*

the two come to the same." Surely what we have here is just a futile attempt to escape the Kantian doctrine of approximation *ad infinitum*.

What, then, is the contradiction which drives the reality from form to form, if it is not the contrast of each with an immanent whole?¹ "The contradiction for us can be no other than this: that every particular form is particular, and this spirit does not stay still, but rather is never as the whole in any one of its particularisations, and therefore its true being is just its circular movement, which in its perpetual rotation produces the perpetual increment of itself upon itself, the ever new history." We see the word "whole" in this passage; but it is clear that the universe as a systematic whole or true infinite, revealing itself in comparable and relatively stable finite forms, is struck out. Reality in itself is nothing but a linear movement, circling *ad infinitum* through the four categories of Croce's philosophy as recurrent phases. Any systematic totality would be pronounced, according to these idealists' mistaken interpretation, transcendent of experience, whereas in fact it is only transcendent of immediacy.² We shall see how this misconception affects the ultimate issue between morality and religion.

I add a passage from Gentile to illustrate more completely the consequence of this prejudice against so-called transcendence in narrowing the

¹ "Saggio," p. 168, cf. "Saggio," p. 65, "Croce's Logic" (E. tr., 103). Something like the immanence of the whole is implied in the "circolo," "Nuovi Saggi," p. 55, but the idea is not grasped.

² Bradley, "Essays," p. 153.

conception of the universe towards what we have described as the real world—the succession of events in time:

“Nor can there be progress for an idealistic philosophy which places the ideas or the idea and the truth outside history and the effectivity of the real; because, if progress is the realisation of the better, of the true being of things, this realisation is impossible, by definition, when this true being is outside the things. And as there is no progress, there is no history; since, at bottom, the two terms are synonymous, as there cannot be development without amelioration, or the manifestation (*esplicazione*) of a law which constitutes the telos (*fine*) of the development.”¹ He does not seem to conceive an infinite real whole, expressing itself in many finite forms, which more or less are charged with its values. The narrow humanism of the real progress in question is striking. It is of interest, however, to compare with Professor Alexander’s conception of Deity, Gentile’s characterisation of the world as “una teogonia eterna.” But I think he only means by it the succession of reality as unified in the act of human thought, which is for him eternity.²

But take the following passage on the work of the creative thought which, in its self-production, is reality, and compare it with Professor Alexander’s treatment of the natural universe:

“Which synthesis (of subject and object in the subject), as concrete reality of self-consciousness, is

¹ Gentile, “Riforma della dialettica Hegeliana,” p. 237.

² “Spirito,” p. 237.

precisely the process which is not fact, but act, living and eternal ; whence to think it truly means to realise it. And at this realisation who does not know that the spirit labours, to inaugurate the fulness of liberty, the reign of the spirit, or that *regnum hominis* in which consists the whole of human civilisation, the mastery and subjection of nature to the ends of man, which are the ends of the spirit ; and hence progressive spiritualisation of the world, and realisation, in a word, of that synthesis which resolves the opposition, while preserving it along with the unity in which is its *raison d'être* and its significance ?" (Heading, "The World as Eternal History").

"But this human perfectibility,¹ this ever more potent mastery of man over nature, this progress and increment of the life of the spirit which is always triumphing more securely over the adverse forces of nature,² and conquers and subjugates them in the inwardness of the mind itself, turning the passions themselves into virtues, as our Vico says : what is it, as we commonly represent it, the journey of humanity from stage to stage, throughout space and time—what else is it but the empirical and external representation of the immanent eternal victory (full and absolute victory) of the spirit over nature, of the immanent resolution of nature into spirit, which, according to the conception achieved by us of the necessary resolution of history in time into the real and eternal

¹ Cf. Croce, "Pratica," p. 180.

² There seems to be no idea of nature as that through which man's own nature is being communicated to him.

history, is the only possible speculative conception of the relation between nature and spirit?"¹ And just below nature is emphatically and repeatedly described as the limit, or the obscure limit, of our spiritual being.

All this seems a narrow intellectualistic conception, in which anyone accustomed to the wide ranges of Hegel or Goethe, Wordsworth or Meredith, or simply to the realities of life, feels stifled for want of open space in which the great forms of experience may expand their reality. We all know, I repeat, that all experience comes to us through responses of mind, by which it weaves a web or constructs a fabric. But that the thinking activity and sensuous response, the common faculty and capacity of empirical individuals is, as such, and apart from a total concrete unity which reveals itself in and through it, the differential source of the great organised revelations which come in nature and in history, seems an incredibly formal and trivial doctrine. Nature comes through mind, and could come no otherwise; but this is not to say that nature is not a great positive experience, in which minds are carried out of themselves and made the vehicle of a spirit which they do *not* individually create and confer, but from which collectively they receive instruction and inspiration. And history is not dissociable from nature. Geography is enough to prove this.² In Professor Alexander's account of our kinship and connection with the stellar universe, in spite of all the difficulty of his hypothesis of space-time as the stuff of things,

¹ Gentile, "Spirito," p. 214.

² "Principle," p. 145.

the neo-realist seems far closer than the neo-idealist to a just appreciation of what "the whole" must signify for mind. "In the poem which he calls 'Meditation under Stars,' Meredith has described this affinity between us and the stars, and how in the view of it our earth acquires a meaning which it has not otherwise.

"The fire is in them whereof we are born ;
The music of their motion may be ours.
Spirit shall deem them beckoning Earth, and voiced
Sisterly to her, in her beams rejoiced."¹

You cannot cut down the universe to the creative work of constructive thinking on the one hand, nor to the real world of the context of our waking bodies on the other. The narrownesses and the recognitions of neo-idealists and of neo-realists balance one another, and amplify our conception of the whole.

¹ Alexander, "Space, etc.," II. 335.

CHAPTER III

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN ITS
FORM OF TO-DAY

I. I VENTURED in a recent work¹ to advance the suggestion that the method of philosophical argument had greatly changed from Kant's day onward. A direct conspectus and collection of the significance of experience in all its forms—an analysis and synthesis of implications—appeared, I thought, to have taken the place of deductive reasoning from postulated principles. By the side of this observation I now place another and a kindred one, to the effect that metaphysic has been much more widely interesting in the current and popular sense of the term since Kant's day than before. If we are asked how to rank Kant himself with reference to this transformation, it would be natural to reply that general and popular interest attached itself to the second and third critiques, as contrasted with the first.

From that epoch—the epoch of the “Critique of Practical Reason”—the tendency became operative to seek clues to the nature of the universe in the more concrete ranges of human experience; and it is this tendency which is the source of that

¹ “Implication,” etc., Macmillan, p. 109.

specific meeting of extremes to-day which we are here attempting to trace.

It is a curious point that precisely the opposite antithesis has also been affirmed. 'Till Kant, it has been said, philosophy was a matter of general interest: with Kant it became the monopoly of scholars and pedants. I suppose the truth is that such men as Locke and Leibniz wrote as men of the world for a public possessing a highly literary and general polite culture, and in touch with questions which were stimulating to common sense, or were concerned with matters of religious orthodoxy; while the immense elaboration of a new learning in the post-Kantian movement and its successors, although it began with an appeal to universal experience, by that very fact made necessary a new order of devoted students, absorbed in intellectual labour. Their own efforts were, in many ways, from their very magnitude, alarming and deterrent to the public, but they contained within them, as I believe and am maintaining, the enormously broad foundations out of which there were to spring the solid, and yet delicate and subtle, enquiries which were to guide the humanistic culture of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

I quote a sentence in which an Italian neo-idealist strikingly portrays the contrast. We may discount, on the ground of our English¹ experience, his conception of the universal triumph of idealism; but if we think, instead, of participation in the work of speculative philosophy, what he says is remarkable and true. "In those days [of Hegel

¹ I mean by English what comes to us in English.

and earlier] the cause of idealism was entrusted to great advocates, to men of genius, and the success of the *idea* could not be dissociated from the names and the fortunes of its champions ; whereas to-day we have a single chorus of a thousand voices, dominating all conceited clamour and shrinking rejection. To-day idealism is no longer Greek, or German, or English, or Italian, or French ; idealism is universal, like the philosophy of which it is the most perfect expression."¹ If we read this not of idealism in the strict sense, but of the effort to contribute to speculative philosophy from all regions of place and of experience, it says, I think, no more than the truth.

"Experience"—it is worth while to pause for a moment upon this word. Forty years ago the idealist logician found no irony too savage to use of "the school of experience." Yet, even then, in other channels than those which joined a narrow theory with Locke and Hume, the term was carrying with it a pregnant significance, and it was not to be long before the same great logician and controversialist made this very word the banner of his theory of the universe,² and another writer of world-wide reputation drew upon the tradition of the mystic and of the religious experience-meeting in devoting one of his best-known studies to "The Varieties of Religious Experience." The change of usage marked a new interest and a new analysis ; and our English word perhaps gained in weight and vitality from the accidental absence of any

¹ Rinaldo Nazzi, "Principi di Gnoseologia," p. xvi.

² Bradley's "Appearance and Reality."

other to serve as a current equivalent for *Erleben* and *Erlebniss*.

And so when we look round us to-day for appreciations of the unity of man with himself, and his fellows, and nature, and the universe, and God, we find not so much an appeal to abstract argument as a consensus from innumerable sources based on a subtle study and appreciation of the emotional continuities by which man betrays his incompleteness in all these directions, and affirms instinctively and emotionally the connection he cannot break. The world of instinct and emotion is prayed in aid of the world of sense-perception and experiment, and if the impulse to analyse the conditions of an occurrence is one part of our world-logic, the impulse to feel and respond to its significance is another. The very "universal" itself—the life-blood of rational thought—is illustrated by comparison with the habitual response of an animal to conditions that recur in its environment.¹

Starting, then, from the idea that experiences in the way of emotion, being attached to instincts or impulses around which they cluster, can be indications or bases of inference, or symptoms, if we like, pointing to connections with the world, characteristic of human nature, we find stress laid on such revelations all round the scientific and philosophical horizon. The matter is so plain that a couple of distinct examples will suffice.

¹ Bradley, "Essays" p. 208. Alexander, "Space, etc.," I. 235, n. "Principles" p. 40.

The supersession of the "ontological argument"¹ by an appreciation of human impulse and emotion is definitely urged by the leading realist, Professor Alexander, to whose work I have appealed so often. The instinctive appetite or demand for God, in his view, has run on separate rails from the recognition, for example, of morality ever since the beginning of human life. It is a proof of the reality of Deity, in the same sort of sense in which hunger is a proof of the existence of food, or the sexual impulse proof of the existence of possible mates. Of course obvious exceptions take place : you may starve ; you may die unmated. But *in rerum natura* an instinct implies its object ; and if you find a special emotional impulse, such as that of worship and religion, which pervades all sorts of particular experiences, but maintains its unique suggestion and demand throughout them all, you can hardly help recognising the object of this emotion as at least some peculiar feature of the world. I need not explain Professor Alexander's special doctrine of the *nisus* of the universe towards Deity, a quality which in a certain sense never comes to be actual. It is, as I understand, the implication of the human body and mind in such a *nisus*, the response in which from the beginning it goes out towards a something greater than itself, which supplies the nerve of his argument.

Thus the realist of to-day recognises religion as a significant experience. He does not become an

¹ Cf. in general for the same line of thought "Value," p. 252.

ontologist in the sense of proving God's existence by abstract argument, and demanding that religious experience shall follow on the proof. He finds Deity—something unique in the experienced world that demands a special response—in the religious experience, and, bringing it together with other indications of the same order, is led to recognise in these various aspects the unity of the world. The experience needs to be completed by reflection, but the experience is the root of the matter.

The speciality and separateness *ab initio* of the emotion in question is of importance in regard to problems which we shall have to raise in the end. "No irreverence is implied in asserting that in its elementary character it is less closely allied to morality than to the uneasiness or sensitiveness which all persons feel in some degree, and some in a more pronounced degree, in the presence of natural mysterious occurrences, like the presentiment of a coming storm, etc."¹ This distinctness of the sentiment of religion and the sense of moral value is a familiar fact,² and Professor Alexander notes a striking comment of Dr. Johnson upon it.³ It begins in its own right, though from its nature it has an intimate relation, but one never passing into identity, with morality. This fact, as I said above, will prove important.

The account thus developed of the religious consciousness seems to come to much the same

¹ "Space, etc.," II. 403.

² Cf. "Value," p. 140, Lecture VIII.

³ "A wicked fellow is the most pious when he takes to it; he'll beat you all at piety," in A., II. 405.

in Alexander the realist, in James the radical empiricist, and in Bradley the absolutist. James concluded from his data that in religion "the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come."¹ And nothing could be stronger than Professor Alexander's own sense and expression of the continuity—the "feelers" which we throw out²—which links us with the universe as a whole. Identity of minds and wills he cannot admit, but the pervading nexus of finite bodies in the space-time of which they are made serves to justify what practically amounts to the same observations as are furnished by other students of religion. It is worth noting that such students find "a general sense of something spiritual, not definite, but vaguely animating the world," in a preanimistic stage of some savage theologies.³

It is noticeable that not only the students of facts of religion, such as the author last cited, unite with realists and absolutists in estimating the significance of immediate experience of religion, but there march with them the whole great army of the mystics, who have indeed a side of their nature strongly akin to realism. When we find their insight expressed in a highly abstract form, as in great theologians to whom I have referred elsewhere,⁴ it seems, indeed, to be something of an intermediate stage between the kind of experience we have been considering and the onto-

¹ Cited in "Space, etc.," II. 376.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 367 (Marett).

⁴ "Value," p. 253 (Westcott and J. H. Newman).

logical nexus itself. But the normal mystical experience—the experience which James describes, and which, in the doctrine of the mystical body of the community, links Plato to St. Paul and St. Paul to Hegel—is really a universal characteristic of human nature, and makes us feel our self-transcendence and continuity with the greater world as an inevitable factor of our being.

2. Only, once more, the neo-idealist, while he apprehends the solidarity of the social self, repudiates the teaching of mysticism, and holds religion to be a myth, destined to be absorbed in the philosophical consciousness. Instead of an enhancement of the individual being, he sees in the self-transcendent experience an annihilation of it, and substitutes for the true insight,¹ "If God is not, then I am nothing," as a conclusion on the mystical basis, the spurious and non-mystical tenet, "If God is, then I am not." The reason, as I have explained elsewhere, I believe to lie in the equation of thought with thinking and of thinking with reality, which is another aspect of the rejection of all transcendence, extended not merely to what goes beyond experience, but to what goes beyond immanence, as must be the case with all transcendence of the finite individual. Thus there is no room for a real which is more than the succession of events apprehended in discursive thought,² however much alleged to be a unity.

¹ Reviews by author of Gentile's "Spirito" and "Discorsi" (*Mind*, January, 1921). Cf. Bradley, "Appearance," p. 450, n.

² See Chap. II., *supra*.

3. On the previous page we saw the experience of religion in its affinity to the experience of sociality. Here again we meet with an argument of the type we are investigating. It has often been pointed out that our belief in the existence of other minds than our own is not well accounted for by the mere analogy which goes from the behaviour of our bodies given in connection with our minds, to the existence of similar minds as indicated by the behaviour of their bodies. The order of cognition so supposed is not the right one; we do not begin from our own bodies (the perception would have to be external, and this comes very late): we learn of ourselves from our acquaintance with others. So that at least we must go, as Professor Alexander does,¹ to the impulse of sociality, in which our experience of the qualities in which others are correlative to us is immediate and direct. It is not that they behave like us, but that they directly respond to us, participating in the situations of our world. In our response to them, as in their response to us, we directly exhibit and perceive the social continuity, or what has been called the consciousness of kind. It seems plain that animals possess this, and a sense-affection on which it depends has in some cases been detected.² This

¹ "Space, etc.," II. 32.

² In the case of ants. Bethe in A., II. 306, n. But I believe that any animal, at least any higher animal, is readily aware of any other animal. Sporting experience tells one that while no non-animal noise nor motion is certain to alarm an animal, any motion *referring to it*, however slight, is

would be an instinctive anticipation of what in man and perhaps the higher animals asserts itself as an imperious need of a nature incomplete in its absence. Gregariousness is more sensuous than sociality.

The distinction between responsiveness and imitation, as grounds of apprehension of other minds, on which Professor Alexander well insists, has not seemed to all enquirers to be quite the fundamental point. It is to be argued by Professor Stout¹ in his long-hoped-for Gifford Lectures that none of these clues would be operative as clues to the existence of other minds if it were not for what I have called by anticipation, and with reference to his chosen phraseology, a sense of incompleteness on the part of the finite individual, such as ultimately can only be satisfied by the conception of a universal mind, but which, as I gather, he considers to be the only explanation of the individual's, in the first instance, coming by the thought of any subjective life other than his own. An indication in which this conception operates as "a primitive tendency to apprehend it [the indication] as evidence of the presence of a mind on which it depends" he finds in the teleological order of nature. I have insisted above on my strong conviction that the higher animals display a quite uncanny sagacity in discriminating an intentional movement, such as may be con-

detected by it with marvellous sensitiveness. I think that their discernment of teleological movement is almost miraculous.

¹ Syllabus, II. x.

cerned with their momentary safety, from any noise or motion which is mechanical and in no way at the moment directed towards them, though it may be meant to alarm them, like a mechanical rattle in an orchard. Partridges, I believe, will nest on a railway embankment, and so forth.

I should venture, with reference both to Professor Alexander's view and that of Professor Stout, to advert to a feature—I can hardly call it a principle—of primitive or rudimentary logic which I have noticed in a recent work.¹ It is this: that to a simple mind an apprehension of unity, constancy, or identity, which is sane and true, may never at all pass through the stage of dissatisfaction; as, in the example which I was discussing, the inference, "The sun will rise to-morrow," would, I urged, be most correctly represented by the question, "Why not?" The thing comes to the mind as a whole; a special reason would be required for discriminating against any part of it, and no such reason is discerned, as indeed, in the case in question, there is none to discern.

So it may be with our incompleteness and our direct responsiveness. Our world comes to us, I take it, all *pari passu* as a solid, living, and single experience. We lack, not a reason for believing in other minds, but a reason for discriminating, in the animated world which includes us, objects which do not behave as minds. It never occurs to us to think of such a thing till scepticism puts it into our heads, and although

¹ "Implication," p. 64.

we have then to admit that we do not directly participate in the immediate experiences of other minds, yet there is so much which they possess in which we do continuously and obviously participate that we find it an extraordinary effort to separate ourselves from them for theoretical consideration. This is why, I think, the accounts of inferential process on the subject are so constrained and so little *vraisemblables*. The fact is, there is a good ground of inference, as in the case of sunrise; but there is not, as a rule or in the beginning, any inferential process at all. The unity just is and persists, until gradually put on its trial by reflection. But we may fairly take this condition of consciousness as equivalent both to Professor Stout's sense of incompleteness and to Professor Alexander's sense of inherent participation in responsiveness. We do not readily discriminate¹ our own character as conscious beings from that of our world, and if we are forced to make the attempt, we say, with the Greek philosopher, it is inherently impossible. Man is a social animal. All we have been doing is to repeat this old story in some of the myriad forms in which modern research subtilises, traces, and corroborates it. Among them was the directly common world of mind as Professor Hocking and others presented it to us in an earlier chapter. Modern science and philosophy, I have urged elsewhere, offer detailed verification of what to the Greeks was a genuine hazard and lofty adventure of reason—belief in rationality and

¹ Caird, "Evolution of Religion," I. p. 214.

morality as the nature of things. So the neo-realist, the man of comparative science, and the empiricist, are everywhere at work to-day according to the method which thought tends to follow in its temporal development, building the foundations of that speculative philosophy whose superstructure already exists. Of course, in doing so, they immensely enrich and effectively amend it.

4. In the following chapter, digressing for a moment from the philosophy of to-day, we will attempt to do justice, which is now rarely done, to the inherent value of the principle which the ontological argument expresses, and which runs through the philosophical positions we have been considering. After all, an essence is an incomplete being. Every essence has in some degree a claim and *nisus* to existence.

CHAPTER IV

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

Is it possible to make a valid inference from essence to existence? I have always been uneasy at the treatment this question has received, whether from Kant, from those whom he criticised, or from those who have resumed the defence of the ontological argument since his day. I do not expect, of course, to say anything new in proof or disproof of the being of God; but I do think that an appreciative survey of the problem may be helpful in removing a common prejudice that error is more natural than truth.

1. In the hope of attracting the reader's interest, and showing at once the sort of thing I want to insist upon, I will take some cases almost at random. I understand "from essence to existence" as covering what we also express in "from idea to fact." Our idea is the essence, or all we can get to stand for it.

An incident is in my mind—I cannot say in my memory, for I cannot date it or attach it to any train of events. But suppose that if, *e.g.*, I think of So-and-so, a man of my own age or less, I find that I think of him as dead. I don't believe I have dreamed of his death; if I had, it would be connected with some night, or with the idea of

awaking and recollecting it. I can trace no fictitious suggestion of it ; no confusion, *e.g.*, with the death of somebody else. I may have inferred it unreflectively from not having heard of the person for a long time ; but the impression seems too special for that. I conclude, in some cases where the above exclusions are decisive, "It is probably true ; I must have heard or read it and forgotten the circumstance." To some people this is not an uncommon experience. They are bona fide doubtful whether they dreamed the thing or self-suggested it, or not ; and the decision is mostly made by reflecting whether an authentic communication of the fact can find a place as an incident in their lives: if they can say, "I might probably have heard of it from X when I met him at A," they will decide, "I fear it is true."

Well, you may say, but this depends on a bit of evidence you have forgotten, not on the character of the thought. I think it depends largely on an *ad hoc* uniqueness in the thought, an incapacity to explain it away. But I will not argue the point, but will pass to other cases.

I find in my mind a very clever saying, or a few quite first-rate verses, and have not the least notion where they came from. Again, I might have dreamed them, or made them up without knowing it. But, not being Coleridge, I rule out that possibility. Then they came from "somewhere"—that is, their nature or quality proves directly that they have an existence beyond my mind.

One has heard of a rule in emending an author's text, "The harder reading is the better"—*i.e.*, its

nature is such that it is less likely to have been invented. You infer from its nature to its factual origin.

So in historical criticism. The alleged circum-navigators of Africa said they saw the sun to the north, and Herodotus did not believe them. But a critic of that day might have argued: "What could make them invent such a fact? From what mistake could it arise? Probably it was true."

Or you meet a man with highly distinctive qualities, and you say: "That was Goethe or the devil"; "That was Porson or the devil"—*i.e.*, the nature of the fact leaves you no alternative as to what its individual existence is. And you can't be wrong where there is no alternative. This is a point in the theory of error.

There are many other cases where you accept things as true because their nature seems to exclude common imagination, confusion, or bias in invention—*e.g.*, facts admitted by a hostile witness or historian, or extraordinarily circumstantial and coherent quality in a narrative, as in Defoe's stories. In all these you tend to go straight from the quality or idea of the incident to its reality.

2. Then there is a somewhat deeper set of considerations.

There are irrepressible ideas.

Consider such a judgment as "Freedom is the quality of man." You cannot establish it by an appeal to "*Quod semper quod ubique*"—at least, not without an analysis which in very many instances would be suspected of special pleading. Still, it seems to carry with it a guarantee of its

existence as a fact beyond the mind which thinks it. It is not *merely* what has been called¹ the spurious case of the ontological argument, as when the idea of anger in my mind involves to some slight extent the existence of anger in it. It includes this case, for where the idea of human freedom is present there must always be in some degree the fact of freedom as a character of the mind. But I mean something more than this. What comes of itself, I find that I have set down² as an obvious truth, is taken as real, just like what comes everywhere. And I did not notice that my language suggested the familiar phrase "*causa sui*." We might here connect existence with essence through power or value. A thought which throws so much light and develops so much force must take you, in virtue of its essence or nature, to real existence of that character beyond any one particular mind which thinks it. It is of no use to say you may be mistaken in it. You may make plenty of mistakes about it. But the quality itself shines by its own light ; you might say it generates existence appropriate to it. *It* cannot be a mistake for something else.

So with religion ; you can explain it wrongly, but what you cannot do is to explain it away. One might again refer to the spurious ontological argument, and say the thought of religion in my mind proves at the outside the fact of religion *in my mind*, not any such fact beyond my mind. But I doubt that. It seems again to be an irre-

¹ Bradley, "Appearance," p. 395.

² "Theory of State," pp. 119-120.

pressible thought, to come of itself as something fundamental, and not to be derivable from any confusion or compounding of experience, and therefore to be a feature of the world.

3. If we are allowed to reach such a point as this the vista opens out and branches. On the one hand, we are led to think of the categories, which seem also to be irrepressible thoughts, and to indicate characters of reality beyond the particular mind to which they occur.

On the other hand, there is opened up to us the whole world of finite fact and existence. You cannot go straight from the nature or essence, the conception of a finite thing, to its actual existence; that is quite plain. But there can be no proof or presumption of actual existence which is not fitted and attached to the essence or nature in question. This is the whole problem of science—to establish proof or explanation precisely relevant to essence. No existence can be established which does not precisely fit an essence. Any essence, nature, idea which claims to involve existence must fit into the world of existence as a key fits into a lock.

Spinoza, indeed, distinguishes sharply between the cause of existence and the cause of essence. "One man is cause of existence of another, but not of his essence, for this is an eternal truth. If you destroy the existence of one man, that does not affect the existence of another; but if the essence of one man could be destroyed—*i.e.*, made false—that would abolish the essence of the other."¹

¹ "Ethics," I. xvii., 8.

Mr. Bradley, with reference to the possibility of *making* truth, has discussed the limits of what can, strictly speaking, be *made*.¹ You cannot make, I understand him to conclude, anything but events in the way of existence; you cannot make the principles or sequences of nature; you can make beautiful things or true propositions; but you cannot make things beautiful or propositions true. Here we seem to have a severance something like that of essence and existence or a thing's nature and the cause of its becoming. But we must remember that if the two are, as we suggest, continuous, there must be an element of non-temporal revelation in existence, as there is a need for temporal duration in essence. "A man produces another man, but not the essence of man"; but the essence of man would be different, though inappreciably in degree, if what the one man produced in producing the other were different. An essence is not a concept, but the spirit of a living world, and can only be an eternal truth as such a spirit; and though a partial given existence does not determine it, yet it is only in existence—the full complement of existence—that it can be fully revealed. All causation has an element of revelation; if it were not so, we could make anything into anything.

Thought involves existence in proportion to its coherence with the world, and this depends on the nature of the thought, how far it is a straight reading of reality, a pure deliverance of mind, without confusion.

¹ "Essays," p 338.

4. What is the common element of such cases as these? Something like this, surely, that essence involves existence where affirmation is free from confusion; that is to say, the sources of error in affirmation are definite. Apart from them, there is no gulf fixed between thought and truth. On the contrary, in Spinoza's words, it is, *prima facie*, of the nature of a thinking being to frame true or adequate thoughts.¹ It is nonsense, he urges, to say "that the mind can feel, and in many ways perceive, what is neither itself, nor existing things, but only things which are neither in it nor anywhere else; that is, that the mind can by its own power create sensations and ideas which are not of things; so that, to some extent, it would be considered as a God."²

If you can get the mind's thought pure—that is, as it is in its own nature, and free from certain definite defects—you must possess in it a true characterisation of reality. For this is the nature of thought, to characterise reality. Its doing so is not exceptional; it is inherent; it is what we mean by thinking.

This way of looking at the thoughts I have mentioned rests on the common feature that they are "clearly and distinctly" apprehended. There is, or it seemed to me that there is, in all of them something that makes them central or unique or apprehensible in their own right, not as an interpretation put upon something in each case which includes them. It is strange, no doubt, to talk of a quality as *causa sui*, as I almost did in the case

¹ "T. de I. E.," p. 25 (V. VI. and L.). ² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

of freedom ; but the analogy, thus indicated, with the old notion of "substance," in which "essence involves existence," appears to be real.

From this way of looking at the whole question two considerations arise.

(i.) First, that the problem how we can attain truth and certainty may be very instructively approached and handled by treating error as the questionable feature, and as that which demands explanation, whereas the affirmations of thought are in principle and *prima facie* true. In this case we start from the conception that essence, nature, or idea involves existence and account for error by reservations upon it.

(ii.) Secondly, (α) that the advocates of the ontological argument for the existence of God, before and after Kant, have weakened their general logical position by restricting it to a single case, although they have gained for that case an appearance of uniqueness ; (β) that Kant's attitude, on the other hand, is not tenable ultimately and in principle. I will say a few words on each of these points.

(i.) The principle that all thinking claims to determine a reality other than the thought seems to be fundamentally one with the principle that essence involves existence, and with the principle that clear and distinct apprehensions are always true. In the first of these three shapes it has been recognised as the basis of the theory of error, and its continuity with the principle of the ontological argument has been indicated by Professor Stout¹

¹ "Personal Idealism," p. 36.

in a discussion of that subject. You cannot be in error about a reality which leaves no opening for misapprehension ; and you must always be thinking about some reality. In the second and third shapes the principle needs much reservation and explanation, and I suppose that, *prima facie*, few thinkers would accept it in these forms to-day. For an apprehension may be clear and distinct in certain respects, or under certain presuppositions only, and when we attempt to assert it without qualification, we may find it no longer clear. And so the argument that essence involves existence has been restricted, both before Kant's time, and in the rehabilitation of the ontological argument after his criticism, to the being which is perfect or complete, so that to deny its existence was like denying that of the universe.

(ii.) (α) On this restriction, which was our second point, there is much that is suggestive in the variations of Spinoza's attitude. He passes from extreme to extreme, but they meet in a most instructive way.

His primary conception seems to be that if you can get the mind thinking purely according to its own nature, the ideas it so forms will be clear and distinct, and therefore true and adequate.¹ In agreement with this view he separates² the laws of memory and associative imagination from the laws proper of the mind, so that the ideas which come by those processes are governed by other laws than those of the mind as such, and are confused and partial, not true and adequate.

¹ " T. de I. E.," *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 29 ff.

But, as it seems, at an earlier time he had advanced a doctrine which was strangely but suggestively the extreme opposite of this. As the pure and characteristic issue of the mind, knowledge, or thought in his mature theory is above all things action. Action, activity, is for him in his mature theory the note of all that is true or good in the mind's deliverances. But this earlier attitude was, in words, just the opposite. "L'acte de connaître est une pure passion, de sorte que nous n'affirmons ni nions jamais quoi que ce soit de quelque chose ; mais c'est la chose elle-même qui en nous affirme où nie quelque chose d'elle-même."¹ He goes on to explain truth and falsehood in terms of this idea. Falsehood is only a partial affirmation.

Now this is a very striking and important view. The world in us *is* a judgment ; it *does* affirm or deny characteristics about itself ; our will can *not* affect it. I, certainly, have constantly found myself driven to this mode of statement, not knowing that Spinoza had made use of it even in an early work.

And we can see how in essence Spinoza is saying here much the same as he came to say later in terms of the other extreme. The pure action or the pure passion—it does not matter much which you say. The pure mind, or the pure nature of things—it does not matter much which you say. The point is that nothing arbitrary, no will, nor confusion, nor partial perception, is to be admitted.

¹ Janet, "Korte Verhandlung," p. 90.

There is another striking saying, which brings the two attitudes together in the sense which I have just ascribed to them. "The ancients never conceived, as we do here, a mind acting according to certain laws, and as a sort of spiritual automaton."¹ Obviously his meaning is throughout that the mind, uninterfered with by confusion or defect of perception, goes a way of its own, and that the right way.

We can trace on this basis the nature of the restriction under which Spinoza asserts that essence involves existence.

Essence involves existence in case of the totality of being, because the affirmation of the totality of being cannot arise by any error, but is the precondition of every possible affirmation, whether true or false.²

And, oddly enough, but quite consistently, essence for him can involve non-existence³—*i.e.*, in things which are self-contradictory, the chimaera, or the square circle. Evil, on the other hand, has no essence—is a mere partial perception, within the essence of something else.⁴

Essence, then, controls existence in the case of necessary things and of impossible things alike.

¹ "T. de I. E.," p. 29.

² See Stout, "Personal Idealism," p. 35 *ff.*

³ In the case of the chimaera "*respectu implicantiæ essentialis suae*" ("Cogit. Met.," I. iii, p. 4). "*Implicantiæ*" may = the hindrance presented by or to its essence, but it makes no difference. At any rate it is an eternal truth that a chimaera cannot exist ("T. de I. E.," p. 17).

⁴ Cf. "Ethics," I. viii, S^o 2: "*quocirca modificationum*," etc.

But in the case of possible things it does not involve existence or non-existence or duration.

And yet Spinoza is clear that possibility is only a defect of our understanding¹; if so, one would have expected that whether we knew it or not the thought or nature of anything must fit or not fit, like key to lock, the conditions of its existence or non-existence.

The reason for Spinoza's negative attitude to the nexus of thought and being in finite things seems to me to have been that he followed the traditional notion of essence, and did not treat it as the fully determinate mode or completely individual conatus in which every singular thing consisted.

We make take, for instance, his argument that the definition of a thing does not determine the number in which such things exist. "Suppose," he says, "that there exist twenty men and no more, all told, past and present. To give a reason (explanation) why they exist, it is not enough to give the cause of human nature in general (*in genere*); but it will be necessary in addition to show a cause why neither more nor less than twenty exist, for there must be a cause of existence for each one. Now this cause cannot be contained in actual human nature since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty." So the cause must be external. It is only substance whose essence involves its existence.²

¹ "Cogit. Met.," I. iii., p. 7.

² "Ethics," I. viii., S. .

To illustrate what seems the difficulty in this view I quote some sentences expressing what I thought obvious when I first approached this point. It may have been just a mistake on my part; but the definiteness of the opposition, I think, is suggestive.

"It is obvious that in every concept the intension dictates the extension. And the extension so dictated must, as an aggregate of instances, be theoretically at least capable of representation by a number, or, if not, it must be in conflict with any and every number." "The intension even of man, colour, gold, or other ordinary general names, must ultimately and theoretically imply a finite numerical aggregate of instances. This number, which in such cases as the above we can never know, could be of no possible interest to us were it not that it [in principle] affects the import [*i.e.*, the truth or relevance] of any other number by which any such concept may be *ad hoc* determined."¹

The opposition between these two ideas depends on the degree in which essence is conceived as abstract and self-contained—a concept *in genere*—and how far, on the other hand, it is regarded as a character which must ultimately reach out and establish connection with the real world, as key with lock, or, of course, definitely reject and be rejected by it, like Spinoza's chimaera. On the one hand, you cannot expect to unravel in detail the chain of causation which has brought man into existence and determined his growth and multi-

¹ "Logic" (2 ed.), I., p. 52.

plication throughout the world. On the other hand, it seems certain that man's development and expansion in the world cannot have been determined otherwise than by his nature, of which a characteristic part is its adaptability to causes which could not but promote it here and could not but restrict it there.

The negative conditions are obvious. Man, colour, triangle; the thought of their nature, extended into the world, must reveal at least some conditions under which they respectively cannot exist. No organic kingdom, no light, no space; so far in each case the existence of their particulars is excluded. And from this consideration to that of positive conditions is only a step. Man cannot but exist where Nature produces him, and in as many particulars as she produces. It is the dullest of anthropomorphisms to suggest that the universe cannot determine him in respect of number because we cannot calculate it. When we know *what* a thing is, we know in principle whether and where it exists and how many of it there are. If we say we know what a sovereign is, and not how many there are in the world, then we do not really know what a sovereign is. Its production is necessarily relative to its nature, to the need for a thing of that particular nature, to the conditions of its supply, and to the degree of its wear and tear. If you do not understand all these things in their connection, you have not the complete thought of the sovereign; if you do, you know how many sovereigns there are. If it is true that there is a warp in space, straight

lines do not exist, I take it, with the simplicity and universality which we used to ascribe to them. I presume they can still be represented somehow ; but they are not the simple data we took them for.¹ Their nature demands another type of existence or being than that which we used to ascribe to them.

(β) So Kant's criticism of the ontological argument consists in generalising the restriction of it, which I believe all its great advocates, like Spinoza, have accepted. Essence does not involve existence in finite or created things. They all, I believe, say this. And Kant only takes them at their word, and further argues as if what is true of finite things is true of everything conceivable. But in ultimate principle, I have tried to suggest, the alleged separation is not true even for finite things. You cannot stop understanding the nature of man just at the point where it will take you into considering how and how far such a nature is and must be produced and sustained by such a world. The pure *causa fiendi* which conveys none of the essence—the external cause to which existence and not essence is due²—is a self-contradiction. A cause is not the same as a reason ; but there can be no cause which does not enter into some reason, and a reason precisely means a condition relevant to essence. A house in all its details exists in correspondence—lock and key correspondence—with some form of human nature. It is of its essence so to exist.

¹ Cf. my "Logic" (2 ed.), II., p. 230.

² See above, p. 80.

If it does not, its essence is in self-contradiction. Its *raison d'être* is wanting. And the *raison d'être* is the central essence.

"In a sense particular things are infinite and eternal [in Spinoza's view]—i.e., *vi causae cui inhaerent*."¹ But then, as I understand, they are no longer particular things. The characters of the infinite and eternal essence do not reveal themselves within the individual existence. The separation of these two worlds is one with the restriction upon the ontological argument which we have been discussing. Spinoza recognises that a separation of individual essences from each other and from the world is the principle which forbids essences to involve existence. For example ("Short Treatise," Janet, p. 15), "*cependant dans aucune des substances que nous savons exister dans la nature, en tant que nous les considérons comme substances séparées, nous ne voyons pas qu'il y ait aucune nécessité d'existence, de telle sorte que l'existence n'appartient nullement à leur essence prise séparément.*" Of course in his later works Spinoza would not have spoken thus of plural

¹ Joachim, p. 76 (his italics). I find a difficulty in the following sentence of Spinoza ("Ethics," II., Axiom 1): "*Homini essentia non involvit necessariam existentiam, hoc est, ex Naturae ordine tam fieri potest ut hic et ille homo existat, quam ut non existat.*" Does this refer to the fact that a man's existence passes into non-existence, the relative periods of which might surely be dictated by his essence, or does he mean that a given man—or men altogether—might just as well not have existed at all? This latter opinion seems to me to involve an error. His essence allows, and prescribes duration mixed with non-duration. But it does not, I should say, allow nonentity.

substances in nature. But his view remained the same in principle. It is a remarkable point, illustrating a factor of severance between particular things and God in Spinoza's doctrine of essence, that, while defining participation of essence to involve reciprocal conditioning, he expressly denies that this degree of unity exists between God and particular beings. God is *sine qua non* to them, but they are not *sine quibus non* to Him.¹ And it is expressly to safeguard this truth, as he takes it to be, that he insists on reciprocity as a condition of essence. Particular things might not-exist, without prejudice to the being of God. I take it that thoroughgoing mystics would hold a very different language on this head.² Or does Spinoza only mean that things' duration is intermittent, and that this appearance—not their total absence from the universe—must be taken as compatible with the being of God? So in "Tractatus Politicus,"³ "Res quaecunque naturalis potest adequate concipi sive existat sive non existat,⁴ ut igitur rerum naturalium existendi principium, sic earum in existendo perseverantia, ex earum definitione non potest concludi."⁵ For they need the same power, that of God, to persist as they did to begin. But then one would have expected that the

¹ Spinoza, "Ethics," II. xi.

² Cf. Bradley, "Appearance," p. 450, n.

³ V. VI. and L., p. 284.

⁴ I should have expected that an adequate idea would be an idea of a thing as it is in God, and therefore would involve its existence. But this is not Spinoza's view.

⁵ Cf. also "Ethics," II., Def. 5: "Duration cannot be determined by the nature of the existing thing."

revelation of God's power would have been held to vary in individuals according to their essence, for, after all, those two things are one.¹

And it seems to me of immense interest that Spinoza now and again shows signs of satisfying this expectation. In the same early work from which I have just cited his decided severance of essence from existence, he also holds a language regarding the connection of essence and constancy, or stability, at least in the mind as subject of knowledge, which sounds more like Plato than anything else in his writings. I quote the passage partly as a curiosity, for it derives the greater stability of the better knowledge from that passiveness of the intelligence to which I referred above (understanding being a passive fact): "Si quelqu'un, étant affecté par la totalité de l'objet, reçoit tel forme ou tel mode de penser, il est clair qu'il acquiert une autre perception de la forme ou de la qualité de cet objet que celui qui n'a pas subi l'action d'un aussi grand nombre de causes, et qui est déterminé à affirmer ou à nier par une action moindre et plus légère, ayant pris connaissance de cet objet par des moins nombreuses ou des moins importantes affections. D'où l'on voit la perfection de celui qui est dans la vérité, au prix de celui qui n'y est pas ; l'un étant plus facile à se laisser modifier, et l'autre moins, il s'ensuit que celui-ci a plus de constance et plus d'être que l'autre ; de plus les modes de penser qui conviennent avec les choses, ayant été déterminés par un

¹ "Ethics," III. vi.-viii. : N.B.—"Res, quae Dei potentiam . . . certo et determinato modo exprimunt."

plus grand nombre de causes, ont plus de constance et d'essence ; et comme ils conviennent en tout avec la chose il est impossible qu'en aucun temps ils soient modifiés ou souffrent aucun changement du côté de la chose, puisque nous avons vu que l'essence des choses est immuable ; or c'est ce qui n'a pas lieu dans le faux."¹ Truth and stability depend on completeness, and completeness, apparently, on a resistant quality of mind, an inertia, which is receptive only to the whole force of the object. The thing, we remember, according to this treatise affirms or denies itself. But only some qualities of mind, it would seem, can give it scope.

Even duration, here, is affected by essence. "La durée d'une chose procède de sa perfection ; et plus elle a en elle d'être et de divinité, plus elle est durable."² We may compare with this the difficult passage in "Ethics," II. viii. S. : "Earum ideae existentiam, per quam durare dicuntur, involvent"; and Professor Joachim's discussion, pp. 222 ff., especially 228: "Temporal existence . . . confers upon them additional reality—i.e., essence includes a need to grow out into temporal existence."³ We have to note, as it seems to me, a certain simplicity, if not crudity, in Spinoza's idea of finite essence, which accounts at once for the *prima facie* severance between essence and existence and for the occasional recognition that it is really bound to pass into existence. I have in mind a passage from the "Cogitata Metaphysica," which I will transcribe in full (I. ii. 7): "*Quomodo distinctio*

¹ Janet, "Short Treatise" (tr.), p. 86.

² *Ibid.*, p. 119. ³ Cf. p. 89, *supra*.

inter essentiam et existentiam facile addiscatur. Denique si quis philosophus adhuc dubitet, an essentia ab existentia distinguatur in rebus creatis, non est quod multum de definitionibus essentiae et existentiae laboret, ut istud dubium tollatur. Si enim tantum adeat statuarium aliquem aut lignarium, illi ipsi ostendent, quomodo statuam nondum existentem certo ordine concipiant, et postea eam ipsi existentem praebebunt." Here there can be no doubt whatever either that the "essence" is inferior to the individual thing in reality, or that its nature implies need to pass into it. It is simply the more or less imperfect conception. I take it that in II. viii. (see Joachim, *l.c.*) Spinoza is divided between this idea of essence and one involving a higher concreteness and individuation.

Elsewhere he seems to mention the very principle we should wish for: "Quo plus realitatis alicujus rei naturae competit, eo plus virium a se habere ut existat";¹ but then he is here only speaking of substance, and expressly notes that what he says has no reference to things which depend on external causes.

Again, his political view is dominated by the recognition that stability and persistence depend on wisdom and organisation—that is, on the character of the thought which forms the essence of the institution;² and the political theory is

¹ "Ethics," I. xi., S.; cf. I. ix.

² Cf., e.g., "Tr. Theologico-politicus," V. VI. and L., p. 410. It is remarkable how Spinoza guards himself against attributing a society's persistence to its own qualities. The real cause must be God, acting "per causas latentes externas."

grounded throughout on the fundamental conception of a law of Nature which is also a divine right by which every singular thing expresses God's power in an individual form "certo modo."¹ Here, it would seem, there can be no discontinuity between essence and existence. And yet even here Spinoza seems to shrink from the full results of such view (see note 2, p. 95). The essence of the particular thing does not contain the secret of its survival or non-survival among the other active powers of the universe. And, of course, it does not in and by itself contain the entire secret. But their friendliness or hostility to it must depend, one would think, on the nature in virtue of which it is friendly or hostile to them, and, as Spinoza constantly insists, to itself.

The idea, then, that even in finite things the thought demands or guarantees the fact, was not wholly foreign to Spinoza. What is the ground of his general conviction, so strongly and uniformly asserted, that the nature of a finite thing can neither ensure its persistence nor determine its direction? I suppose its source is in some degree of shortcoming not desired, nor, I think, admitted, by him, in envisaging the finite conatus or essence as an impulse springing from the full universal spirit. For any such shortcoming has a two-edged result. The finite conatus, thought, or essence neither clothes itself in actual duration, grasping the finite world and coalescing with its existence; nor—the same thing from the other side—does it by inherent impulse transcend and terminate itself.

¹ *Ibid.*, c. xvi., p. 552.

And, of course, it is true that a thing has these characteristics only when taken as one with the order of the universe, and not in isolation. And when Spinoza insists that its determination depends on other things and not on itself, that is probably what he means to say.

Nevertheless, it does impress itself on my mind that we should see the whole problem of truth and error in a better perspective if we started from the unrestricted idea that the mind's nature is to affirm truly of reality. Then we should be in a position to allow for all determinable sources of error, without raising in principle the insoluble problem, "Supposing thought to begin in a world divorced from truth, how is knowledge ever to be come by?" We should recognise that throughout experience, and not in the central regions of totality and self-evidence alone, there are signs of thought producing inevitable affirmations. And we should see that the restriction of the ontological argument to the ultimate being on the one side, and Kant's mocking estimation of it by the most finite of objects on the other, spring from mere traditional ideas of essence and an imperfect sense of unity.

Even a remark of Hegel¹ on Kant's criticism, which, I will confess, for a long time struck me as a mere irrelevant retort, appears to me now to have, from the present point of view, a valid meaning. If a man cherishes a thought of a hundred pounds, Hegel said in effect, he had better set to work and get it. What he meant,

¹ "Hist. of Philosophy," III. 453 (E. tr.).

I suppose, was what I have tried to illustrate above, that an idea or nature or essence is in principle self-contradictory until it has given rise to appropriate existence. I do not mean that everything can in the strict sense exist, but everything, I suppose, has its reality in some degree by controlling existence.

Finally, a certain view of inference seems to gain support from these ideas. It suggests itself that every alleged essence, every distinct thought, carries with it, in virtue of its special nature, a certain claim to find itself in reality. The task of inference, then, would be to work out in detail the necessity of this claim, along with the modifications which its systematic completion would entail upon the initial conception. The degree in which such a necessity could be made apparent, in proportion as the relations demanded by the idea were pursued by thought and traced throughout experience, would be the degree of presumption or implication that reality—or, in the appropriate case, existence—attached to the idea. The point of principle is that to see reason in the finite series and complication of causes, though difficult and in some regions apparently hopeless, is yet not really an isolated or self-contradictory adventure, as is implied by the fundamental severance of essence and existence in the finite world. Innumerable degrees of presumption in favour of innumerable conceptions are traceable in every phase of science, and become better warranted from age to age. I ventured to suggest long ago that the order of natural knowledge to-day is a confirmation for us

in sober earnest of what for Greek philosophy was a splendid intellectual hazard, whose audacity we can no longer realise, just as the political and ethical world-order—I do not fear to say it, looking full at the significant crisis in which we stand—is a confirmation of what in them was a miracle of moral, social, and political insight.

I can imagine a critic remarking that this is rather a prolonged argument and a lofty language in which to recommend the principle that what one says is true in so far as one makes no mistakes. I could only answer, first, that it is not my fault if an axiom so fundamental has not always been recognised in what has passed for a theory of knowledge; and, secondly, that a systematic method, governed by the idea of establishing ordered areas of experience in which coherence shall exclude mistake, involves a conception of non-syllogistic inference which has not yet, to the best of my knowledge, been completely and successfully formulated.

CHAPTER V

$$7 + 5 = 12$$

1. EXTREMES of thought may meet in an error as well as in a truth. And I now desire to approach, in a short argument more abstract than those before, the fundamental error, as I take it to be, which the spirit of the age seems to impose upon thought in many quarters. It is an important error. It is the source, as I hold, of a widespread superstition which sets up a bugbear called "intellectualism," and thereby to a really incredible extent disorganises the classification and appreciation of philosophical ideas; and ultimately it is operative in that one-sided preference for the ethical as distinct from the religious attitude, which is the heart of what is most superficial and most characteristic in modern progressivism and "ethical culture."¹ This consequence I shall endeavour to trace and estimate in two of the later chapters. In the present I shall try shortly to expose its logical root.

2. All round the philosophical horizon we observe to-day, as I have already noted, the

¹ Here, such is the complexity of these currents of opinion, I have with me Professor Alexander, though himself what I call a progressist (Alexander, "Space," etc.). His wide recognition of experience has in some degree counteracted his progressivism. See above, p. 67.

insistence on the objectivity of time and change and the condemnation of a block universe. We find it in the neo-idealist, in the neo-realist, in the votary of duration, in the radical empiricist, in the theorist of action. And this insistence and this condemnation are, as a rule, accompanied by a censure or suspicion of an attitude styled intellectualism, which is held to be responsible for a total denial of the reality of time and change, and for the belief in a perfected and immobile system of reality, which has been stigmatised as a block universe. There are four kindred motives, I believe, which are at work in this suspicion, and are apt to co-operate with each other.

First and simplest—if to know is to copy reality, a pre-existing model, it is a useless duplication of something already there, and moreover implies that the model is immobile, for a change in it would make the copy false. This I believe¹ to be an imputation arising by the common custom of ascribing to an opponent the error which you have just discovered in yourself. Of course, it has no application in the region of what is entitled to pass as speculative philosophy.

Secondly, by an illusion which is far too nearly akin to that first naïve illusion to be even *prima facie* justifiable, the neo-idealists of Gentile's type hold that to believe in a real universe which is not immediately created and affirmed by the discursive thought of finite spirits is to accept a transcendent kindred to the thing in itself, a

¹ "Logic" (2 ed.), II., p. 263.

something which, not being identical with the positive act of thinking, falls outside the activity of the subject, and, once more, is a fixed and given object, a dead reality, which is to living and creative thought as a fetter and an incubus. A curious importance is attached in this connection to the law of identity, as if it were a principle of analytic inference—an impossible thing—by which Greek philosophy and Plato's world of Forms was dominated as an immobile object, and a self-creative development was rendered *ex hypothesi* impossible for thought.

Thirdly, in the apotheosis of duration as against the world of the intelligence, the same superstition prevails. Here it is the intelligence itself which is pronounced inherently defective, and the defect is fundamentally the same, an adoption of the law of identity—the law of repetition—linking the same with the same, as the sole and central principle of the intellect.

Fourthly, it is, I presume, as a corollary from this conception of the transcendent and immobile object of the intelligence—an object, however, in this case admitted to be not a presupposition but a construction—that we get the quite extraordinary fantasies of William James about the “intellectualist philosophies.”¹ I must really call them fantasies, for neither his characterisation of individuals, which is just as directly and precisely wrong as any characterisation could be,² nor his

¹ Watts Cunningham, “The Philosophy of Bergson,” p. 181.

² I feel myself here rather in a cleft stick, for I do not want to emulate Boswell's feat of defending Johnson's

conception of the approach to an idealist vision of things, as the building of a classic sanctuary, has any jot or tittle of resemblance to the personalities or conceptions about which he was writing.¹ In the temper of Green's day, an idealist meant a person who approached reality through the back street and the elementary school and the dust and heat of parties. Professor Watts Cunningham himself seems to me to throw his whole argument out of gear by addressing it to idealists *qua* intellectualists. This is to destroy the unity—the one spirit—in which they believe.

3. $7 + 5 = 12$. I take for consideration this simplest case, in which, as I believe, the whole decision upon the ultimate reality of time and progress, and the just criticism of moral perfectibility as a world-principle in opposition to religious self-transcendence, can be shown to be contained in principle.

We start from elementary logic. If 12 were not the same as $7 + 5$, the judgment would not be true. If it were not different, the judgment

sincerity by proving the moral defects which he admitted. But in fact, of course, anything but the imputation of tender-mindedness and refinement was the general joke—*e.g.*, against Green, and especially in connection with his management of affairs. A well-known saying of his day was, "The fellows of Balliol are thoroughly good men; they are not to be turned from what they know to be right by any scruples of conscience." I remember his condemning, or at least greatly regretting, a friend being kept out of holy orders by scruples of conscience.

¹ See especially "Principle," Lecture I., where I have dwelt on a striking example of this total divergence.

would not be a judgment. There is no province of knowledge over which the law of identity, construed as the principle of tautology, bears sway. There is no region of reality which can be interpreted by its aid.

What you have in this simplest example, then, is an *eternal novelty*. It is the expression of something which, parting from itself, remains within itself, and which, being always old, is yet perennially new. To consider the expression impartially is to recognise in the simplest thought this inherent connection. Here we have the open secret, from which a hasty and one-sided philosophy runs away. It applies its "either . . . or" where they deny the foundations of reality.

So when we find a doctrine which judges of ultimate reality on the basis that if novelty, progress, difference are to be achieved, the identity of the whole as a whole and in its ultimate character must be abandoned, we know where we are. We are simply in the presence of a blunder in elementary logic. We are confronted by the belief that a whole complex, to affirm itself in something new, must, as a whole, depart and recede from something that it already was.

Thus we find that Gentile devotes the earlier part of his "Logic" to a consideration of the logic of identity, which he believes to be a way of regarding reality peculiar to the cognitive attitude involved in that law. It is, for him, a feature of all consideration of the real universe as an object of thought transcending the discursive thinking of the finite spirit, and holding the place of a

being to which that thinking has to adapt itself and from which it has to learn. This he and the neo-idealists who follow him hold to be characteristic of Greek thought as a whole (not merely of Parmenides¹), and ultimately, by implication, of all metaphysic prior to Italian neo-idealism. Throughout his works, this is the distinctive contention. If you accept spirit or nature or God as a world uncreated by the activity of thinking, you accept a fixed and finished identity, into which life and change can no longer penetrate.

And, as I said, this second of the four points of view distinguished above continually betrays contamination by the first. The reality which is not produced by thinking is easily supposed to be a reality which dominates thought and is its fixed and permanent model. And then we have the copying theory and the impossible and unintelligible duplication of reality alleged in aggravation of the vices of a pre-existent and transcendent universe.

The third and fourth attitudes referred to, those of Bergson and James, though not obsessed by the extreme idea of creative thinking, apply a similar misconstruction of the meaning of identity respectively to the capacity of intelligence and to the meaning and nature of an absolute whole. In the latter, I fear, the doctrine of the incompatibility of an absolute whole with the true significance of time, I must hold that Professor Alexander participates in the fundamental error.

¹ I do not think he really grasps even the doctrine of Parmenides, whose greatness surely lay in taking thought as a clue to reality, not, according to an obsolete interpretation, in holding thought to be one with an immobile real.

4. There is, of course, a conceivable parry to the imputation of this fundamental error which confounds identity with tautology. There is always apt to be this difficulty in philosophy. I charge you with an error. You retort: "The error is not mine; I do not make it, but impute it." But then the rejoinder which we make in this case is often justified: "You could not impute it, unless you held it. You try to exhibit a certain fallacy as covering huge areas of thought and great conceptions of the universe, and you treat it as a special and recognised logical conception. You could not do this if you fundamentally grasped its nature. There is no such logical conception, and the character supposed to be attributed to the universe in virtue of it is not so attributed. It is a mare's nest, due to the critic's imperfect logic. The universe has been regarded, since Plato inclusively, as a differentiated and self-differentiating reality throughout, which is what the law of identity *ab initio* requires it to be."

To this, however, there is a possible re-rejoinder, on which great stress is laid by all the progressist thinkers from Gentile to James. It depends on a conception which I will call the conception of secondary or acquired analytic identity, and if I can, as I believe I can, wholly explode it in principle, I shall have done something to clear up our thoughts on this question of the self-differentiation of a real whole. The fallacy in question consists in thinking that though $7 + 5 = 12$ is certainly in itself an embodied synthesis, or necessary novelty, yet when once passed and admitted, or, as we say,

made an object of knowledge, it is, so to speak, killed and stuffed, and *for the future* is taken as a fixed whole. Thus it loses the living nexus of its terms and is ranked as something whose novelty is neutralised and exhausted, each of the terms having acquired a permanent determination by the other, which reduces their nexus to a tautology, and brings the proposition under the law of identity in the barbarous form offered by elementary logic, A is A. I will return to this notion below, after referring briefly to the other considerations alleged in the rejoinder which I suggested as offered against the progressist imputation of a tautology-theory of cognition and reality.

(i) Tautological identity could not conceivably be imputed to Greek philosophy in Plato and after on historical grounds. I am not treating of the history of philosophy for its own sake, but will remark on two points of logical interest.

(a) There is in Plato no fixed dualism involving a transcendent reality. The levels of reality are fluid, and their descriptions and relations are tentative.¹ The great forms are, as we should say, the main categories of the universe, by help of which its less perfect appearances can be and are constantly being unified through knowledge with its intelligible system, which is thus enriched. Plato's astronomy, which is perfectly scientific and rational, allowing no difference of kind between earthly and heavenly bodies, is decisive on this point.²

¹ Cf. "Principle," 378 ff.

² See Burnet, "Greek Philosophy," Part I., "Thales to Plato," pp. 227 ff., 348-9.

(β) The original and classical statement of the law of identity or non-contradiction, which involves at the same time the true account of contradiction, even yet ignored by current logic, occurs in the "Republic,"¹ and runs thus: "If the same system appears to behave in opposite ['different' would suffice: 'opposite' is not a term with a meaning prior to contradiction, but is attributed by it] ways in the same part of it and in the same relation, then there is not one part (or one system) concerned, but more than one." The several very felicitous examples given in the context explain that the law always refers to a complex system; that in such a system there is always a plurality of acting parts, whose distinct behaviours produce an appearance of contradiction if the parts so behaving are not discriminated; but the essence of the law is that when there are two or more discernible behaviours within the same system, there are two or more parts or relations² concerned in the behaviours. It is contradiction when two behaviours are ascribed to the same element within the same system, without ground of distinction. They then become "opposites." It has always struck me as very remarkable, and as a fact most strangely ignored by modern and, I suppose, medieval logic, that the first formal statement of the law of identity or non-contradiction, and that on which Plato relies in the very knot of his analysis of the self, should so distinctly presuppose a system including a variety of behaviours and relations,

¹ 436.² As, e.g., in relativity of motion.

and explain how within such a system the confusion which causes contradiction can be avoided. Of course all Plato's philosophy works on this principle, which his theory of judgment in the "Sophist" explains more in detail.

The same is true in the main of Aristotle. Leaving, as open to uncertain interpretation,¹ the law of identity as laid down in its abstraction, let us go at once to the governing law of inference, the definition of the syllogism, which, of course, is only a more explicit judgment: "An inference is a nexus of thought in which, certain things being posited, something different from these positions follows of necessity from their being what they are."

Thus Plato and Aristotle clearly laid down the central paradox of reality and cognition which every philosophy has to face, and is judged by its power to face. There is no inferential thought unless it presents a bona-fide difference limited by a bona-fide necessity. If you scamp or slur either of these factors you have no whole of reality and no genuine cognition. No such law of identity as the neo-idealists speak of as something which can be embodied in a special view of a special type of reality ever came into their minds. No such type was ever dreamed of as established by them. No one could dream of such a thing who was really

¹ This is always so, except when the statement is fully elucidated in reference to a concrete system. See my "Logic" (2 ed.), II., p. 210, and above, p. 107, on how the law of identity is made to turn out = A is A, and below on the refutation of this trick.

grasping such a judgment as $7 + 5 = 12$.¹ The imputation rests on the power of the fallacy over the imputer's mind ; and so with Bergson's view of the intelligence, and James's of the Absolute and a block universe.

(ii.) But there is still the conception of acquired analytic identity, the only point of view from which for a moment the law of identity can be represented by A is A . The notion is this: Granted that your cognition, and the real which it cognises, is all of it synthesis, and all the synthesis necessary, still you may rejoin with Gentile, Yes, but as *thought* (passive participle), not *thinking*, it has *become* a rigid structure and an eternal datum, or pre-existent. It was once synthetic, but now its synthesis, being known and taken for granted, has become analytic and secondary, no longer admitting of novelty or origination. And, he may add, this must be so eternally ; what springs by necessity from the given is itself as good as given, and therefore with Bergson *tout est donné*. To suppose that the universe is ultimately a unity whose nature, being all that is, cannot in itself become other than it is, and finds expression within itself, but not by advance or modification from what it is to what it is not, is to suppose that all is an eternal immobility, and there is no novelty nor freedom. If the universe is immutable as a whole, in the sense in which acknowledged truth is, all its differentiation, being given and the basis of what can be given, does not save it from being a block universe.

¹ See the suggested answers to "How many are 12?" in "Rep.," I. 337.

In suggesting a different conception, I start from a sceptical notion, suggested, I believe, by Mr. Russell. How do we know that truth continues true, or that the laws of nature continue to indicate what takes place? We suggested an¹ answer to a similar question about the sun rising to-morrow, which did not appeal to the mere fact of past experience, but to the nexus of the phenomenon in question with the continuing whole. Why not? seemed to be the just and natural answer, resting on the normal acceptance of the ultimate unity of things, which can only be impeached in detail on specific positive grounds.

The same answer, in principle, not only will serve, but is necessary, to justify our cognition that $7 + 5 = 12$. We are in a certain degree repeating and affirming Gentile's own position, affirming it with a difference, and in its only true meaning, when we say that as an isolated proposition, which we know to have been held true, it could not be accepted as a truth. To know it, we must connect it with the whole; and to connect it with the whole, in principle and ultimately, we must revivify the whole in its connection with the living present of thought. In the universe there is no Aaron that can stand between the living and the dead. The life of reality is one; and the reason why we expect our truth to continue true, if ever it was true, is that it belongs inherently to the universe which persists, and with which, as a whole, our thought and activity are bound up, and which our constructive thinking enriches in main-

¹ P. 73, above.

taining and maintains in enriching from moment to moment.

In this last sentence I am reproducing Gentile's contention, but the whole paragraph reproduces it with a difference. The difference lies in the assumption, which I reject, that the universe, in so far as it is greater than finite thinking, and commands us in and through it, fails to retain that continuous life and unity in virtue of which it is ever new in its synthetic determinations. Thus a dialectic, a self-determination of thought, which recognises the totality of the universe, and is driven by the tendency to return to it, is contrasted, as dead and finite, with a dialectic for which there is no totality, and which a logically inexplicable motive urges in an infinite progression. "From the abstract to the concrete there is no path,"¹ is the principle he proclaims. "Every abstract tends to return to its concrete" is the principle in which totality is recognised as the mainspring.

When once for all the principle of the judgment $7 + 5 = 12$ is mastered, we grasp the paradox at once of reality and of inference. The whole does not abandon itself to give rise to difference; it is as a whole, and not as surrendering its totality but precisely in virtue of its wholeness, that it is the source of differentiation. The secondary tautology, which we dream that we have found in the reality whose syntheses we "know," does not exist. It is only in the whole reality that the syntheses hold good, and for every reaffirmation the old syntheses rest upon the continuous life of

¹ "Spirito," p. 237.

the whole. The whole reality is a source of syntheses, as our typical judgment shows us, at once inexhaustible and necessary, and is as fertile of "new" syntheses as continuous in the "old." The difference is relative to us. Both are new as bona-fide differences ; both are "old" as rooted in the whole ; both are necessary because the whole lives in its expression. The reason is that a true infinite, in being expressed through finite terms such as those of our experience, can never be adequately expressed ; but being a true infinite, it is represented as a whole in each of its revelations, and does not move from its character of totality to enter into them. It has not a history of its own—history could not represent it, as a simple analysis of the narrative judgment demonstrates directly.¹ But it contains histories without number.

(iii.) There are progressists—I have coined the name for shortness' sake—who seem to understand this whole relation, and yet to be coerced by the spirit of the age into an ethical approximation-theory after the manner of Kant. Why not, for example, have simply accepted the criticism of Professor Watts Cunningham in his "Philosophy of Bergson," where he excellently explains the true account of reason offered by Hegel, in contrast with Bergson's caricature ? I answer, vulgarly, because the proof of the pudding is in the eating. If you think that the ultimate real whole can and must, in order to secure change and freedom, change itself as a whole in real time—that is to say, must fail to fulfil the conditions of being a

¹ "Logic" (2 ed.), I., p. 199.

whole—then you have not understood, such, at least, is my conviction, the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$. I need not dwell on the principle of “creative finalism,” on which he relies to avoid the destiny of Tantalus for God and man. He has himself said, in my judgment, all that is necessary in criticism of it,¹ and I have dwelt elsewhere² on the self-contradictoriness of a finite teleology as a metaphysical conception. I say a finite teleology, for a teleology which is not a feature of a finite being is inconceivable. How is the whole reality to entertain in itself such an incompleteness that it must alter itself—not merely expressing a side of itself in the need of a finite being within it, but altering itself as such, its fundamental nature, with an eye to a perfection which so far has been denied it? It is the old story. The progressist runs from the paradox of reality. He will not understand that the infinite whole, in its wholeness, is a life and self-enrichment; and to get the novelty and irrational freedom he craves, he demands that the whole, the all-inclusive universe, shall depart from what it is, and assume new characters, different indeed, but not necessary, thus omitting one-half the nature of a rational nexus.

5. It is not easy to know, I may observe in concluding this chapter, the precise significance of the term “intellectualist.” It is on the whole, I think, felt to be a dyslogistic epithet, and it is interesting to find that Professor Watts Cunningham is disposed to accept and defend it. He

¹ “Philosophy of Bergson,” p. 169.

² “Principle,” p. 391.

takes it merely to mean that the real is subject to the categories of intelligence, and, in this sense, given a wide interpretation to those categories, such as he insists on against Bergson, the dyslogistic significance would, I suppose, be removed, as it is for him.

But in the current usage of the term, which he also refers to, which applies it in general to Greek philosophy as to post-Kantian idealism and its successors, there is, I take it, as we see in James and Bergson, a truncation of its meaning. It is held that cognition is taken as the type of thinking activity,¹ and that cognition in part is analytic *ab initio*, as Bergson supposes, and in part lends itself to the consequence which we have discussed under the head of secondary tautology. That is to say, the nature of the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$ has been slurred, and neither its full synthesis of differences, nor its essential implication in the life of the universal spirit, has been taken into account by those who apply the designation. No doubt the so-called identification of will and knowledge by Socrates had something to do with the origin of the term. But those who know most of Greek philosophy will be slowest to call intellectualists the men for whom it was essentially a life and an activity, and as regards so-called idealists, Mr. Bradley's protest in the "Logic" against the identification of thought and reality is surely not yet forgotten.

The fact is, if the one life of the real is

¹ Compare, for instance, Clarke among the English moralists, who identified theft with falsehood.

thoroughly apprehended, and the relation of conation and cognition, and of both with the æsthetic attitude, is fully conceived, there is no room for the application of the term "intellectualist," in a dyslogistic sense or any other. People who disparage the ontological value of time¹ do so not because they overvalue cognition, but because they apprehend the unity of reality.

¹ Watts Cunningham, p. 206. The superficial misconception which accuses, e.g., Mr. Bradley of intellectualism and a belief in a block universe is thoroughly illustrated in Ugo Spirito, "Il Pragmatismo nella filosofia contemporanea" (Vallecchi, 1920), pp. 29 ff. He gives no sign of appreciating the position of cognition in reality. Cf. the best authority on Green, "The central conception is that the universe is a single eternal energy or activity of which it is the essence to be self-conscious—that is, to be itself and not itself in one" (Nettleship, "Biography of Green," p. 109). This, as we saw, is involved in $7 + 5 = 12$.

CHAPTER VI

TIME, PROGRESS, MORALISM

I SAID in the Preface that when we began to deal with ultimate problems it would be necessary to insist on the most startling of all coincidences between extremes in the modern philosophical world. And in the third section of Chapter II. I brought together some materials for forming a preliminary conception of the attitude of neo-idealism in comparison with that of Professor Alexander, the neo-realist who has the greatest sympathy with idealism.

But now we have to consider the influence of the characteristically modern attitude, dating, I presume, at least from what Carlyle would call the Progress of the Species¹ theories of the French revolutionary period, which is asserting itself with decided superficial resemblance in neo-realism and neo-idealism alike.

The three naturally connected characteristics of this position are the acceptance of time and change as ultimate characteristics of (not "within") the universe as such and as a whole; faith in the progress and, in some sense, the perfectibility of the human species, either as a possibility or as an established law; and the identification of morality and religion with the faith in this law, or possi-

¹ "French Revolution," i. 27 (ed. 3 vols., 1871).

bility, and practical conduct directed to realising it. Evil, therefore, is actual (on this point the idealists in question differ from the realists at least in expression), but is capable of being diminished without limit. As the idealists accept this last view in substance, it is plain that in some sense they admit the actuality of evil.

The point, then, for the purpose of our present comparison is this. The school of neo-idealists in question, of whom Croce and Gentile may be taken as typical, have, in the first place, thoroughly admitted time and change into the core and basis of reality. Reality is "divenire," "becoming"; the idea of evolution in time is taken by them, in conscious harmony with the trend of thought throughout the philosophical and scientific world, as the very spirit of their philosophy. They have not yet, so far as I know, dealt theoretically with the modern problem of space-time; but I do not think that this need affect their position, and if it did, according to current ideas it would be taken to confirm it. I do not think this a necessary consequence, as we shall see when we consider the philosophical bearing of relativity.

Arguments could be alleged in their case, as in that of Professor Alexander, to prove that so much of unity and wholeness is admitted—the system of categories, the essence of truth, beauty, and will, "the eternal ideal history," and the like—that a change of reality, as distinct from changes within reality, ought not to be taken as what they contemplate. But there is no question that in their minds this is what they intend to affirm—

viz., that in its very basis and meaning reality is a history or an unending dialectical progression.

And the narrowness of their conception of progress is quite typical of the views which belong to Progress of the Species theories. It is the progress *ad infinitum* of the human species on the surface of the earth. They speak of the whole, but in practice the universe either disappears altogether or is entirely secondary to terrestrial history. Immanence is to be absolute. There is no unity such as can be the object of metaphysic, and though it is strikingly argued that "all history is contemporary," this can only refer to the nexus of events as seen by finite minds from their position as a centre in time at any moment. The passage on forgetting tells us that much which has been real is to drop altogether out of the content of the universe. It is, that is to say, to survive only *in* that which follows it, not as in a whole which includes the two.

The progress, being rooted in the ultimate conception of reality as becoming, is conceived as necessarily unending, but it is not admitted, as we saw in Chapter II., to merit the disparaging addition of progress *ad infinitum*. It is argued that the continuous attainment of the end by the continuous integration of the relatively evil into a fuller solution removes the character of sheer endlessness which implies total non-attainment; whereas in their conception a continuous attainment is realised.¹ Evil, again it is argued, though present as fact, is never present as evil, because it

¹ *Supra*, p. 57.

is only realised to be evil as it passes into its solution, and in that passage has ceased to be evil. Thus the progress is held to be demonstrably necessary, and to involve what may practically be treated as the progressive extinction of evil.¹

Religion, then, as we shall see directly, is identified with morality—that is to say, with the will and endeavour to realise fresh good by extinguishing what in being extinguished is identified with evil. This is the essence of “ethical religion,” which, in the general prevalence of the Progress of the Species doctrines, is coming to be more and more the current form of religion, or, as one might say, the popular substitute for it.

Now the striking point is that in all these respects the neo-idealist revival has adopted the same general attitude that is characteristic of the neo-realist and kindred movements. We find in these, *meliorism*, reliance on the future to complete if not to compensate for the past; progress of the human race as the central feature of religious faith and duty; “the good is to be won by the race and for the race; it lies in the future, and can result only from prolonged and collective endeavour.”² All this, again, is shared by neo-realism with the pragmatism of James and the instrumentalism of Dewey.³ The essential matter for all these as for the neo-idealists

¹ Cf. Herbert Spencer's argument to establish the evanescence of evil. Bradley, “Ethical Studies,” p. 84, n.

² Perry quoted by Hoernlé, “Neo-Realism and Religion,” reprinted from *Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1918, pp. 148, 163.

³ Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

is the repudiation of any view which can affirm a perfection in the universe apprehensible through religious experience and philosophical speculation, not limited to the series of temporal events.

We may examine a striking connection of thought which shows how conscious and decided is the neo-idealists' choice in favour of moralism in the sense of devotion to the abstract ought-to-be (*dover essere*), and in opposition to the idea of religion as the union with a whole beyond the finite self, and self-realisation in and through this union.

We go back to a citation from Gentile,¹ which showed him arguing that if the reality lies outside (*fuori*) the chain of temporal events, then *ex hypothesi* all progress is impossible, because by definition such a reality is incapable of it. This conception we find further elaborated in his special treatment of religion (the "Discorsi di Religione") with a definiteness which leaves its significance unmistakable.

The argument is introduced by a sharp severance between Greek philosophy and the essence of Christianity. Greek philosophy believes in a whole which *is*, and by union with and inherence in which the finite spirit finds self-realisation and spiritual life. Now this is, for the modern idealist (that is, for the theory we are considering), to accept a reality which the spirit does not create. Such a creed, in his view, can never rise to the intuition of the moral life. For the ferment of all modern civilisation, the originating intuition

¹ Chap. ii., *supra*, p. 59.

of Christianity, is that the world is ours, "because we make it in the light not of what is, but of what ought to be" (*dover essere = sollen*). Plato's "good" is conceived as there naturally, *ab initio*, as a given feature of the universe, and the love for it, in Plato's eyes, is a universal natural instinct, an impulse to conform to a pre-existing and transcendent real. But all this, to the modern spirit we are describing, is a dead block-universe, which imposes itself as a fetter on the thinking mind. "Love your neighbour" only becomes moral when it refers to a moral act originating in your own progressive impulse. "If the good *was* originally, we could not make it (or, do it), and the good which is not done (made) is not good."¹

"This conception² of an absolute new departure in Christianity, culminating in Kantian ethics and in the attitude of creative idealism, though it lays emphasis on an important feature of the creative modern mind, seems wholly to ignore the mode of participation by which Gentile has explained how the finite spirit is linked with the group-mind, nourished by it, and embodied in it. For this, the recognition of the human-divine spirit in the communal life, is the golden thread which links Plato to St. Paul, and St. Paul to modern thought. And apart from such a recognition, extended to the universe, we hardly see how absurdity can be escaped when we insist

¹ Gentile, "Discorsi di Religione," pp. 95, 99.

² I venture to cite a paragraph from my review of the "Discorsi di Religione" (*Mind*, January, 1921).

on the truth that nothing is our self-realisation which does not spring from our will."¹

It all turns on the abstraction imputed in the word "fuori" (see above, p. 121). We proceed to the result. "Idealism must say that morality and religion are antithetic terms, each of which is the negative of the other; *mors tua vita mea*" ("Discorsi," p. 130). For religion, he urges, is essentially mystical, the annihilation of the subject before an unknown transcendent object, and its attitude is essentially "where God is, we are not; in so far as He is, we are not" (p. 78). In this account of religion, the true religious insight—that if God were not we certainly should be nothing—is ignored; and the non-moral character of religion, as concerned with a being outside the progress which is the elimination of evil, and incapable of entering into it, follows necessarily. And so ultimately we find "that Christianity is not solely a religion; it is also a philosophy, and therefore a moral doctrine; and its greatness rests on the philosophical and moral truths which it proclaimed, and by which it succeeded in transforming human civilisation, not on its sheer religious element" (p. 129).

Surely all this leaves no doubt. We are back, to our surprise, in a Kantian morality of the "ought to be" as opposed to the "is," a morality of endless approximation, according to which the

¹ I have pointed out elsewhere that Mario Casotti comes nearer to a true recognition of our right attitude to the universe than Gentile or Croce does. See his "Pedagogia," p. 99: "una religiosa adesione e sottomissione."

injunction "be a whole or join a whole" has been rejected by reason of being set in a false antithesis to the law which commands an opposition to what is in virtue of what ought to be.

In its bearing on self-realisation, the conception of the self-creative thinking ego has proved no less pluralistic than the particular visible self of common sense; more so, indeed, for the latter, in obedience to common sense, is always treated as a collective agent. Recent idealism in other forms has adopted the same antithesis,¹ and we seem bound to note that the peremptory needs of the pure ethical impulse, which is no doubt one side of religion, but one side only, are asserting themselves alike in all the extremes of contemporary philosophy.²

I call special attention to the narrowness of the humanism in which, as we saw above, the neo-realist agrees with the neo-idealist, and both of them with the other types of modernism, which indeed would class themselves in general under this very title of humanism. And it is remarkable that to find a true interest in the unity and destiny of the universe we must go to-day either to the absolute idealist or to a few exceptionally gifted members of the realist or analogous persuasions.³

¹ Bradley, "Essays," p. 439, note on Royce's "opportunity for an endless series of deeds": "As this, to some minds, appears to be the evident condemnation of God and themselves to the fate of Tantalus——"

² See Hoernlé, "Neo-Realism and Religion," on the neo-realist hostility to the mystical side of religion.

³ Professor Alexander, Mr. Bertrand Russell, the exponents of "Relativity"; cf. Professor Boodin in *Arist. Proc.*, 1920-21,

What philosophical moral does the meeting of extremes suggest to us in this particular case? In the instances which we had previously examined, our tendency was to suggest that the more subtle and impartial examination of phenomena on which realism and the sciences pride themselves, was by undesigned coincidences doing much to strengthen the basis of speculative philosophy, while readjusting the emphasis of its affirmations as offered within the idealist tradition. Here the general effect of what is occurring is *prima facie* more hostile to the necessary demands of that ancient tradition. But the rationale of the whole movement is fundamentally the same. It is the assertion of the immediate and the practical, of the democratic element, it might be said, in thought¹; just as is the reaffirmation of external being, and of all the forms of instinct and emotion which bring home to us ontological and cosmological truth in a simple and coercive manner. It tends to compel a restatement and a better intelligence of the ultimate crux of speculation; the place of time, progress, and change in the universe. There is nothing so difficult as this problem, and nothing so essential to reasonable thought or conduct. A progress outside the

p. 116: "Worlds, like individuals, have their seasons of budding springtime, summer bloom, multi-coloured autumn, and grey winter; but the cosmos has all seasons for its own." Cf. "Appearance," p. 500: "The Absolute has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit, and blossoms." Perhaps Mr. Russell's views might be called a humanism reversed.

¹ Cf. author's "Logic" (2 ed.), II., p. 268.

whole, or a self-realisation to which the whole is a stranger, is a conception which falls to pieces at a touch. But the democracy of thought, so to say, is resolute to have the phenomena appreciated. It loves the direct consciousness typified by common sense; change, at all events, whether progress or not, is an obvious fact; and so is its connection with my will, and that of my will with evils to be extinguished and problems to be solved. "If the whole cannot be made intelligible in connection with this demand," experience seems to clamour around its whole horizon, "we will not tolerate the notion of it." Yet William James' reading of the Absolute as a contrivance for repose is on all fours with Gentile's "fuori"; and for a balanced statement the question demands the ideas of our chapter, $7 + 5 = 12$. The distinction at stake is that between time in the Absolute and the Absolute in time. A subsequent chapter will illustrate this antithesis by dwelling on the distinction between the religious and the moral attitude.

CHAPTER VII

CRITICAL REALISM AND THE THEORY
OF THE ABSOLUTE

BUT I first take up the parallelism of recent realism with such a doctrine as that of which Mr. Bradley is the leading exponent to-day, from the point where, as we saw, neo-realism sharply diverges from it. In order to have a name for this doctrine, which is not happily entitled either idealism or realism of any type, I will refer to it in this chapter by the term "absolutism," which itself comes rather from enemies than from friends.

Absolutism, then, and that form of recent realism which is spoken of as neo-realism, we found to agree decisively against a corresponding novelty, the theory which I have called "neo-idealism," represented, say, by Croce and Gentile, in regarding the external world of things, in the current and popular sense, as a factor of the universe having its own reality, and not a product or creation of the mere thinking activity. Nature in its concreteness and beauty is real, and is real as we know and value it, and is not created by our thinking.

This was as far as neo-realism and absolutism went together, and so far they confirmed a

necessary element of speculative philosophy against neo-idealism. But when neo-realism goes on to treat "things" as not merely actual and individual elements of the real universe, but as existents which unite in their own private existence, by themselves and apart from connection with each other and with percipients, all those features which they present to thought and perception, then it parts company with all and every idealism, not merely with neo-idealism, but with absolutism. Absolutism will never be brought to believe that things exist as they appear, apart from the context of the system in which we find them, whether in its causal or in its apprehensive aspect. It does not hold, as I understand it, that their *esse* is *percipi*, if that implies immediate presentation. It holds that reality is what thought, operating on and in the whole complex of experience, compels us to affirm. Reality, therefore, as the object of thought, is always mediate and transcendent of the immediate. This is a fundamental principle, governing the whole problem of transcendence, and I mention this point to guard against misunderstanding at a later stage. But my present interest is in the parallel movement between absolutism and the realism which is called "critical," which begins at this point and continues for a space.

Critical realism is a realism in holding that there are external existents, the physical objects of science, which are in themselves what they are, unaffected by the thought or perception of other beings, and form the real world with which we are aware of being in contact, and to which our efforts

and cognitions are directed. Thus, stated in general language, its position bears some resemblance to that of neo-realism. But the difference from neo-realism, and the relative agreement with absolutism, appear in its attitude to the "things" of everyday apprehension. Its criticism follows the familiar idealist line, to the effect that the things of normal apprehension cannot be regarded as self-contained existents composed within themselves of the qualities which we find belonging to them. Separation from the context of percipients and of other things destroys their qualities, or, if we insist on treating these as inherent, makes the apparent group of them a mass of contradictions—of inconsistent magnitudes, figures, colours, temperatures, and the like. They cannot therefore supply, as they stand for our everyday perception, the physical objects demanded by science as the members of an existent world.

Thus critical realism goes so far with absolutism as to treat the members of the normal outer world, other than physical objects, as something determined by intercourse with each other and with intelligent organisms, and as shorn of all or a great part of their appearance in so far as such intercourse is ended or suspended. The thing, as we perceive it, becomes more like a theory than a self-contained existent. It is an enormous system, developing *ad infinitum*, of appearances responding to the infinitely varying conditions of its context, and coherent and intelligible only in connection with these. And this, I may observe, is, I believe, the true account of its character, and that from

which it is in essential principle impossible to depart.¹

The agreement, then, between critical realism and absolutism is decisive and complete so far as the criticism of the ordinary thing is concerned. It is for both an appearance, and cannot subsist as it appears apart from the context which conditions its appearance.

But, further, there is a certain analogy, curious but, I think, important and suggestive, between the doctrines, even after the point at which, *prima facie*, they sharply diverge.

Critical realism, I said, believes in a world of existents which are in themselves what they are, and are not affected in their nature as existents by perception or cognition, but exist just the same whether there is awareness of them or not. It is in the relation of these objects of thought to actual cognition that the analogy I speak of arises. It is generally an error of method to mix criticism with exposition, but I feel so uncertain of the precise intent of the writers in "*Essays in Critical Realism*,"² and it seems to me so probable that my uncertainty is at least not wholly my own fault, but arises from a sliding scale introduced into their doctrine by the difficulty of living up to its fundamental paradox, that I will state it as I see it in terms of such a sliding scale, giving references by which my view, if erroneous, may easily be elucidated and corrected.

¹ I do not know that Mr. Bradley has anywhere precisely expressed such a view.

² Macmillan, 1920.

The point in question is the separation between the what and the that of objects of thought which takes place in cognition. In these terms everyone recognises at once a feature of Mr. Bradley's doctrine of the real in its connection with knowledge. Critical realism recognises the same general fact, but naturally accounts for it by a different hypothesis.

Critical realism, I said, believes in physical objects as existents—the existents in themselves to which our thought and conations are, as it holds, really addressed, when we fancy we are addressing them to the “things” perceived all about us. These existents *ex hypothesi* transcend our experience as such, not merely immediate experience. Existents cannot, as such, be “possessed” by our minds. To have them, to “have the very independent existent itself open to an immediate and penetrative inspection,” would need “instruments”—“which are not possessed by the human organism.”¹ *Ex hypothesi*, you cannot “possess” or intuit the object known.²

What, then, is knowledge?

I will venture to put the answer briefly and dogmatically as it separates itself for me into steps of a sliding scale.

1. The existent, the object of thought, is never and in no degree identified with what we have before our minds as the “content,” or “essences,” or “quality group,” which we perceive in the thing of normal apprehension. The object is not

¹ “Essays in Critical Realism,” p. 201.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

the percept, and the percept is not the object ; and no quality which is existent within the existent structure of the object can be present in the perceived datum or quality group. Many expressions point in this direction, and the principle strictly demands, I think, in their mode of sustaining it, that the severance of the what and the that should be absolute. Nothing of the "that" should overflow into the "what." But you must, they point out, be able to recognise *which* "that" you are referring to. And this, I think, starts the sliding scale.¹ But this takes us to the next heading, for it departs from the strict principle.

2. Certain special qualities of the existent, it comes to be admitted, are known as inherent in it, and therefore as identified with the existent and existent themselves.² One writer leans to finding these in the "primary qualities"³ in general, others to identifying them with qualities which I take to be the physicist's determinations of the physical object.⁴ In these the "that" would seem to have opened itself up for inspection as the "what."

3. Further, it comes to be held that *any* constituent of the quality group or group of essences

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 96 ff., 24, 32, 201.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 21, n.: "It exists just to the extent to which it is in fact the nature . . . of the object known."

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 22 [note the phrase "which we take to exist, but which *have no existence except as* some of the traits of the complex are *actual traits* (my italics) of the physical object perceived"], 23-4: "primary qualities" of the visible thing, not of the physical object?

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 110, 199, 218.

by which we recognise and suppose ourselves to think of an ordinary "thing" may be considered as one with the essence embodied in the physical¹ object. Here, as I understand, we are speaking in a much wider sense; not solely of the minute determinations of primary qualities which constitute the physicist's conception of the physical object, but of any properties which are truly—in accordance with science and common sense—ascribed to the apparent thing or quality group, which is merely a bundle of appearances due to the causal operation of the physical object.² It ought, I should urge here, to be admitted that when we think of these properties—e.g., the "secondary" qualities—we are thinking of them as integrated with the "object of thought" (the "physical object"). That is to say, the fundamental division, by which essences or apparent qualities are not the object of our thought when we think of the thing,² should be abandoned. When we think of a friend, his moral and physical qualities in the current sense should be admitted to be part of the object of thought, which according to the strict doctrine they cannot be.³ The object of thought in the strict doctrine (Case 1 above) is a mere existent, a bare that' which though sole object of thought, presents to thought no features

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 240-1.

² *Cf. op. cit.*, pp. 22 ff.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 99 ff. They are treated as not the object, but the means by which we think or perceive the object. Thus, when we think of a friend, his physique and character are not elements in the object of thought. This is strange language, for obviously they are the main things we think about in such a case.

that can be thought about. I think the concluding essay modifies this attitude in general, and not merely with reference to physical determinations.

Taking this conception without further criticism at the moment, we see in it a very suggestive analogy to the absolutist doctrine of truth and reality.

The fundamental feature of critical realism is its account of knowledge as involving the separation of the "what" from the "that." The "what" is in the form of "essences" or quality groups; the "that" in the form of existents, identified with physical objects. Knowledge consists in qualifying the existent "that" by the ideal "what."

This reminds us strongly of the familiar absolutist theory of the relation between truth and reality. It might seem, indeed, as if the two theories differed only in words. They agree that knowledge must always be discursive—an affair of qualifying something real by a meaning distinguished from it. Thought deals with its object by way of affirmation; it is always about a something which is not merely its own act. It would almost seem that if we were to treat the difference between existence and essence as in principle relative and vanishing—as the one and necessary modification in which reality expresses its own nature and character in the medium of ideas, we should possess in critical realism the same fundamental conception of truth as the revelation of the real which we were taught by absolutism. Thus considered, all predicates are

the qualifications of the concrete real under some set of explicit conditions, and the object of thought gains in nearness to reality as it gains in determinateness, remaining always the whole with which thought is dealing.

Many phrases in the work in question remind us of such a view, and the concluding essay seems almost to pass the frontier towards it—*e.g.*, “if the knowledge is true, the essence given is the true essence of the object,” “this logical or essential identity is thus the keystone of a correct theory of knowledge.” “If the essence is truly the essence of the object, as it should be in order that knowledge may be correct, the essence given and the essence *embodied in the object* (my italics) are not two but one.”¹

I can hardly think that anyone who studies this essay in connection with the ten pages or so following p. 96 will find it easy to read their doctrines as the same. It seems essential to the earlier essay that while I think of the perceived content of a house or a friend when I think of it or him, yet the object of my thought is not, and does not include, the content I think of, but offers to thought as what it is to consider, supposing that it considers its object, either nothing, or certain physical determinations.

This latter view, as I said above, I take to be strictly in accordance with the critical realist's theory. He has grasped the principle that truth cannot include the reality in its perfect character of a completed concrete whole; but he applies

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 239-41.

that insight not to the growing synthesis in which thought builds up the whole which from the first has been its guide and object, and which is its actual and genuine matter of consideration; but to a supposed existent, whose qualification for the post of "that" is merely the negative one, that it is held incapable of entering into experience, and therefore serves as a mere peg or attachment to which the real characters of being may, so to speak, be moored. And yet, as we saw, the demand of thought for an object which is not featureless was so inevitable, that it was found to identify itself with a nature which is a content of experience and nothing else—viz., the determinations of a physical object.

It is this hypothesis which destroys the possibility of a progressive and intelligible reunion between the that and the what. The necessary expansion of the "thing" through appearances *ad infinitum* has been interrupted by erecting into an absolute existent what is merely one set of these appearances, and we are faced with a "that" which has in principle no "what," and a "what" which has in principle no "that." The existent is the object of knowledge, but it has nothing for us to know. What we have before the mind is not the object of knowledge, but it is all that we can perceive or think. We have a complete and not relative separation between facts and ideas, and therefore, as Mr. Bradley has shown to be a necessary consequence, we are left without either.¹ In other words, the existent is taken as particular

¹ "Essays on Truth and Reality" p. 301.

and as independent of being experienced ; while the experienced " datum " is taken as a bare universal and as mere " essence." But for absolutism this analysis is a fundamental error. An existent for it is not a particular—there is no such reality *in rerum natura*—but an individual, the synthesis of particular and universal. An essence is not a bare universal—there is no such thing *in rerum natura*—but is the universal aspect of an individual.¹ The critical realist agrees that essences as such do not exist. But it is an extraordinary thing that, to the best of my recollection, there is not a word in the book about individuality. Its place is taken by the alleged particularity of the existent. But this is a glaring contradiction of experience. Individuality comes of function and qualitative uniqueness rooted in concrete system. It belongs to a sphere of apprehension far above the unity of the physical object, which may or may not accompany it.

This, then, the absolute severance of truth and reality as opposed to their relative identity, is the point of divergence between Critical Realism and Absolutism. We have noted the sliding scale, into which, as we think, Critical Realism is driven by the total impossibility of sustaining its conception in its purity. It is only through this sliding scale that the protest² against its existent

¹ On p. 231 occurs the expression, "an entirely concrete universal, a universal of the lowest order." For me, at all events, the more concrete the universal, the higher—the nearer to reality—is its order.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

being identified with the Kantian unknowable *Ding-an-sich* can be sustained for a moment. In principle there can be no doubt that after acknowledging relativity for a certain tract of its journey, the theory has yielded to the temptation which made Kant seek an absolute substructure in another world, and has, in part at least, eked out its suggestion by reviving the old superstition which takes "the primary perceptual qualities" as "literal characteristics of objects."¹

The critical realist's view being motivated as it is by an absolute severance between essence and existent, the existent comes necessarily to belong, like the Kantian noumenon, to a different order of being from the experienced content. It is held to be something foreign, transcendent of experience and not merely of immediacy, a term different from the thing of common apprehension, connected with it by causal relations, though these only have a meaning for nexuses of objects and events apprehended within the same ordered world. And it has no content. For in principle anything we learn about it from science at once passes into the status of essence and takes its place in the datum or quality group, pushing away the existent, which never can be content, to further grades of remoteness.

For the interest of the matter, and to show more thoroughly why at this point the doctrines

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 23. Apparently these as so taken are not characters of the physical object, but of the visible object, quite as incoherent as any secondary qualities, and as "subjective." Cf. above, p. 132, note.

must diverge which have so far gone hand in hand, I will reproduce with some fulness a profound and striking modern criticism of any realism which takes up the position I have been describing.¹

First, if the supposed cause in any sense *is*, it must *in principle* be capable of being apprehended and experienced, if not by us, yet by other egos which have better and deeper insight. This is an essential necessity from the nature of the apprehension of things.²

Further, it could be shown that such possible perceptions, with essential necessity, would have to be perceptions by means of appearances, so that we should find ourselves in an inevitable regress *ad infinitum*.

Again, an explanation of processes given in perception by hypothetical causal entities (as of planetary disturbances by a new unknown planet) is different in principle from an explanation in the sense of a physical determination of experienced things through such physical modes of explanation as atoms, ions, etc.³

I will reproduce the following passage verbatim, as it seems to me to go to the heart of the matter.

"Let us start from the position, which is easily established, that in the physical method *the perceived thing itself*,⁴ always and in principle, *is precisely the thing which the physicist investigates and determines scientifically*.

¹ Husserl, *Faßbuch*, 1913, p. 97.

² Cf. author's "Implication," p. 79, referring to Husserl.

³ Cf. Whitehead, "Concept of Nature," p. 31.

⁴ Italics throughout are Husserl's.

"This proposition appears to contradict the earlier propositions, in which we attempted to determine more precisely the meaning of current utterances of the physicists—*e.g.*, the sense of the traditional discrimination between primary and secondary qualities. After the elimination of obvious misinterpretations, we said that the 'thing experienced in the strict sense gave us the mere this,' an 'empty X' which became the bearer of the exact physical determinations, which themselves did not fall within experience in the strict sense. To be 'physically true' was therefore 'something in principle otherwise defined' than what was 'bodily' given in perception itself. This was present in sheer sensuous qualifications which are just not physical.

"However, the two accounts harmonise well enough, and we are not obliged seriously to controvert the former interpretation of the physical mode of apprehension. Only we must understand it correctly. We must by no means get into the pitfall of the fundamentally perverse portrait and sign-theory¹ which we considered above and refuted in radical universality without special reference to the physical thing.² A portrait or sign points to something which lies outside it, such as 'itself' to be apprehensible through a transition into another mode of indication, that of dator perception. A sign and portrait does not reveal in itself the self which is indicated or portrayed. But the physical thing is nothing foreign to that which

¹ Cf. "Essays in Critical Realism," p. 165.

² See p. 72 of Husserl's *Faßbuch*, 1913.

appears bodily in sensuous form, but is something which primarily reveals itself in this latter, and, for irrefragable *a priori* reasons of essence, in it *only*. Therefore, too, the sensible determining content of the X, which functions as bearer of the physical determinations, is no foreign garment investing the latter; rather, it is only so far as the X is subject of the sensible determinations that it is also subject of the physical determinations, which on their side *reveal* themselves *in* the sensible. In principle a thing, and precisely the thing of which the physicist speaks, in accordance with our full discussions, can only be given sensibly, in sensible 'modes of appearance'; and the identical element which appears in the changing continuity of these modes of appearance is what the physicist subjects to a causal analysis, an investigation into real nexuses of necessity, in relation to all connections capable of being experienced (therefore perceived or perceivable), which can come into consideration as 'circumstances.' The thing which he observes, with which he experiments, which he continuously sees, handles, lays on the balance, places in the fusing-furnace: this and no other thing becomes the subject of the physical predicates, such as weight, mass, temperature, electric resistance, etc. Just as truly it is the perceived processes and connections themselves which are determined by notions, such as force, acceleration, energy, atom, ion, etc. The thing in its sensuous appearance, which has the sensuous shapes, colours, properties of smell and taste, is, therefore, anything but a sign for *something else*, but is in a certain sense

a sign *for itself*. Only one may say thus much: the thing which appears with such and such sensible characters under the given phenomenal conditions is, *for the physicist* who has *already carried out in general the physical determination for such things* as a class, in nexuses of appearances of the kind in question, the indication of an abundance of causal properties of this very thing, which as such reveal themselves just in interdependences of appearances which are familiar according to their kinds. What reveals itself in such cases is plainly—just as revealing itself in intentional units based on experiences of consciousness—in principle transcendent. According to all this, it is clear that even the higher transcendence of the physical thing indicates no reaching out beyond the world for consciousness, or for every ego that (by itself or in a connection of empathy) functions as a subject of cognition.¹

“The state of the case is, to indicate it in general, that physical thinking establishes itself on the foundation of natural experience (or of the natural theses which that establishes), and, *following the motives of reason* which the connections of experience offer it, is compelled to fulfil certain modes of apprehension, certain intentional constructions as demanded by reason, and to fulfil them *for the theoretical determination* of the sensibly experienced things. It is just by this that there arises the opposition between the thing of mere sensible imaginatio and the thing of physical intellectio, and for the latter side there grow up all the ideal

¹ Husserl, *Jahrbuch*, 1913, pp. 99-100.

ontological thought-structures which express themselves in physical conceptions, and draw their meaning, and are able to draw it exclusively, from the method of physical science.

"If reason in the logic of experience under the title Physics thus elaborates an intentional correlate of higher order, physical nature out of sheerly apparent nature, it spells mythology to set up this datum of rational insight, which is nothing beyond the determination of nature as given to sheer intuition, by the logic of experience, as an unknown world of realities in the way of things in themselves, which is hypothetically constructed as foundation for purposes of causal explanation of appearances."¹

Thus the idealist's estimation of the position seems to him quite simple and straightforward. A thing is an individual, the object of thought and perception, including all that we actually think of as composing it. The quaint separation between what we think of and the means by which we think of it has no *raison d'être*. A thing is its properties which are determinable *ad infinitum*, and its physical determinations are among them. In knowledge, the what, though severed by its ideal form, recovers and maintains its unity with the that. Knowledge is a form in which the real manifests itself through the ideal. The existent is not beyond the quality group; they are one and the same thing—the actual concrete taken in the whole wealth of its conditions and relations, and not as an isolable abstraction. The alleged difficulty of exhibiting a physical object disappears.

¹ *L.c.* p. 101.

In the physical aspect of the universe, each thing plays its part and is "ingredient" everywhere, just as in every other aspect under its special condition.¹

This is the difference between the two positions, the difference between a concrete real and a pair of abstractions—existent versus quality group. But it is the analogy that I wanted to insist upon. Critical realism, it seems to me, has done the work it claims to have done, so far as destroying neo-realism is concerned. The group of determinations *ad infinitum* cannot function as a single, isolable, external, self-existent. It must be quite differently regarded, and must be a whole which lives in the life of its infinite context. Critical realism recognises this, and treats it as a quality group, a group of appearances relative to conditions. So far so good. Truth is the qualification of a real by ideas, by essences, if you will. So, in a sense, we say too.

The point where necessary conflict between idealism and critical realism begins is indicated by the term "transcendence." A careful study of Professor Pratt's argument on this head reveals a state of mind which is really amazing.² A new and very unexpected meeting of extremes is involved in it. Critical realism, that is to say, maintaining the reality of the transcendent, understands the term in the same manner as neo-idealism, which rejects it—as the isolable, pre-existent real,

¹ Whitehead, "The Concept of Nature," p. 158; cf. p. 145. I suppose our author's "physical objects" are his "scientific objects."

² "Essays in Critical Realism," pp. 97 ff.

inaccessible to actual thinking. And this error of its own—a very simple one—critical realism charges upon idealism as such, alleging it to be the ground upon which idealists, along with other thinkers, accuse critical realism of making knowledge impossible. And against this alleged objection the author accumulates, as counter-evidence drawn from fact, all the cases and types of knowledge in which existents transcending immediate experience are accepted as established elements of the real world. This is what I characterise as amazing, incredible if it were not there in black and white.

I confess that I think the whole matter is perfectly plain. Every object of thought is real, and every object of thought is transcendent of immediate experience. The distinction of knowledge of acquaintance and "knowledge about" is in principle untenable. Knowledge of other minds and of existence in the real world is knowledge of the objects of thought, furnished by thought and inference, which are in principle one and the same thing and come under the general category of implication. Another person's mind, a past event, the real Julius Caesar, the inside of a solid and opaque object which cannot so far be X-rayed, the other side of the moon, are all alike objects of thought implied in our standing experience, and accepted as real on the principle of thoroughgoing conviction, "This or nothing." One would almost think that the author had never heard of thought, or considered the meaning of our belief in the reality of what we cannot avoid thinking—

of all that is *implied in* the given. This is transcendence of immediacy, and there is no experience of objects which does not presuppose it.

But critical realism seems to us to confuse this with a very different thing—namely, transcendence of experience, experience including all thought and objects of thought. To reject this is merely to reject the unknowable thing in itself; and it is not a question of evidence—it is a question of a contradiction in terms. Every object of thought is the subject of significant propositions; the alleged transcendent existent is not the subject of significant propositions, for, *ex hypothesi*, no essence by which it is characterised is one with it as object of thought. The author's defence on p. 110 cannot stand for a moment. In face of the principle that the object of thought never includes any determination which we can think of—and we can and do think of all and any predicates or characters which we affirm—it is futile to maintain that it is not a *Ding-an-sich*. Plainly, too, *solvitur ambulando*. Try to carry out the theory, and where are you? Julius Caesar, as an object of thought, is either nothing before our minds at all, or, waiving the inaccuracy of ascribing some peculiar predicates to the bare existent, he is a dance of electrons. If we think anything further of him, it is not he we are thinking of. He is not existent in his characters, nor his characters in him. He is not a constituent of the proposition that describes him.¹

¹ See Brad'ey, "Essays on Truth and Reality," with reference to Russell, pp. 409 ff.

No doubt the critical realist's impeachment that *all* transcendence is denied lies against some of those he mentions. It has been worked out as against William James in a masterly discussion, which has much in common with a passage in "Critical Realism."¹ It is just the omission to consider what is meant by the object of thought which is the cause of the defect imputed, and this cause the critical idealist shares with James, though its result in the former is different—not a restriction to immediacy, and so far it is well, but a jump into pluralistic Absolutism, which is the Kantian *salto mortale*. He starts boldly towards reality as the whole, but is frightened *en route* and calls a halt at a place where there is nothing but—a something.

All the argument from the consciousness which goes with activities is irrelevant to the main point. It is an interesting "meeting of extremes" with analyses of the judgment in reference to reality, just as are the modern arguments from religious or social experience with abstract ontological doctrines. But it all falls within the definition of thought. When you have laid it down that intelligent mind is inherently a centre of social and scientific relations, you only need to trace their gradual appearance in childhood and adolescence to cover all that is said in this respect by Professor Pratt.² It is all—gradual development and all—made perfectly clear in Plato's "Republic" and Aristotle's "Ethics" and "Politics."

¹ "Critical Realism," p. 41. Cf. Bradley, "Truth and Reality," pp. 146 ff. Or see on "Transcendence," *ibid.*, p. 153.

² "Critical Realism," pp. 94 ff.

I will summarise the meetings of extremes newly touched upon in this chapter.

Where neo-realism parted company with the older idealism, critical realism joined the latter for a space. Asserting, with neo-realism and against idealism, that there could and must be self-existent external objects, unaffected by the presence or absence of percipience and intelligence, it yet contended in agreement with idealism and against neo-realism that such objects could not *be* the quality groups familiar to us normally as "things." Thus it was led into a very instructive polemic against the naïve acceptance of the sense world as real *per se*, and took a long step in harmony with idealism.

But this step, combined with the postulation of external self-existent objects somewhere, if not in the currently received thing or quality group, brought it to the assumption of external existents as objects of thought but not subjects of propositions, involving a separation in principle between the that which was thought of as existent, without being expressed in significant propositions, and the what which was expressed in significant propositions without being thought of as existing. This runs parallel so far to the doctrine that truth presupposes the severance of the what from the that, and is thus a special form of reality. But it departs from the further consequence of this doctrine by making the severance absolute, and so denying the presence of reality in the experienced group of characters as a developing whole, which is the growing but self-identical object of thought.

Thus the physical object, taken as the external existent independent of thought and perception, is treated as in a different dimension from the familiar perceptible thing, whereas it is, according to experience, a set of that very thing's determinations in the same world with it, and no less relative to consciousness.

To sustain this contention critical realism defends transcendence, interpreting it as transcendence of experience, and in this interpretation joining hands with extreme neo-idealism, which, however, for the same reason, rejects transcendence. Their common error is the confusion of transcendence of experience and transcendence of immediacy, which latter is the inherent character of thought, and includes all the recognised cases of transcendence on which critical realism relies to establish its doctrine. But its own special case is *really* a transcendence of experience, and as such involves the contradiction in terms which attaches to the unknowable *Ding-an-sich*. Here the same necessity—the refusal to find reality in the implications of the whole of experience for thought—leads to a meeting of extremes with all believers in the *Ding-an-sich*, in the same abrupt expedient, the postulation of a world of self-existent substantive particulars, objects of thought without being subjects of propositions—a contradiction in terms. The special argument from our instinct of co-operation with a real world of existence is merely an application of the conception of thought, forming a meeting-point with other contemporary types of reasoning, and familiar already from Greek philosophy.

CHAPTER VIII

UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE, AND RELIGION

IN the present chapter it will be necessary to repeat the journey traversed in Chapter VI, only, as it were, on the other side of the hedge. We saw the strength and spread of the progressive doctrine in to-day's philosophy. But we noted by contrast indications which the philosophers we spoke of share with other modes of thinking, to the effect that their primary and explicit common contention omits something of the truth in which other thought converges with what they suggest.

1. I begin by observing, merely to meet a plausible idea which popular science might suggest, that the philosophical bearing of the doctrine of relativity is less certain than some of its language might make us think. It might be held that the problem of the ultimate reality of time had been finally decided when it is admitted to be an element in every experience of space, and that therefore it could no longer be questioned in any sense whatever. It might be held, too, that the essential progressiveness of ultimate reality—its incompleteness and restlessness, to use a favourite phrase of Professor Alexander's—was therefore established. All that I venture to say on this point, while passing to the fundamental problem of the unity

of the universe as demanded by metaphysics and by religion, is to recall a very simple and primary analogy which I have appealed to elsewhere,¹ in dealing with the alleged reality of the time experience. The analogy in this seems to me suggestive, if I am right in gathering that the thoroughgoing relativity of space-time *prima facie* indeed disintegrates the universe into individual time-systems, estimated primarily from bases within themselves, and entirely relative in their character when determined *ab extra*; but that when the matter is pressed home it seems evident (such I take to be Professor Alexander's conclusion²) that a common world is implied "in which the worlds of the two [all possible] sets of observers are unified." The world is a unity of movements, but not a single movement (anticipated by Bradley, "Appearance," pp. 210 ff.).

I said above that this result might almost have been anticipated from a familiar and commonplace observation on a very much lower level of experience and thought, which seemed to me to bear on an analogous problem.

What I am referring to is the private or personal experience of duration in comparison with the standard or general time of the sun or our clocks. This time view³ is in the first place most completely relative. It is so relative as to be almost

¹ In earlier writings on the subject of time. I have not these or the references.

² "Space, etc," I, 90.

³ There is a well-known sermon of James Martineau's on it, called "The Christian Time-View."

absolute—isolated, unREFERRED ; we do not in the least know what it is relative to. When we seem to be waiting endlessly, racked by pain or anxiety, what does clock-time matter to us ? There is no time-experience more variable than this, and none more relative to its conditions, if we knew what they were. And certainly there is none more real. Nothing you can think or say about time can supersede this duration or modify its actuality.

Now this, I take it, is our primitive sense of time. At any rate, it is in one way prior to any measured duration—lacks something in comparison with it—though, as I say, it is by no means less real, and persists beside the other. But beside it, and gaining more and more extension and authority as civilisation becomes more insistent, we have uniform time, clock-time of some sort. We erect a measure in some natural or artificial process, the uniformity of which we think there is no reason to doubt,¹ and we believe, though to test our belief is strictly impossible, that its successive sections are equal durations, that if, *per impossible*, they could be superposed, they would coincide. We think this an advance. We have standardised durations and made science and social co-operation possible. It is clearly analogous to what happens when we establish a general principle or theory,

¹ I do not know whether Professor Whitehead's remarks ("Concept of Nature," p 137) are meant to dispute this—viz., the natural logic which relies on a process such that we see no reason for it to change its pace. If they are so, I should be obliged to differ, however rashly. See "Knowledge and Reality," p. 329

or state the variations of secondary qualities in terms of their primary bases.

But this "uniform" time does not supersede the personal experience of duration. The latter persists by the side of the standard time, just as do the secondary qualities by the side of the primary qualities to cases of which they are referred. It is foolish to treat the uniform time as the reality or the real time in any sense which implies that it supersedes the other. We know what comes of treating secondary qualities as unreal in comparison with primary. The world is robbed of half its beauty and interest ; if we persist, we land in materialism. So it would be if we treated clock-time as *the* time or the only time. Our lives, we may say, would be wiped out.

Our personal time-view then is relative, because so wholly unstandardised, though for this very reason in one sense absolute, comparable with nothing else. The accepted uniform time is "absolute" because, as we suppose, at a certain stage it enables us to refer all durations to a single standard. If I am to meet you, we must go by the same time, and for that we appeal to "the time," which we idealise as a uniform flow, as if something apart, when it is really the consensus of all motions so far as corrected by comparison and reasoning, and brought to an agreement, deviations from which can be detected. I do not know how any such account stands towards Newton's absolute time ; but I am sure it is a sufficient description of what Locke meant by it.¹

¹ See "Knowledge and Reality," *loc.*

Now we see in this commonplace comparison of primary experiences an analogue of the doctrine of relativity in its philosophical bearing. In the secondary world of advanced precision, we seem to be playing the same game over again. You begin with experiences, unique in themselves, but variable *ad infinitum* as referred to each other, as you did with the personal time-view. And this is all real. You cannot modify the unique time and space for the observer at rest in his space-system.¹

But it appears that in this secondary world of extreme precision and complex theory you can make a further step, as was done in the primary world when man conceived uniform time. The unique systems cannot be superseded, but they can be brought into a common world. Then, so far as I can apprehend, the spatio-temporal universe would have to be conceived as a world whose members lived in or at related space-times, but which had no single space-time of its own. As absolute time connected personal durations, but did not absorb and include them, so total space-time would connect its unique embodiments, but would not supersede them by a single progression of its own. Life, motion, would be their way of being within the whole, what Spinoza would call their proportions of motion and rest, but it would be idle to talk of a motion or progression of the whole as such. To what could it be relative?

The moral which I am trying to point is merely this. No one should ever have thought that by connecting personal duration with a standard

¹ Whitehead, "Concept of Nature," p. 178.

which gave so-called absolute time, we were superseding the former by the latter, or substituting a reality for an appearance. It might just as well be interpreted the opposite way. And in the same way no one should think that in connecting relative systems of space-time with a total of their relativities, we are combining them into a real time which supersedes their individual lives. The total of connected time-systems is more concrete than the single standardised time-flow, but it is still a world of times and not a time. So at least it appears to me.

We have just seen that the principle of space-time, as developed in the conception of relativity, does not, at least in Professor Alexander's hands, prove fatal to the belief in a common world. It does, in fact, at least connect with and develop doctrines familiar to the most absolutist philosophy.¹

¹ I cite from Mr. Bradley's "Appearance" (2 ed.), 1897, p. 598: "A difficulty which might have been included in this chapter [chap. v., "Motion and Change and its Perception"] is the problem of what might be called the Relativity of Motion. Has Motion any meaning whatever except as the alteration of the spatial relation of bodies? Has it the smallest meaning apart from the plurality of bodies? Can it be called, to speak strictly, the *state* either (a) of one single body or (b) of a number of bodies? . . . The idea of the motion of a single body may perhaps (I am ignorant) be necessary in physics, and, if that is so, then in physics, of course, that idea must be rational and right. But, except as a working fiction of this kind, it strikes my mind as a typical instance of unnecessary nonsense. . . . The whole idea [reference to Lotze, "Metaphysik," Sectt. 164, 165, and Liebmann, "Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit," pp. 113 ff.] of a solitary sphere in space, to say nothing of its rotation and centrifugal force, considered

Now we are to proceed in considering the points which give significance to the position opposed to that described in Chapter VI., if not including and superseding it.¹

metaphysically, is, I should say, a mere vicious abstraction, and from the first totally inadmissible. . . . That in philosophy any man should use the idea of a single moving body as if it were a thing self-evident and free from difficulty, this really surprises me." Mr. Bradley, of course, is here sustaining his own argument that the contradictions of space and time point to a higher mode of being. The interest in the context of my argument is that relativity enforces it upon us that we must go at least as far as the whole experienced system. Then, in what manner this can really be is a matter for further enquiry. Such words, say, as "whole" and "system" (see Whitehead, "Concept of Nature," p. 146) are good ones; and science evidently means to make full use of them. But they do not tell you by themselves how far they may carry you.

¹ An obvious recognition of the inseparability of space and time in the region of everyday experience is, of course, to be found in the expressions which indicate measures of time or distance. The passage in Herodotus (I. 72) is typical: μήκος ὁδοῦ εὐζώνῳ ἀνδρὶ πέντε ἡμέραι ἀνασιμούνται ["the length of the journey (the road) is five days for a good walker"]. I do not know whether "Stunde" first meant time or distance. As our means of travelling came to vary very greatly, the relativity of time and distance, which I take it was in early experience drawn from current usage based on the usual mode of travel, comes to be commonly insisted on, space-denominations being absorbed into time, which is the practically important feature. "We live an hour from London." "An hour from London by rail." "An hour from London by express." No doubt we shall soon say how far by aeroplane. A curious case is one in which the *name* of the *distance* is retained, but indicates different lengths according to the time (or exertion) [Morse's "Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire," chap. vi., "Measure of Distance": "A theoretic unit is the li, measuring 1,800 of the land foot (the foot differs in length for different purposes).

We will begin by attempting to estimate the depth of the unanimity which we pointed out as existing between the neo-idealists and the neo-realists, especially such a neo-realist as Professor Alexander,¹ and will then attempt to develop and complete the indications which the enquiry will bring before us, that some further modification of their common ideas is inevitable.

Everyone knows there is time and change in the universe. It is the first lesson of experience, and the question for philosophy is whether it is also the last. We observed that the latter conviction has come upon the modern philosophical world like a flood, and that in the regions *prima facie* most removed from each other. The universe is history through and through, say Professor Gentile and Professor Alexander alike. For the neo-idealist who thinks with the former, reality is one with the pulse of thought. Its growing-point is in the dialectic contrasts, one side of which is necessarily and endlessly, in an ever self-reflecting circuit, evolving the others.

Based on a foot of 10·1 English inches it would measure 705 yards, or $\frac{1}{10}$ of a statute mile. In practice it is one-hundredth of the distance a laden porter will cover in a day of ten hours' marching; on the plain this would represent a third of a mile, a half-kilometre, more or less, but in hilly country it varies considerably. By Chinese reckoning, if it is 50 li to the top of Mount Washington, returning by the same road to the same point it may be 25 li. A mountain may be spoken of as 100 miles high—by road"]. Everyone is aware that you don't know what a distance is till you know what kind of going it is.

¹ Professor Watts Cunningham, who follows Bergson on the reality of time, occupies an interesting middle position.

For the other, and I take it M. Bergson so far goes along with him, the reality of time, "creative time," is the mainspring.

The fundamental problem, common to both attitudes, is stated effectively in the quotation from Gentile which I used in opening up the comparison which I am now developing.¹ It turns, in his phrase, on the word "fuori" (outside). If your philosophy places true being outside history or things, progress, which is the realisation of the true being of things, is *ex hypothesi* impossible. In other words, we might say, the universe is cut in two. The real is not rational, and the rational is not real. The series of events does not touch the true being of things; the true being of things is not revealed in the series of events.

Very well, then; our two extremes, creative thought, we may say shortly, and creative time, meet in the demand that true being—ultimate reality—must somehow engage in history and in progress. It must not be behind them or beside them. The changes which form the succession of events must be changes in the real system of the whole universe. It, itself, must be first one thing and then another. It must cease to be what it was, and become what it was not. What I want to do is to see exactly, so far as I can, how much this signifies for each of the thinkers concerned, and how far they respectively go towards recognising the universe as a unity. What I suggest by anticipation as broadly and

¹ Chap. II., p. 59, *supra*.

roughly the truth is that Professor Gentile has recognised the unity without the universe, and Professor Alexander the universe without the unity.

(a) In order to determine the real attitude of neo-idealist and of neo-realist to the unity of the universe, let us consider their respective modes of dealing with the problem of transcendence. If the reality of things is embodied in an actual succession of events, how is the connection between the members of this succession and one another, and also between each of them and the whole of finite experience, exhibited and maintained? How is a past event accessible from the standpoint of present experience? And, if the series by itself constitutes the whole and sole reality, and passes beyond present experience, how is any identity of characteristics guaranteed to the universe as a whole?

In face of such questions as these, there is no doubt what the neo-idealist would answer. Of all things he most decidedly rejects the transcendent. "Nothing pre-existent, nothing transcendent," is his watchword. Nothing enters into his real world which is not created, produced in vital coherence with all else, by the pure act of thinking. So far, one might say, the whole system is founded on the vital oneness of the thinking spirit, which *is* the whole and the universe.

And the thinking spirit is explicitly declared not to mean the finite subject of thought. The theory is not a subjective idealism. To identify

thought and reality would be absurd, if thought were the thinking of the empirical ego. The thought, whose thinking is reality, self-creating reality, is the thought which lives in the "we," the group life, the social unity of fact and will. Metaphysic, the study of reality, is for them the "*Metafisica della Mente*" by contrast with the superseded "*Metafisica dell' Ente*."¹

Reality, then, is historical through and through. It is the progression which is moved by the dialectic of finite mind according to the ultimate structure of the spirit. And nothing outside this progression—nothing transcendent—is real.

If we ask now about the members of the progression itself, say, a past event, the primary answer is not wanting. "All history is contemporary." The past, if I understand rightly, is implied, as we might say, in our given present.² It is all of one tissue, and the reality lives in our experience, as amplified by all that is implied as a living outgrowth from our present. Still more to unify the world, we are to realise that the history, which is thus, while a progression, a single real, is also—I had almost said—an appearance of a real in a different form. But that language would not here be accepted. All that we can say, I believe, is that the historical progress is the same thing with the "ideal eternal history," and, in short, that history is one with philosophy, and, if we will speak of an absolute, is in this sense one with the

¹ "*Spirito*," p. 12.

² The doctrine is so far one with that of Bradley, "*Essays*," pp. 147-8, 426.

absolute. For the absolute does not fall outside the progression. It is, I gather, the term applied to the circle of categories, which, reproducing each other in the rotation of an unceasing dialectic, form the very being of the self-creative thinking which is reality. It would not be fair, I think, to suggest that in identifying history and philosophy they pronounce the concrete world-process one and the same thing with the rotation of abstract terms which constitutes the dialectic movement. As I understand, philosophy stands with them for the concrete culmination of all living and thinking; and so, if we concluded that the absolute is finite experience at its *both* fullest *and* most intelligible pitch; that this is philosophy, history, and the realisation of the ideal eternal history, which is eternal in recurrences, but not repetitions—we should be doing our best for their argument.

Out of this intention of theirs we can gather a good deal that makes for the unity of the universe.

The dialectic process, indeed, is endless. The "Tutto" is spoken of; but there is no whole which is the spring of the dialectic in the sense of the return of abstractions to the concrete which completes them. "There is no path from an abstraction to a concrete."

Still, there is a conviction that the character of the Tutto is permanent. The categories of the rotation, attitudes of the spirit, are apparently in principle immutable. The values, in connection with them (as beauty and truth are two levels of the relatively apprehending spirit), are also eternal features of the universe. The eternal history is

the realisation of the "immanent and eternal victory of man over nature."¹ The conflict is endless, but not indecisive. Evil becomes known as evil, in and through its rejection, and therefore the succession of events is inherently, and by definition, an advance, and the perfectibility of man (by approximation, I take it we must understand) is an axiom. We may speak of God,² but purely as immanent in man; and of Providence which guides history, but simply in the sense of the reasonable spirit active in man. We noted the idea of a unity linking the steps of the series together, the form of a *nîsus* or dream, prophetic of the phases of development yet to come, and inspiring man in his endeavour towards them. Here the coincidence with Alexander is remarkable, and we seem also to receive suggestions of a spirit which transcends human thinking, and lives no less in the growth of "nature" than in man. Insistence on this aspect of the theory would, as it seems to me, transform it. "The Spirit, infinite possibility overflowing into infinite actuality, has drawn, and is drawing at every moment, the cosmos out of chaos—has effected the passage from animal to human life,"³ etc.

(β) What we have mainly to set against these indications of a realised unity of the universe, besides the fundamental difficulty of the endless progression itself as the nature of ultimate reality,⁴

¹ Gentile, "Spirito," p. 214.

² Croce, "Pratica," p. 181. Gentile, "Spirito," p. 237: "teogonia eterna," said of "il mondo." Cf. with Alexander.

³ Croce, "Pratica," p. 179.

⁴ The spirit conceived as infinite possibility seems at once discrepant with this.

are the paradoxes which arise out of the identification of the ultimate real with human, or at least finite, thinking—the act of thought—in its form of history and philosophy. We saw how, for example, the transcendence of the past is overcome. But it does not appear to be overcome completely. What is not unified with present experience is forgotten, and what is forgotten, as I understand, is clean gone from the universe, and rightly so, except in as far as its effects survive, apart from consciousness of them.¹ Again we have noted the narrowness of the conception of progress. We are told of the thinkers who, in preparing for the true modern standpoint, “pioneered the course of thought towards the human and the terrestrial (*terreno*) as the exclusive reality (*come unica realtà*).”² This really drops back into a progress-of-the-species theory, as in an ordinary neo-realist.³ The same exclusiveness appears in the estimate of the values and problems of philosophy. Sociality, religion, metaphysic, are all of them forms for which the system can find no place.⁴ There is no central or fundamental problem of philosophy, such as the distinction of reality and appearance, which might form the object of metaphysic.

Thus the statement made above seems to be so far justified.⁵ For these thinkers there is a unity,

¹ P. 54, *supra*.

² Croce, “Teoria e Storia,” p. 137.

³ Say Perry in Hoczné, *Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1918, pp. 147-8.

⁴ “Estetica,” chap. viii, “Teoria e Storia,” pp. 137 ff.

⁵ P. 159, *supra*.

for thinking is the essence of unity, and what they found their doctrine on is the act of thinking, taken as the self-creative reality. But it seems not to develop into a universe. The rejection of transcendence seems to be applied not to transcendence of experience, but to transcendence of immediacy. And with the repudiation of transcendence in this latter sense, the transcendence which belongs to every object of thought, the objective and differentiated universe becomes a blank, and there is nothing to sustain the endless progression, to unite it with a whole, and so to guarantee its nature and character. Unity is affirmed, but not substantiated ; not exhibited in differentiated detail, nor in the mainspring of the dialectic, the return of the abstract to the concrete. And we saw in the previous chapter the special result in the preference of a moral to a religious attitude, an attitude of meliorism and conflict to one of religious faith.

In turning to attempt an analogous estimate of the features in Professor Alexander's theory which mark how he conceives the unity of the universe, I should, if my estimate were to be thorough and adequate, be embarking on an enterprise of greater range than the former one, and, strictly speaking, beyond my competence. Nothing justifies me in attempting it but my confident belief that, even to my comparatively uninstructed gaze (for the modern theory of time is almost altogether out of my reach), there are considerable elements of value to be drawn from points in which a really great and philosophically minded realist may be com-

pared with a somewhat passionate though brilliant and suggestive idealist.

(α) The evolution of the universe is, in Professor Alexander's view, rooted, not in the dialectic of thought, but in the inherent restlessness of time. Everything in his system depends on the inherent nature of space-time, which, as I understand, is a real system of motions, arranging themselves in patterns, which are the actual essence of things.

Now, according to the ordinary view of time, in its separation, Alexander would say, from space, nothing could be less suggestive of the unity of the universe than an identification of it with a progression in time. If time is ultimately real, we commonly say, this means that the past is really gone, is no more anything. Time is the scythe-man, the aspect of negation in succession. Alexander's conception is different. If time is real, if it is taken seriously—he admits a considerable debt to Bergson—it follows that the past is real. It does not exist to-day; that is true. But its reality is to have existed when it did.¹ For time is not a mere negative aspect. In its conjunction with space it is a creative being, and in a complete view of space-time, as I gather, any past event would appear within a single whole which centres in the present, and placed and dated with reference to it.

Now, whatever difficulties one might venture to find in Alexander's scheme, one must admit that in it the structure of the universe is broadly and

¹ "Space," etc., I. 72.

impartially laid out. To start from human experience is an intimate and attractive introduction to reality.¹ But it is obviously narrow and impotent unless some doctrine of implication or differentiation widens and confirms its foundation. It is a strange experience in the cases before us to turn from the idealist to the realist. With the idealist, however noble and brilliant his inspiration, everything was passionately human. We really seemed to forget "the spacious firmament on high," of which it was a merit in our early religion perpetually to remind us. With the realist—extraordinary reversal!—we move in a larger air. We are with Meredith, the poet of the stars, of motion, of colour.

And in all this the underlying unity is not indeed mind; but it is not wholly heterogeneous to mind. There is something in the restlessness of the universe—its time—which is akin to mind, or at least to soul. "Time is the soul of space"; and, as I gather, in the special qualities which emerge in the course of evolution from the complications of space-time, there is at every level an analogue of what time is to space, and our own psychoses to our own neuroses.

Then, further, the relation of deity to the universe is full of suggestion. What is actual in it, as I understand, is the universe with its *nisus* and its dream, which rather remarkably, as I said, reminds us of Croce. But here we have something which the neo-idealists repudiate in principle. We have the second and inde-

¹ Cf Bradley, "Essays," pp. 142-3.

pendent root of religion, over and above the demand of moral law, in the sense of an emotion which demands a something that can be worshipped. This sense, while founded in something very primitive, yet has in it the beginnings of that identity of the finite self with the greater being which includes it, which is perhaps the principal and most inspiring feature of the unity of the universe. To reject religious faith—that is, identity in will and belief with a supreme power and good—is to take the heart out of the effective oneness of the world, and of humanity with the world. In spite of Alexander's peculiar theory of deity, of which the little that I have to say will be in place at another point, the universe is clearly marked for him as affording an object of worship, and exercising an influence upon man which leads him to the attitude of worship. And this is a principal element in the unity of the universe, as he clearly recognises: "The world as a whole in its forward tendency acts upon our bodily organism, and the religious sentiment is the feeling for this whole."¹ The action upon our bodily organism may be doubted; it belongs, I suppose, to the doctrine which places the one reality of the universe in space-time. But the religious emotion as an emotion "towards the whole of reality in its nisus towards a new quality" seems a solid fact of experience, elucidating and elucidated by such a conception as that of James that in religion "the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come."

¹ "Space, etc.," II. 376.

(β) After these few words of reference to Alexander's real universe, it is necessary for our purpose to indicate how far its unity is secured by the system he ascribes to it. It would be a fascinating task to study the connections in detail, and endeavour to estimate their necessity, or their coherence; for the word "must" he is inclined to reject from philosophy. But it is not our task, at all events, in the present work. We must confine ourselves to the humbler and simpler function of indicating how far, in principle, the fundamental paradoxes of a realistic and successional point of view have been overcome.

If we had analysed the entire work—we pre-suppose the reader to be familiar with it—we should have observed that the foundation in space-time necessarily draws out into a succession of features which we should have expected to be intimately interdependent in a whole. The most original and extraordinary of these dissociations is, of course, the position of deity itself. But this, as the author constantly insists, is only in line with his whole principle of emergents—the successively higher qualities carried by complications of space-time. The point is, however (and the author makes no attempt to conceal or to blunt it), that "we still raise our altars to the unknown God." "The infinite God is purely ideal or conceptual. The individual so sketched is not asserted to exist." "As actual, God does not possess the quality of deity, but is the universe as straining to that quality."¹ The quality of deity

¹ *Op. cit.*, II. 361.

is always future in the evolution ; it is what the world is dreaming of and reaching towards. What we actually worship is the universe as straining towards that quality, itself unknown, but superior to mind and spirit, and analogous in the law of its emergence to mind as compared with life, and to life as compared with physico-chemical relations. Always there is a specialised complex of space-time which "carries the new emergent quality, itself unknown until it appears, but holding the place of deity to the previous quality."

Alexander frankly raises the question of a "possible objection to this notion of a variable God, which is, as it were, projected in front of each successive level of existents. How can we declare him to be the whole universe ? Must not God be different at each level?"¹

His answer is clear ; and, for good or evil, it must decide our question of unity. The unity is space-time. This is the absolute, for the author. It is the lowest expression of the universe, not, as the absolute for absolutists, the highest. The variations of deity fall within this. "It is always the one universe of space-time which is God's body, but it varies in its empirical constitution and its deity."²

This pronouncement must, I think, decide our question, though it may decide it differently for different readers. The unity of the universe lies in space-time, which is an all-inclusive though creative being ; it is the whole, though through the creative incompleteness of time, inherently

¹ *Op. cit.*, II. 366.

² *Ibid.*

incomplete. It *is*, however, the whole in a very important sense. It is not within any further space or time. It *is* all the space and time there can be. This will perhaps affect the question of its ultimate progress or motion as such or as a whole.

But in the meantime, for us, the question is decided in the negative. Where there is no universal mind, no all-inclusive experience, there is for us no unity of the universe. The whole set of connections—*e.g.*, those of the empirical qualities with space-time—is arbitrary, and there is no whole in which the past is apprehended as an enlargement of our present experience, springing, through implication, from the whole which is immanent in that experience. There is no universal mind; no common mind either in family, society, State, or the religious experience, such as the facts of a general will, or a will shared in religion by God and man, seem to most of us to affirm. I do not know that argument is helpful here. It seems a case for Professor Alexander's own method. If we attend to the common substance of particular wills in the family and the State, and yet believe that it can be reduced to a similarity of particular finites between which there is no objective identity, it is impossible, perhaps, to establish the contrary. All we can do seems to be to point out what we take to be the confusion which treats the irreducible unsharableness of the immediate experiences of finite minds as an objection to finding a fundamental identity in the systematic ideas and purposes which they constitute,

by participating in them ; not by way of repetition, but by way of complementary co-operation. It seems to us to express an atomistic superstition and nothing more. Every mind is, for this attitude, a thing among things ; a complex of qualities, including consciousness, carried by a special complex of space-time within the pattern which constitutes an organism.

Further, the aspect of unity which seemed to be so appreciatively handled in the account of religious emotion, seems here to have its foundation destroyed. God is not, as such, of the nature of mind or spirit, and therefore He cannot be united with man in any such kind of being. Nevertheless, it is possible to push this criticism too far. One cannot but note that our leading thinkers are more and more inclined to insist on the metaphorical character of the phrases in which we express the identity of consciousness between God and man.¹ I do not say that a recognition of this kind justifies Alexander's removal of deity in principle beyond the present of experience. But the account of the universe as it is an actual object of worship—as a whole straining towards deity—goes far to compensate for the rejection, in this one reference, of such special terms as mind and spirit.

For us, however, when all allowance is made, it is enough to say that, for this doctrine, the unity of the universe lies, completely, in space-time alone, its lowest expression. It plays a part, in spite of

¹ Bradley, "Essays," p. 436, n. Stout, "Syllabus," II. 13, 16.

the real qualities supposed to inhere in it, analogous to the existent objects of thought (the physical objects) of critical realism. Individuality, identity, significance live in a higher world than these. It is not an infinite or individual unity, one in which the whole inspires every member. If infinite in a sense, it is an infinite of a low order. Yet Alexander's recognition of the specific religious experience must not be slurred over.

(γ) We saw that Alexander gives full weight to the special religious experience, the emotion towards a something which demands our worship, and in which we come to feel a greater than ourselves with which we are one. This gives us a deeper view of the universe than that which treats the religious experience as mythical, and restricts the good which we seek to grasp and realise to the strictly progressive attitude of morality. Alexander, indeed, disagrees in many respects with the criticism which Mr. Bradley has launched at the purely moralistic attitude; and if I were treating his work completely and for its own sake, it would be necessary to explain my attitude to these disagreements. But I do not think that he either could or would repudiate the distinction between religion and morality which seems to me fundamental. Morality represents, as he says, the solution of a problem.¹ Moral goodness is a new reality whose internal coherence is its goodness.² Now for these reasons it is essentially progressive. The multitude of desires and of conditions necessarily demands perpetually new solutions, and leaves on the individual the impression that he can never be

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 274.

² *Ibid.* 280.

wholly equal to the occasion. To some extent in the social world a standing solution has been established ; and so far we have a relatively satisfactory whole with which we can identify ourselves up to a certain point and so far be at home and have a good conscience.¹ But this social satisfaction is essentially incomplete, and so far as it has completeness, and functions as a whole, is nearer to religion than to morality. Morality is essentially the growing-point of goodness, at which we find our best coherence to be but incoherent, and a new coherence, like a new theory in face of new facts, to be demanding realisation. This is what the progressive theorists, neo-idealists and neo-realists alike, insist upon. The failure of solutions is the motive of their progression *ad infinitum*. The end, it is said, is realised progressively ; but, it is the old criticism of Kant, this seems to say that it is never realised at all.

Here Alexander, whether accepting or rejecting any such criticism levelled at the essence of moral good, has, as we saw, emphasised another experience. In religion we find "saving experiences"—he quotes the phrase from William James²—in continuity with a wider self. We are one with the whole by faith and not in works. Here our inadequacy is done away. This is the very meaning of "saving experiences." We throw ourselves upon the grace of the universe and find in oneness with it an adequacy which is self-contradictory for us as finite agents. I daresay Professor Alexander would not subscribe to all this explanation ; but he

¹ Bradley, "Ethical Studies," "My Station and its Duties."

² *Op. cit.*, II. 376.

recognises, as other realists do not, the experience and its main significance. And so far there is a meeting of extremes between him and the other idealists (the so-called absolutists) which the neo-idealists do not share. It comes of his taking so seriously the differentiations of the universe. Religion, as he sees, is, so to speak, a special differentiation in experience addressed to and uniting the finite being with the universe in a special aspect and character—that of a unity which thrills and grasps the finite soul.

I shall now attempt, in two concluding chapters, to concentrate, in their true terms of agreement and antagonism, the motives which make for a belief in alteration and advance, or again in eternity and conservation, as more ultimate and fundamental characters of the universe. When their significance is thoroughly weighed, and their appearance, in the different quarters in which they appear, is duly estimated, it seems to me that the issues raised will be more instructive, more concrete, and more applicable to experience than the customary attitude of aloofness permits. Every disputant will find, I think, that he has important problems to recognise, not only in his opponents' views, but in his own; and that you cannot marshal in their order such indications as we have been tracing without revealing necessities which will bring into each other's presence questions more fully explained and more carefully discriminated than has been customary in those regions where, I should say, the issues as a rule do not really meet.

CHAPTER IX

UNITY OF THE UNIVERSE AND CHANGE

I wish now to attempt the completion of the chain of thought suggested by the various meetings of extremes in the previous chapter, and to bring it to a reasonable issue, in which the considerations are really relevant to one another.

I start, for the sake of clearness, so to speak, from the other end of the argument, as compared with the previous chapter. We were there comparing the recognitions, on very various sides, of the facts and demands by which life impresses upon us the truths of change and of unity. I now desire to take my stand, to begin with, at the most simple and abstract thought concerning the universe, in order to state the total burden of my conception in a very few and plain sentences. But I do not propose to neglect the good and wise habit which we noted as a meeting of extremes in modern philosophy—the habit of amplifying and reinforcing the insight of ontological thought by a careful and comprehensive survey of practical and emotional responses, such as are evidence for the general drift and orientation which are natural and inherent in our mind. After trying to make clear in general the conclusion which I mean to suggest, I shall, therefore, go back over points in

the special observations we have traversed, and endeavour to present a sketch of an attitude which is, if I may use the phrase, at once rational and reasonable ; justified by argument, and by comparison with the demands and reactions of life. In welding together the two sides, or two stages, of my argument, I shall not admit, and shall attempt in passing to discredit, the language of disparagement which is now not infrequently held towards definite thought in general. What governs thought and finds utterance in its coherence is, as I hold, simply the nature of things. When we read, in distinguished thinkers to-day, of mere logical coherence,¹ or of the vice of going to thought and not to things for the standard of contradiction,² I feel for my part that to such language no clear ideas can be attached. There is no special logical coherence that I ever heard of ; there is no special contradiction called a contradiction of thought. The coherence is the coherence of all that there is ; a contradiction is an impasse which not all the experience available can resolve. If you impeach my coherence as narrowly founded, or my contradiction as omitting elements which might resolve it, bring out your additional or underlying elements and let us see them, and see how and why they make a change in the situation. No one denies that they may do so ; but the question is if they do.

I begin then with my simple statement. The

¹ Haldane, p. 322 : " mere logical coherency apparently contrasted with " concrete experience " !

² Alexander, II. 372.

whole cannot change. The whole I take to mean the universe ; all that in any sense is. It cannot change, because any change introduces something that is, and this, *ex hypothesi*, falls within the whole. The whole, if it changes, was not the whole, but something less. All that is includes all that can be ; there can be nothing more than it.

Now I am perfectly well aware of the dialectic of being and becoming that might be applied to any such determination as this. The little novelty, if it is even a partial novelty, of my treatment is that I want to work it out in the suggestions of life and experience, and not in the language of abstract speculation. This latter, though really, if precisely used, it utters the controlling nature of things, yet does not, by itself, exhibit the eccentricities and onesidednesses which attach to the defective points of view. It does not "place" them at once in the concrete context of life, where their weakness and its pervading grounds strike the eye directly. I will begin by reminding the reader of what sort of subject-matter we are talking about, and try to enforce my point of view at starting by some remarks on possibility.

(a) As in most places where a true philosophical problem is in question, we have here, in the attitude to be taken towards the universe, some help from Professor Alexander. We cannot be content with his definite account of it as space-time,¹ the lowest expression possible, but we note his repudiation of certain determinations of it, as not a whole of parts (at least not such a whole as can be relative

¹ "Space, etc.," I. 339 ff.

to other wholes of parts), not a one, such as can descend into the field of number, but, if we like, *the* one; and not a substance related by causality to other substances. This way of speaking, though it implies matters with which we do not agree, such as the absence of a universal mind, yet exhibits a complete and valuable grasp of the main thing about the universe which seems so fatally hard to apprehend. This is, that it is simply everything, and the theatre of all that happens. Thus, when you begin to talk about it as you would about one finite being, or organism, or society among others, you are always at least on the brink of the unmeaning. We will speak of time below, but with reference to the ordinary experiences of change, progress, and decadence, it is clear that it is one thing to attribute them to units of a number of finite beings, interacting causally within a theatre of common features and endowments, such that creatures in all stages of evolution are continually impinging upon one another, and supplying to each other new conditions, grounds of possibility, materials, and interferences of all possible kinds and directions—directions being determined, to use the phrase fashionable to-day, by systems of reference offered by and within the universe itself. But it is another thing to ascribe them to the total itself of all that is, whose nature is, *ex hypothesi*, the unique and only source and foundation of all that in any way comes to pass.

When you bind yourself to apply such a mode of consideration to the system of all that is, the

scene is surely changed. You are bound to furnish a distinction between a movement or advance within it, relative as between the elements which are its subordinate members, and a movement or change of it — of the all, the totality of the real, of the ultimate base and foundation of being as such. Now I should be absurd on my side if I said that a change of the whole could have no meaning so long as anything in it at all were persistent, that there was no change of the whole short of a substitution, in which nothing remained the same. But, on the other hand, in face of a living and seething entirety, *prima facie* cross-currented in all conceivable directions, you are, I think, bound, if you say that all that is has a movement as a whole, and not merely movements within itself, to explain how you differentiate the two things from one another, bearing in mind that it can have no external relations. Of course, to contrast your view with such an idea as *a totum simul*, or as a static, pulseless, and rigid block universe¹ can have no bearing of any kind on the question when thus stated. We are trying to see what can be meant by the movement of all that is as a system, or as a whole; ceasing to be one thing, we must suppose, and becoming, in the main and in its profound character and foundations, something altogether different. I shall argue, according to the method I am adopting, not so much that this is impossible *in rerum natura*, though I am of that opinion; as that, when its range and significance are plainly seen, no one will

¹ Watts Cunningham, pp. 206-8; and see Haldane, 317.

be found to believe it for a moment ; no one, that is, will be found who shows, when we come to survey his view in its bearings and precise implications, that he does, in fact, believe it for a moment.

Let us consider first the relation of the universe to possibilities. It sounds a simple rejoinder to our formal arguments to say "Yes ; the universe is all that is ; but then, over and above all this, there are the possibilities ; there is all that may be and that is to be. This is how the whole can change. It is within another and a further world ; the gates of the future are wide open ; besides what is, the universe is in relation with what may be."

But we are driven to reject any such reasoning. It will not stand before a direct logical enquiry into the conditions of possibility. Possibility is within the real, not reality within the possible. It rests on a positive foundation, and indicates a determinate condition which, if completed in a certain way, which we do not know to be excluded by the nature of things, would carry a certain consequent, which is then, as so hypothetically conceived, an actual possibility.

Possibility, therefore, does not help you to bring alteration into the totality of what is. Its possibilities are rooted in itself. They can derive from nowhere else ; there is nothing else from which anything can derive. As I have argued elsewhere,¹ a being that has a purpose, a career, an alteration in time, is a different sort of being from the universe. It is one among others, a finite, a

¹ "Principle," chaps. iv. and x., Appendix II.

partial nature which, in the conditions which meet it in the world of all there is, finds stimuli, ends to attain, defects to make good, positive but partial conditions calling for completion. The universe is the *raison d'être* of all this. It is the ultimate real in which lies the fact that anything at all is and can be, and the ultimate characters which are, in virtue of that fact. Starting from the common ground that the universe is full of change and movement, we have staring us in the face the problem whether it can be described as, taken altogether, a movement or engaged in a movement. That would mean, as I understand, on any reasonable rendering, whether it was, to put it quite roughly at first, more like the ocean,¹ or more like a river; whether it is, in its entire and fundamental being, engaged in a passage and departure from one type or determination of being to another which succeeds the former and excludes it.

Let us pause here for a moment and consider what we are about. We are speaking of the all-inclusive being. And our imagination is continually inciting us, so it seems to me, to treat it on the model of the "things" which surround us, giving the preference, no doubt, to those examples of them which have the ampler foundations in our world, and make the greater display of being something like self-contained—a social whole, European civilisation, the human race, the earth

¹ Or, say, taking a suggestion from Warde Fowler's explanation of "*Hic mihi magna domus*" (said by the Tiber), the whole connected water-system of the terraqueous globe.

on which we live. Any one of these objects tends to run a course which we can describe under conditions which we can to some extent and with some plausibility lay down. We can estimate—empirically, perhaps, but by empiricism on a grand scale—within what sort or kind of limits their variations are likely to be restricted and their course to be laid out. We quite understand that they have respectively lines of evolution, each unique and individual, and dependent on the part of the universe with which they have to do, on its responses, its reactions, and its impulses. Now even with them there seems to be an element of stability as well as an element of alteration. The world of values seems to use the various temporal series of events to bring into existence and appreciation something which is fundamental and supreme within the whole agitation of the universe, and which is not *prima facie* tied down to any single line of advance, but rather reveals in an infinity of features an infinitely complex order in which the whole—the entirety¹—maintains its general nature in infinite directions at once.

Thus, if we hold ourselves able to treat the entirety of it on such a model and on such an analogy, we should surely be talking without rhyme or reason if we did not attempt to assign in some tolerably definite sense the limits or principles of its self-alteration, so as to have some conception what sort of thing is likely to maintain supremacy as its primary character. It is nothing relevant to

¹ To use the novel phrase which Lord Haldane has introduced with advantage.

urge that in fact and in our expectation it contains within it certain developments. The decisive question must surely be whether it is altering as a thing within it does when it "runs a course," when it follows, that is, some narrow track or fibre of the universal life, variously conditioned by the remainder, ceasing to be what it was and becoming what it was not; or whether we are rather forced to conceive the whole as a unity which in its infinite life, without narrowing itself to a single line of advance selected from among all the characters of which its life is capable, rather reveals itself through infinitely diversified resources as in all directions an inexhaustible fountain of values. The point is, it seems to us, that its evolution and self-revelation need not proceed by any one of what are called progresses or advances, which involve moving away from its own nature, and diminishing itself on one side as it intensifies itself at another. That is the growing of a finite creature. An infinite whole, it seems to us, must live out alike to all its sides and aspects, must expand into and live itself out in all values, but constrict itself into a history in respect of none.

(β) Let us resurvey from the standpoint we have now reached the actual ideas which are offered us as expressions of an ultimate reality which has time and change at its inmost heart.

I will begin with a cry of hope and aspiration from a quarter where not everyone is aware that it could be found. "Strive upwards to the sun, my friends, that the salvation of humanity may soon be ripe! What matter for the hindering leaves

and branches! Struggle through to the sun, and if you grow weary, never mind! You will sleep all the better!" This is Hegel, in 1795, at the age of twenty-five, writing to Schelling, and quoting from a well-known writer to utter his heartfelt faith and hope.¹ Identified in spirit with this lofty ardour, and confidence in human destiny, there was springing up at this epoch, over the old world and the new, a victorious humanism, about to find doctrinal utterance in its strictest anti-metaphysical form through the Positivism of Auguste Comte and his Religion of Humanity. Through wide-reaching influences of the nineteenth century, in many ways akin to this great conception, the interests of the human race and the destinies of the earth on which we live became the central object of philosophical thought, and connected themselves in principle with the repudiation of an other-worldliness which seemed, in its traditional shapes, to be a fraud upon the aspirations of mankind by offering them a shadow for the substance. Hear Croce's language when he is tracing the sources of his own views, which identify philosophy with the methodology of history²—"the opposition in which the idea supported by us is found to be against the ancient and widespread notion of philosophy as resolutrix of the mystery of the universe, as cognition of ultimate reality, as revelation of the noumenal world, taken as beyond the phenomenal world in which we pass our

¹ Hegel's "Briefe," p. 16, quoting Hippel's "Lebenslaufe nach aufsteigender Linie."

² "Teoria e Storia," pp. 137 ff.

ordinary life and in which our historical research is occupied. This at least we must say: that its origin [that of the ancient notion, etc.] is religious or mythological, and that it persisted even in the philosophers who most effectively directed thought *towards the human and the earthly as the exclusive reality*,¹ and initiated the new philosophy as a methodology of judgment or of historical cognition. It persisted in Kant, who admitted it as a limit of his criticism; it persisted in Hegel, who included his exquisite researches in logic and the philosophy of spirit in a sort of mythology of the idea." Then, he continues, positivism in the nineteenth century carried on this conflict with idealism (he is referring mainly to the last generation of thinkers in Italy); and his own idealism, while rectifying the errors of positivism, maintains on the whole the same conflict which it was waging, and with the same adversary—that is, with the idea of a transhuman world.

It is plain, surely,² that he identifies *any* object of metaphysic, conceived as an enquiry into ultimate reality, with the thing-in-itself in its vicious sense; and confuses, as any commonplace empiricist might, the universe of experience with the immediate concerns of the human species on the surface of our globe.³

In alliance with this point of view, we find the insistence on the perfectibility of man, and the pro-

¹ My italics. The words obviously express what Croce holds the *right* direction.

² E.g., *ibid.*, p. 141.

³ Croce, "Teoria e Storia," pp. 137-8.

nounced ethical standpoint—the endless progression—on which we commented above in him and in Gentile.¹

Now all round the horizon, what we have, wherever this meeting of extremes occurs, is in principle just the same. I quote Perry, the neo-realist: "The good is to be won *by the race and for the race; it lies in the future,*"² and can result only from prolonged and collective endeavour; and the power to achieve it lies in the progressive knowledge and control of nature."³ "[Neo-realism] shares the belief in the perfectibility of the world ('Meliorism') with the Pragmatism of James and the Instrumentalism of Dewey. In eliminating from religion all supernatural elements and identifying it with the hope of and the endeavour for a more glorious future for mankind, it presents the same marriage of Naturalism and Philanthropy which was characteristic already of Comte and Mill and the 'religion of Humanity.'"⁴ Everywhere, in fact, we have a popular movement as of the ethical societies. And this I take for an important symptom. Those who have had actively to do with institutions of this type know how simple and how attractive their attitude to life can be made to appear. You admit that there is duty and happiness, and a world to be made better, it is not necessary to decide how far—and, *voilà tout*. All can co-operate, all can sympathise, up to a certain point. And I call their frequency and the general

¹ Cf. *supra*, chaps. ii. and viii.

² My italics.

³ Perry in Hoernlé, "Neo-Realism and Religion," p. 163.

⁴ Hoernlé, *ibid.*

appeal of the moralistic attitude an important symptom of the onesidedness of the spirit it represents, because, as Professor Alexander's acute insight informs him,¹ it does not supply a really adequate solution of the problem. The passions for nature, or beauty, or morality, or truth "may be happiness enough in the lives of some and serve them in place of religion, but they are not the religious passion and only simulate it."¹ It seems to me quite plain that this verdict covers the whole of the neo-realistic and neo-idealistic pretension to a religious attitude, excepting, so far as we have seen that it recognises the special relevant experience and its speculative foundation, Professor Alexander's own. The point is that for the ethical attitude man's perfectibility is taken as realised in the unending series of events. This is an obvious contradiction, which no conception of endless approximation is able to remove.

The same fundamental character of popular philosophy in the refusal to face the ultimate paradox of the universe appears to me to disclose itself in the creative finalism of Professor Watts Cunningham,² and to betray its dangerous attractiveness in the influence it appears to have exercised even on Lord Haldane's attitude. In Professor Watts Cunningham this is the more significant that his criticism of Bergson's creative evolution³ in comparison with the genuine principle of Hegel's notion seems adequate by itself, and is in

¹ "Space, etc.," II. 407, n.

² "The Philosophy of Bergson" (Longmans, 1916).

³ *Ibid.*, chaps. iii. and iv.

harmony with the views developed above in our chapter " $7 + 5 = 12$." His further ascription to the universe and to ultimate reality of a movement and self-alteration for which the type and evidence are drawn from the development of finite creatures and sets of creatures within the whole¹ seems to be of the same character and to reveal the same onesided modernity which we have noted throughout in our survey of to-day's philosophy. It does not seem to take seriously the idea of the infinite whole, or to recognise any obligation to distinguish a partial construction of thought within it² from a recognition of a change or movement, in which it, the whole of what is, should move away from its foundational nature and become other than it was. To my thinking—prejudiced in my own favour, no doubt, but I hope sincere—the argument which I have advanced elsewhere on the nature and conditions of teleology has not been answered, has not indeed been seriously noticed.³ It is closely connected with his criticism which Lord Haldane has to some extent adopted, of what has come to be known by the name of the "coherence theory."⁴ But if we start from this latter, as those do, I presume, who accept it, not as a criterion adopted by arbitrary preference for use in logical discussion, but as a simple and necessary corollary from our conception of experience and of the universe when

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

² Cf. Bradley, "Appearance," p. 499.

³ "Principle," chaps iv. and x., Appendix I, 3.

⁴ Cf. Lord Haldane's "Reign of Relativity," chap. xiv.

seriously taken, we should not, I think, accept the conceivability of an end immanent in a finite creature, unstimulated and unsupported by the nature which it shares and the contacts which it endures with the entirety of what is. There is no creature that is not partly modelled by the whole ; there is none that in partly modelling itself does not give effect to the operation of the whole within it. If one compares a serious discussion of the relation of coherence and comprehensiveness to experience as a whole,¹ with such a criticism as is cited by Lord Haldane from Professor Watts Cunningham,² it seems tolerably evident that the principle has not in the latter been considered in its total nature as an expression of the unity of things. To us it seems clear that the teleological character of thought or consciousness is simply a sub-case of its nisus to the whole. But an end which is not a response of a nature inspired by the whole and working out its adjustment to it is, I believe, a contradiction in terms, and a novelty, which is not a revelation of the synthetic character of the whole, is both a superfluous and a self-contradictory conception.

Let us now return to the sentence we quoted from Hegel,³ and compare it with the neo-realist and neo-idealist doctrines of progress, perfectibility, and meliorism. "Strive upwards to the sun, my friends, that the salvation of humanity may soon be ripe." The mood and attitude are plainly the

¹ *E.g.*, Bradley, "Essays," pp. 210 ff.

² "Reign of Relativity," p. 318.

³ P. 183, *supra*.

same as in those. It is the cry of any enthusiastic youth, viewing the world from the standpoint of a definite partial evolution or revolution. Of course the world is full of such advances, and of retrogressions and deviations, inherent in the very pulse of the advance. What we know is that in these courses and careers we have a world of values revealed. The histories which are within the universe bring an eternal world into our experience.¹ But are we to conclude from this that the universe, the whole which is the entirety and foundation within which all these partial constructions are revealed to thought, itself is occupied in the passage and a course in which its whole nature passes, say, from worse to better, from disvalue to value?² Surely this would be a complete confusion of distinct "systems of reference." "Shutting yourself up in the region of practice, will you insist on applying its standards to the universe?"³ It is all the more instructive to see that for Hegel, as a student of reality, time could not be ultimately real, when we note how naturally and how passionately the cry for a welfare to be achieved in the future by our own right arm springs from him as from all of us. And the cry is just and right. No one ever denied that there is a world of practice. But if we are to be either moderately reasonable or to attach any weight to religion, we

¹ Cf. Bradley, "Essays," pp. 468-9.

² "From chaos to order," as Croce typically says see above, p. 54.

³ Bradley, "Appearance," p. 500.

base our assurance, our perfectibility, or our meliorism on what we hold to be irrefragably revealed to us by the universe. If the basis of the universe were changeable, the basis of our argument, whatever it might be, would vanish with the stability of the whole.

What of those who hold a fundamental uncertainty essential to the active and practical mood?¹ Is it true of them, as we said above, that, considering their attitude from a standpoint which is made clear, and in which issues are really relevant to each other, they do not really hold such a belief? This would appear, we said, if the issues were stated with serious precision, and so as to be relevant. There is nothing relevant to affirming that the universe as such progresses, in pointing to the French Revolution or the Italian Risorgimento, or to my moral endeavour in an act of will. It is nothing relevant in this connection to say that the universe is an endless dialectic of the spirit,² or that it is composed of space-time, of motion. If we read Professor Alexander's account

¹ I hardly think this true of Professor Alexander. I shall remark on his view below. It is on the whole, I suppose, true of James. Yet cf. "Talks to Teachers," pp. 299 ff.: "The solid meaning of life is always the same eternal thing. . . . In this solid and tridimensional sense, so to call it, those philosophers are right who contend that the world is a standing thing, with no real progress, no real history. The changing conditions of history touch only the surface of the show." Is this so far from saying they are appearances? We do *not* say "mere appearances." "On my view there is not, and cannot be, any such thing as a *mere* appearance" (Bradley, "Essays," p. 272).

² A "storia ideale eterna," see p. 160, *supra*.

of the Categories as the fundamental properties of space-time, we shall see that the universe for him, in its aspect of temporal passage, is not at all departing from its eternal nature.¹ We must remember that if in it any antecedent were different some consequent would be different.² The universe is all that exists, and the question, strictly stated, is whether we can attach any significance to saying that this totality goes fundamentally—I do not say in every detail—from its character and assumes another. Its nature reveals itself in changes, partial and correlated ; but there is nothing to justify a suggestion that the whole changes its nature. But perhaps Professor Watts Cunningham would say its nature is to change. We may appeal here to his own argument : Change without identity is self-contradictory. Change with identity, such as to be the necessary basis of moral action, is a determinate character, and one who affirms it denies that reality is undetermined, except for our ignorance. This, however, once more is nothing relevant. No one, unless it were Parmenides, has denied, so far as I know, that the universe is full of change, and that its changes reveal its nature.

Plato, for instance, was concerned not to deny that the heavenly bodies move, but to ascertain the true laws which express the real facts of their apparent motions.³ The whole can be said

¹ "Space," etc., I. 189.

² *Ibid.*, II. 330.

³ Burnet, "Greek Philosophy". From "Plato to Thales," pp. 226, 348.

to change only if it departs from its unity of character and value. But no one, so far as our survey has shown us, appears content to abandon the fundamental conviction that the whole of what exists cannot move away from its fundamental characters—say its categories—and values.¹

For Professor Alexander, it is true, the deity issues from the universe rather than the universe from the deity. *The* coherence, which is to be the good of the universe, is determined in the end² by the struggles of human beings. But surely this “in the end” stands to his philosophy as Hegel’s aspiration to a future human welfare stands to his. It suggests a future critical point and a decision of what, previously was uncertain. But for Professor Alexander, of all thinkers, there can be no “in the end.” There is no “end,” no critical and decisive epoch at which a movement is wound up, determining one way or another a character of the universe which was undecided before. The universe simply works itself out, in part through the agency of finite minds. If we study Professor Alexander’s teaching on the non-existence and the not coming into existence of the totality of all that exists, the infinite becoming,³ or on the unity of the universe as the body of God,⁴ we shall at least be brought to see the seriousness and reality of the distinction between the temporality and

¹ On genetic theories of logic, see my “Logic” (2 ed.), II., chap. vii.; cf. in “Reign of Relativity,” pp. 194 ff. and 398.

² “Space, etc.,” II., 400.

³ *Ibid.*, I., 337 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II., 366.

progress of any piece of existence, and the temporality and progress of the whole within which all progress and existence have their being. So far as I can see, the progressiveness of the whole as such might be disputed from the modern standpoint on the sole and single ground that there can be no system of reference from which it can be judged, no intellectual as no physical *ποῦ στῶ*. Perhaps the nearest approach to a serious belief in a wholly indeterminate career of the universe is in Bergson's "Creative Evolution," on which Watts Cunningham's criticism seems to me to be successful. The question is, for me, whether the same criticism does not apply to every view for which the universe is in ultimate change.

It is impossible for me to deal at the length it deserves with Lord Haldane's thorough and comprehensive revaluation of what has been called idealism, and his effort, in a high degree successful, to establish its essential significance on a plain and stable foundation. But it would be improper, I think, to leave it unmentioned; and I must try to indicate, however inadequately, the direction in which, over and above its solid and unmistakable achievements, it has appeared to me in some degree open to observations comparable with those which some other forms of contemporary thought have suggested.

As I understand, it is in the main an appeal to the great fact of thought, as an entirety which constitutes our universe and from which, as determining the standpoint and conditions under which all and every reality is felt, affirmed, or produced,

we cannot escape, and need not attempt to envisage an alien world. The contention that thought is foundational, that with its appropriate systems of reference it is everywhere, and makes possible the relative interpretations which not merely construe but construct reality, appears to me, in the ample and massive sense in which Lord Haldane develops it, to be irrefragable, and to be exceedingly necessary at the present day, when the pure productiveness of thought on the one hand, and its pure and absolute receptiveness on the other, are widely accepted contentions which obviously demand mediation.

Agreeing that in this respect—the principal respect—the argument of the work is substantial and has a special value to-day, I will remark, in the spirit of the survey I have been conducting, on an important passage which forms the conclusion of the chapter called “An American Criticism of Bergson,” and will compare it with other arguments in the work.

The passage refers to¹ “that conclusion [the author’s] which treats reality itself, as well as our knowledge, as disclosing itself at a variety of levels which form intelligible stages in the logical process of its self-development: and,” it continues, “may not truth lie rather in consistency in this development of the continuity of the logical progress from each level to the larger level beyond it, than in the attainment of a goal² which thought itself cannot define, and which must remain for ever an ideal that cannot be realised? If so, it is the striving that contains the truth, the truth of quality. And

¹ P. 327.

² I take it, Mr. Bradley’s absolute.

the ultimate reality is just what is expressed in the truth of this striving. It is in the world of ends that we must seek our standards. Was Hegel then far wrong when he declared that within the range of our finiteness we could never see or experience that the end had been really secured, but that the consummation of the infinite end lay in the removal of the illusion which made it seem unaccomplished, an illusion which our finiteness has created? If this be the case, then, that there should be progressive supersession of error is essential to what is no static attitude, but a dynamic progress."

I will very briefly suggest three points in connection with this passage.

(1) Knowledge seems to me to be appealed to, as in some degree throughout the book, rather as a massive fact than in its characteristic affirmation and aspiration. It is there, and in a sense is our all. But if you ask: "What does it tell us; what does it claim and demand?" I miss the direct answer. Indirectly, however, at least, as we should expect from the author's proved philosophical acumen, we get it plainly enough. Knowledge tells us of transcendence¹ and it claims to qualify reality. When we omit to consider this, we speak no longer of knowledge but of psychical fact. Now if we look at other phases of Lord Haldane's argument we find him, of course, quite alive to this necessity. "If we would see God we must be capable of ceasing to be as merely men."² "Time

¹ Transcendence of immediacy, not of experience,

² *Op cit.*, pp. 194 ff, 311

is included by mind, not mind by time" [shortened]. "Universal and particular, thought and feeling, mind as distinguished from nature, are phases in a whole which in its self-completion is beyond the order of time, and is spiritual in its inmost character." I must not multiply quotations; the recognition may be taken for granted in such a writer.

When we take knowledge in its essence and spirit, then, we take it no doubt as a striving, but a striving which cannot be experienced or understood apart from the affirmation of a completed whole. Call knowledge what you please; but you can call it nothing intelligibly unless you begin by calling it a judgment. It is not itself as it occurs in finite thinking. It is only itself as it is endowed and invested with the reality and relations of things. No doctrine of thought can dispense with its self-transcendence; everyone knows that his process of thinking is not where we look for essential knowledge. Call it the Absolute, the Real, the Universe, the ideal of completed thought—what you please. It makes no difference. You cannot possibly found a system on knowledge if you omit to imply its transcendent completion. Take away this implication, and it is a dead psychical mass. Therefore I see no weight in the arguments against the Absolute. For me they rank with Croce's and Gentile's repudiation of the Universe as thought (*pensato*) in favour of thinking (*pensiero pensante*). It is, as I see it, simply a loss of vital connection.

(2) "In short, thought must be said to have its

habitat primarily in the objective order, and only secondarily in the individual."¹ This is a quotation from Professor Watts Cunningham, with which Lord Haldane reinforces his position. I cannot think that Professor Watts Cunningham appreciates his own attitude rightly. He considers himself an intellectualist, and argues in favour of the reality of time from the characteristics of finite individual consciousness. But we who have learned from Hegel and from the Greeks, do not consider ourselves intellectualists; and arguments for time drawn from the teleological character of finite consciousnesses leave us cold. I believe in my own mind that the radical misapprehension of English idealism which appears to me to prevail in recent American writers is largely due to Royce, who, using such a phrase as a *totum simul*, passed on a total misconception to James, and James, I think, to current American thought.² In fact, for example, the passage here cited might well be a shortened version of a well-known place in Green,³ and expresses his fundamental contention. To regard discursive thought, even the best, as instanced in philosophy, as *the* thought which was one with reality, was for him Hegel's one fundamental error. Thought for him meant no subjective activity, but precisely the objective order of things.⁴ "We shall never get a true idealism established," Green here says in effect, "until it is made more

¹ "Reign of Relativity," p. 321.

² E.g., all the "tender and tough" distinctions; see *supra*, p. 102 note.

³ Proleg. to "Ethics," Sect. 47.

⁴ Green, "Works," III. 142 ff.

clear that the nature of that thought, which Hegel declares to be the reality of things, is to be ascertained, if at all, from analysis of the objective world, not from reflection on those processes of our intelligence which really presuppose that world."

Thus, when we speak of knowledge as foundational, we mean not the aggregate mass of stand-points and judgments as it exists in the way of fact in thinking minds; but we mean that completeness or completion of experience, apart from the living demand for which the mass of knowledge becomes a mere dead weight, and which every genuine act of judgment affirms as the objective order of the universe, transcending in detail our finite intelligence yet in principle its only significance. Transcendence, it must be remembered, is the law of the world; and as there is a sense in which every conclusion contradicts its premisses, so there is a sense in which thought's own inherent demand can only be fulfilled beyond it. Repudiate the Absolute as much as we please, we can never actually embody in finite experience the thought which is the objective order and reality of things. Grant, for argument's sake, that Mr. Bradley has not expressed it right; what must inevitably be wrong is not to attempt to express it at all. Yet to this reality there is no other pathway than that which thought itself prescribes, and realises in proportion to its completeness.

(3) The world of ends, then, falls within the world of objective thought. An end is a partial conception involving responses and counter-

responses within a systematic whole. Our ends are as often wrong as our judgments or our æsthetic valuations—the latter, it should be noted, are nearest to reality of all our current experiences, and have nothing to do with ends. The progressive character of reality as exhibited in striving within the finite process is an aspect necessary to finite being ; but as a mode of reconciling attainment and non-attainment, it is precisely and essentially the illusion to which Hegel refers—the illusion by which the finite spirit's grasp upon perfection is taken to lie in a perfectibility to be realised within the series of events, which is thus the essence of non-attainment. And the removal of the illusion, of which Hegel speaks, is just the direct assurance of a unity in which the finite spirit is at peace, and raised above the moralistic contradiction, in faith by the religious attitude and in speculation by philosophy.

This I believe to be the conflict of principle which most profoundly divides the thinking world to-day : on the one side the temper of the ethical movement, the Italian neo-idealism, the humanistic and neo-realist currents of life with all that are akin to them ; on the other side all speculative philosophy which penetrates and apprehends the unity which is grasped by faith, and which, while recognising the series of events as the vehicle of revelation, is aware that the concrete perfection which the finite spirit essentially needs to lay hold of cannot appear in its full nature within the succession of temporal events. The holding together the elements of this supreme paradox, the

realisation of the real because it is the only reality, is, as I believe, the supreme crux and test of a philosophy. Time is as real as the finite ; but the infinite whole, as our authors seem plainly to show us, is beyond it. The concluding chapter will attempt to exhibit their union in the actualities which normal life maintains and affirms.

CHAPTER X

A COMPARISON AND A CONCLUSION

WE saw that it is a helpful modern method of evaluating an ontological contention to estimate and appreciate carefully and in the concrete the characteristic emotion and behaviour which utter and express it in the world of conduct and response. We learn in this way its comprehensive orientation, and can note how it agrees and differs in influence and total direction from a principle which is ontologically different. This, which is itself a mode of enquiry predominant in many fields where abstract ontology was once the guide of research, I mean to appeal to in this concluding chapter in order to procure a concrete and penetrating impression of the two antagonistic attitudes to time and change in the universe in which we have found so many philosophical traditions to array themselves for conflict. It does not appear to me to be generally seen either how little the two time-views, reasonably construed, would differ in outward appearance or, so to speak, in current practice, or how profoundly their ultimate difference must affect the very roots of life and will, and expand its influence over the whole of expectation and aspiration ; how equally acceptable to normal anticipation would be the view which has

the very far higher ontological value. We have seen that in the apparently technical question of the ultimate reality of time, the ultimate changeability or progressiveness of the universe as such, the modern meeting of extremes is concentrating the whole conflict between the ethical and the religious attitudes to life. Each of them, we may say with probability *ab initio*, is incomplete in itself, and ultimately needs the other for its perfection. But there can be no doubt that each of them is a primary impulse and instinct of human nature, somehow inherent in its complex structure, and sustaining itself on some principle which unites the finite spirit with its world.

We saw that the assurance which takes the real universe to be ultimately progressive in time rests principally on the observation of finite consciousness, finite history, and finite time-systems. Finite consciousness, or something below it which we may call organic unity, has the inherent character of carrying within it adaptations to the demands of the ultimate system within which it lives. Finite history is the construction from a partial basis of the continuous and unique career of a given finite creature or group of creatures. Finite time-systems, as I understand, are beings which have no meaning, except as observed in reference to one another within the universe which they constitute.

And we have noted how narrowly and unreflectingly this character of progress is ascribed. For the most part,¹ as we have seen, the universe

¹ I make a decided exception for Professor Alexander.

drops out of sight, and the consciousness of ultimate change and progress is referred to some limited movement or aspiration in some fraction of the human species on the surface of our earth, or to some dialectic of discursive thought within the intelligence of a philosopher. Now I maintain indeed, and will not surrender the position,¹ that what thought ultimately reveals and expresses through its necessity can be nothing less than the nature of things. But it is quite another thing to say that the sequence of the ideas which appear in the discursive order of a finite mind's intellectual process, is actually itself, and in this abstract process, the ultimate concrete and total reality which is one with the real and the universe. The universe is a highly differentiated concrete; the finite course of thought is a partial and isolated abstract. Thought which is reality, we saw,² is the objective order of things, not a course of ideas in finite experience.

The ultimate reality, then, of which thought and knowledge inform us, is what experience in its ultimate and total coherence determining the pathway to reality, compels us to affirm. This is a wholly different thing from the actual process of inference and affirmation in its temporal succession, or from the activity of partial consciousnesses as adjusting themselves by means of an ideal dimension, which is one form of their effort towards totality, to the perfection which declares itself only in the whole.

¹ Contrast Alexander on "contradictions of thought"; see p. 176, *supra*.

² P. 198, *supra*.

I think that a reader who has followed my survey of the progressist doctrines which prevail to-day throughout the philosophical world, in all its camps and quarters, must surely have been startled by the extraordinarily restricted and arbitrary type of evolution with which the ultimate self-alteration of reality is identified by them. It really rests on what we call the world-movement of a certain epoch and complex of peoples, concentrated and represented in the spirit of humanistic positivism. Such philosophy has ceased, we might almost say, to speak about the universe or to be interested in it as a whole. Even those among its votaries who stand nominally in the idealistic succession care, as we have seen, rather for the massive and gigantic fact of thinking in its actual process and aggregate, than for the affirmed unity and ultimate totality without which its life has no centre or mainspring and amounts to nothing, but contradicts its own essence.

The working attitude of mind which attends upon this philosophical position—the doctrine of change as ultimate—is quite unmistakable, and most plainly coincides with that which comes naturally, as we saw in Hegel's case, to the normal enthusiast or philanthropist as he confronts the succession of events in which is the immediate theatre of his action and aspiration. It is the ethical attitude; the individualism of the natural man who, being finite, must necessarily, in every actual achievement, fall short of perfection, and whose progressive perfectibility, therefore, being looked for in actual attainment within the

series of events, must necessarily be a failure *ad infinitum*. We criticised and rejected the attempts of Croce, essentially the same with that of Professor Watts Cunningham, to set aside the obvious condemnation of the Kantian moral progress *ad infinitum*; and we saw that all intelligibility of the universe is here staked on a *de facto* sequence in the future of a partial and arbitrary type; a type, indeed, which is, for the reason just explained, self-contradictory.

The idea of progress which in the working out of such a principle comes to fill expectation and aspiration necessarily suggests something increasingly intensified in character while contracted in amplitude. The advance is to be that of a special race; it is to keep the line which has been begun, so as to surpass, and to absorb, and obliterate on its own ground and after its own kind¹ every value of the past. If progress is the fundamental character and rule, obviously this must be so. We think entirely of the future. Men do not, under the influence of such progressism, admit that some one or more climaxes of the finite may have been attained in the past, as an inexhaustible source of values has revealed, with all fulness possible to the finite, some several sides of itself, and may in future reveal others to infinity not competing with these; whereas something is lost in the narrowing brought by every mere progression and advance, as something—very much, if we please—is also won in each given

¹ I am taking Croce as my example. Note also the stress which has been laid on a future lengthening of human life.

and maintained direction. They do not recognise what seem to others the obvious indications that an infinite source of values is bursting forth on every side and in every direction; and that in all the advances in which the finite selects and continues this or that special career, something is being abandoned by the selective movement of finiteness which was essential to the total revelation. For such a fulness of revelation cannot conceivably be received in the constricted channel of a finite history. Are we really to suppose that the future of the human race is to surpass and absorb its beginnings in every specific side and development of value, so that we shall not add to Shakespeare and Sophocles something different in kind as one star differs from another star in glory, but shall proceed straight forward on a high road which will carry us away and beyond them, so that their place shall know them no more?¹ Yet, if we take it seriously, this standpoint is natural to the idea of humanistic progress *ad infinitum*, which merely enforces certain hasty postulates about what we call civilisation, happiness, culture, and never notes the warnings that such postulates are subject, if taken as ultimate criteria, to great and terrible reservations. If we will not hear Rousseau, Edward Carpenter, and William James, will we learn from tuberculosis and the great war? A revelation of spiritual meaning is another and a larger thing than an accumulation of advantages along the lines of humanism and philanthropy.

The protest against other-worldliness came,

¹ See p. 54, on Croce.

indeed, not too soon ; but to mistake this-worldliness for the superseding truth—and there can be no doubt that it has been so mistaken—is a disastrous confusion. “ Our minds and hearts are not bounded to one among the phenomena of this one among the bodies in the universe ; and to attempt to set this finite phenomenon before us as an object of worship¹ is an attempt to turn the history of religion backwards, and to close on us once more those Jewish fetters which Christian civilisation, after so many efforts, has burst through. If humanity is adorable, it is so only because it is *not* merely the last product of terrestrial development, but because the idea of the identity of God and man is the absolute truth, because finite rational mind (wherever it exist), is not *merely* such, but, in another sense than physical or animal nature, is the self-realisation of the spirit in which all moves and lives, and so is an organic whole in that unity.”²

If then we ask ourselves how our expectation and aspiration would appear in our lives, if, believing in the ultimate reality of time and change, we should embody our belief in reasonable and serious ideas, the greater part of these humanistic notions which are the meeting of extremes between so many philosophies would die away.

We should expect, certainly, that the temporal universe would run a course *ad infinitum*, because its cessation would appear unmeaning. Endeavouring to apprehend the significance of such an

¹ The reference is to Comtism in particular, but we have seen the connection with the total mood we are discussing.

² Bradley, “ Ethical Studies ”: “ Conclusion.”

expression as "all that is," we should not allow ourselves to be drawn into identifying this course with any of the limited histories of limited groups on a single planetary body; but we should find ourselves more in tune with the large and reverent considerations offered us by such a thinker as Professor Alexander (I am assuming *ad hoc* the standpoint of a believer in real time) and should phrase our aspirations for the future in terms of some great and splendid development for which the unity and kinship of the infinite universe should be a fitting foundation. We should not bring down the universal evolution to the level of movements of groups within terrestrial history. We should endeavour to learn from the whole of experience how human destinies can be exalted by conception in the light of thought, in terms of the ultimate necessities which it reveals as affecting whatever is to be perfect or complete.

We should accept the warning of a student who has learned of the Eastern mind. I venture to repeat a citation which I have used before.¹ "The high Renaissance pride and glow are apt to leave this bitter taste in the end. Absorption in man as the centre of the world and the hero of existence leads certainly to loss of that sanity and sweetness which an openness to the abiding presence of the non-human living world² around us infuses into life. It is not by that absorption that we shall find the full meaning or animating power of

¹ "Principle," p. 370; citation from Laurence Binyon.

² And I extend the principle to Meredith's sense of kinship with the spatio-temporal universe; cf. p. 166, *supra*.

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our Western faith that in man the divinity is revealed."

Our expectation and aspiration, then, as evinced in our hopes and our conduct, would be of an ampler and freer kind than those which connect a humanistic temper with the ultimate alterability of reality. They would be more of the type which I have indicated elsewhere,¹ and would principally turn on the revelation of the fullest meaning of things through the varied and *prima facie* contradictory experiences which the sequence of events would afford. We should not suppose ourselves to read off the lines of advance in the nature of the whole from successions empirically observed in the history of our planet. If our philosophy drove us, as we are assuming for the moment, to the postulate of an ultimately progressive reality, this conviction would be the root and source from which would spring our exploration of the possibilities open to such an advance and worthy of it, and we should not make our progressist enthusiasm and aspiration the ground for a philosophical conviction regarding the ultimate nature of what is.

If now we turn our eyes to a working expectation and aspiration consistent with the opposite view of ultimate reality—viz., the view that the foundational nature of all that is, while containing the infinite changes which are the revelation of its inexhaustible life, not confinable within a single direction or temporal career, is not itself and as such engaged in a progress and mutation—we shall

¹ "Value and Destiny," Lecture X.

find, I think, that nearly all the current argument directed against it on the ground of *prima facie* temporal actuality is unintelligent and beside the mark.

We should, to begin with, stand on the same primary ground with the temporalist view as regards the type of appearance which we should expect to continue for ever. The succession of finite phenomena is for us the necessary utterance of the infinite reality through finite spirits, and we should anticipate that this would continue as the normal routine of the universe. Comparing this conception with the second and higher version which we suggested as compatible with temporalism, we should not suppose that the two were empirically and externally distinguishable. We should not think that a superficial success of humanity was a proof of ultimate alteration in the real, nor that events which might appear to us to mean failure were a genuine metaphysical proof of a reality that did not go forward. We should submit ourselves to the universe and try to learn its lesson, being convinced that in all its bewildering diversity a fundamental unity—a simple energy and life—was revealing itself to us in the only way in which anything could be revealed to and through finite spirits. That the universe was full of histories would not seem to us in the least to suggest or to make plausible that the totality of what is could be in movement away from its foundational character, and in course of transmuting the whole essence of its values, which we take to be its realities.

In our working expectation and aspiration there would, however, I believe, be certain significant differences of tendency, though I should not put them on a level with philosophical demonstration. I should not hold it probable that the visible advance, due to the self-upbuilding of a self-conscious real, would be an advance mainly surpassing itself in recognisable directions and could be so without forfeiture. It might be, of course, that Greek art is destined to be included and surpassed in what is yet to come on its own ground and apart from a difference of kind ; but I should not anticipate it as a necessity. I should start from the idea of an infinite inexhaustible source, making known its perfections through finite media, and rather, so to speak, in rotation according as need and occasion might arise, than advancing wholly upon itself on lines defined *ab initio* ; indicating everywhere its abiding and underlying nature, but not passing in ultimate reality from nature to nature, so as at every point in its self-revelation to supersede and extinguish a previous being of itself.¹ I should take it as obvious that the whole cannot be manifested as a whole at any point throughout the finite sequence, and therefore, in a sense, it is true that the revelation of its character within this series can only exist—it is a tautology—in a succession *ad infinitum*. But then, on this ground, the appeal to the future must go. There can be no point in the future at which such a revelation can exist.

¹ It will not do to say with Croce that the past is absorbed in the present. If change is ultimate fact, the past is largely dropped out and gone. See Bradley, "Essays," p. 153.

And the difference of our emotion and response would nevertheless be profound and fundamental. It would lie in our absolute assurance that this succession in existence was only a succession because, so to speak, its finite character admitted, as essentially imperfect, of no other form in general and as a rule; but that behind it, as many of its features and our responses to them betray, there lies a total perfection, which to approach and apprehend through the finite and its essential nexus with the infinite is the very gordian knot or crux and touchstone for a man, for life, and for philosophy. And further, that in the world of everyday conduct, and reaction in experience, this perfection is augured and indicated by our finding everywhere throughout the successions of events, glimpses and pervading suggestions of values, unique and splendid, universally distributed and irrepressible, and in no way lending themselves to the conception of a greatness lying essentially in the future, and that future one which as such, and as being the mere vehicle and promise of the greater fruition which it is always foreboding, can never come into present existence.

This, I urge, would be the feeling and response towards the world of those who, like myself, are convinced that change is not the fundamental nature of ultimate reality. But so far, though we should be more attentive and sympathetic than are the humanitarian and progressive philanthropist and socio-political enthusiast, to the older and simpler indications of value¹—older forms of art, of simple

¹ It is only in a limited and indirect sense that we care most about the future. Any extension of knowledge, *e.g.*, is

living, of faith, courage, heroism, and to the earlier absence of many specific horrors and terrors of civilisation, and of its enormous dulness—there is nothing absolute to divide us from the humanitarians and those who say that the end is progress. There is a very noticeable difference of ethos and valuation, and more love for great outlooks, and for the whole rather than for the future. But the two tempers might be combined in some degree with each other and with the antagonistic philosophical beliefs which in principle dominate them. No one doubts the infinite sequence, or that finite spirits, here or anywhere, have got to do their best in the conditions which may befall them. The empirical attitudes we have described do not by themselves tell us with philosophical certainty what the truth about time may be ; whether there is or is not a principle of change at the very root of the all. But “tarry a little, there is something else.” We have seen how the very extremes of philosophy, in so far as it assumes the character of a philosophy of change, concentrate themselves round the moral point of view. The moral point of view is that in which man seeks his realisation in an endless process, and so perpetually feels the impulse to transcend his existing reality. “So we see that the moral point of view, which leaves man in a sphere with which he is not satisfied, cannot be final. This or that human being, this or that passing stage of culture, may remain in this

equally welcome ; it was future because *we* had it not before ; but it need not *refer* to the future. This, I think, is very important. We care for “the whole,” not for “the future” as such.

region of weariness, of false self-approval, and no less false self-contempt; but for the race as a whole, this is impossible. It has not done it, and while man is man it certainly never will do it."¹

The point, then, to which we are brought is this: that spatio-temporal existence must be a succession of events *ad infinitum* is common ground. Now thought furnishes us with an idea of self-realisation, completeness, perfection, and the succession of events *ad infinitum* is all the actual existence we have hope of possessing in which this idea of perfection could be realised. And we have just seen that there is a view of life from which the demand and this condition of its fulfilment can be brought together. This is the moral point of view, which translates perfection into perfectibility. Nothing perfect can appear in the series of events; but if we read perfectibility for perfection we may get a quasi-fulfilment by a compromise. You never get perfection, but you are always getting it. Nothing is or can be what it ought to be, but it is always going to be what it ought to be; and this is a demand which can be fulfilled in a series of facts. And thus, the moral point of view can, it would appear, be satisfied by a universe whose total reality is ultimately and actually a succession. On such a view we should take ourselves to live and have our being in the sheer march of events; we should always be getting on towards the impossible perfection; and we should gain no reality but the successive events.

¹ Bradley, "Ethical Studies," p. 279.

For us, on the other hand, there is another possibility. Let the series be the revelation, springing from an infinite and inexhaustible source, a series infinite because the source is inexhaustible, but finite because conditioned by finite spirits. Then we can pass from the moral point of view to the point of view of religion. Nothing is more easily caricatured than this—we have seen examples of such an attitude in James' treatment of the Absolute as something to lie back on, or Croce's or Gentile's as involving a something "transcendent," "outside" the series of events, and consequently prohibitive of progress. For us it is the living source of the series, a source with which we can identify ourselves by faith and will, and therefore can unite ourselves with its perfection, although not in factual existence transcending the temporal series. Then the world of realities into which we rise by faith and will, and which we find suggested everywhere in the spatio-temporal region, and are able in a measure to introduce there in so far as we live for true values—this is not in ultimate reality a universe of time and change. It does not move from its nature, but reveals it; and the moral point of view itself becomes another thing and loses its self-contradictoriness when its constant aspiration after an actual self-transcendence becomes the necessary consequence of a will, which is in principle and assurance identified with the supreme good in a stable universe, and is a form of its self-utterance.

It is plain, I think, that if the issues are stated thus, which is the only true and relevant

way to state them, the current caricatures of the views which subordinate time and change to the unity and eternity of the universe, with their question-begging epithets, are altogether beside the point when we raise those serious questions regarding time and change which really concern philosophy. If anyone asserts that he knows the universe to be ultimately in change and in time, he must face the question of the kind and degree of its unity, or conservation of values, and when he has given an account of this, it will be time enough to ask whether the change he affirms is a revelation of the unity he believes in, or a derogation from it. The problem, I repeat, is the central crux of philosophy; and that is why it seems natural, that just as the more superficial democratic gospel is to-day overspreading the world, being the popular advance-guard, we hope, of a persuasion deeper and more thoroughly spiritual, so the simple philosophy of absolute and ultimate progress in the real, an attractive evasion of the fundamental problem, is growingly influential in all philosophical quarters. It is, as I must believe, related to the true doctrine as was Hegel's youthful yearning to his mature vision of reality, and as, through rude primary aspirations after future peace and comfort and equality, there is dawning, we trust and are assured, a deeper democratic sense of spiritual oneness in the universe, as we find ourselves compelled, by a widening and deepening experience, to interpret and to value it.

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